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PART VIII.

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS.

47

July to September 1921.

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PART VIII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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July to September 1921.

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## Chapter II.—SYRIA AND ARABIA.

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART VIII.

CHAPTER I.—TURKEY.

[E 7570/143/44]

No. 1.

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 1828.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 1, 1921.*

THE French Ambassador came to the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to present a communication from M. Briand. The Greek Government having refused to accede to the suggestion made by the Powers that Greece should place herself in their hands, with a view to the suspension of hostilities in Asia Minor and the conclusion of peace with Turkey, M. Briand now proposed that a joint notification should be addressed to Athens, warning the Greeks of the dangers of the course they were pursuing, and throwing upon them the responsibility for the resumption of the war and the still further arrestation of the conclusion of peace in the East. M. Briand proposed, as a second step, that the facilities which had hitherto been given to Greek warships at Constantinople, and the use which Greece had been permitted to make of that place as a port of call and re-victualling, as well as the use which had been conceded to her of the Marmora, should, in accordance with strict neutrality, be withdrawn. Only by these means, M. Briand was convinced, could matters be brought to an early head and hostilities, even at the eleventh hour, prevented.

I replied that I did not feel able to entertain either proposal. The first was superfluous, because we had already told the Greeks, in the telegram which I had drafted in Paris and which had been approved by the three Powers, that, if the Greek Government preferred to decline our mediation, the exclusive responsibility would rest upon themselves. I did not, therefore, see any point in repeating the threat at the present moment, or stating again what was an obvious truism. It could have no effect either as a rebuke or as a menace. As regards the second suggestion, the advantages accorded to the Greeks had been recommended to us from Constantinople, where it could not be said that a very pro-Greek feeling prevailed, as entirely consistent with the strict neutrality which we, at any rate in this country, had pursued; and, as long as it was open to the Turks to obtain supplies of men, money and arms from Bolshevik Russia without fear of any interruption, it seemed to me a one-sided proposal to apply this particular form of coercion to the Greeks. In my view, the only safety lay in a continuation of the policy of strict impartiality to which the British Government, at least, had all along been faithful.

As regards the general situation, I acquainted the Ambassador with the information which we had lately received from our military experts, both in Constantinople and in Smyrna, which led us to form a more favourable view of the morale and equipment of the Greek army than we had previously been led to adopt; and I remarked that, if these accounts were true, it was not for a moment to be expected that the Greek army would decline to resume a conflict in which it appeared to expect an initial victory. In all probability, although what had happened at Ismid was an unfavourable omen, the Greeks might expect to obtain some such preliminary advantage. If they held

this view of their own chances, it was out of the question to expect them, because of any representations that we were inclined to make to them, to desist; although it seemed to me extremely likely that, once the initial success had been obtained, they would, of their own accord, appeal to our good offices.

The situation, I admitted, would not be rendered any easier by such a development, because the kind of terms that we had considered when I was in Paris might be more difficult to obtain from the Greeks if victorious than if they had not fought at all. On the other hand, should the issue turn the other way and the Turks be victorious in the impending struggle, we should find them also more difficult to deal with than they might be before the fighting recommenced.

The prospect, therefore, was not, in my judgment, very encouraging either way; but, however that might be, it seemed to me a useless expedient to attempt to intervene at the present stage, and I could only hope that, before long, whatever the result of the impending hostilities might be, a more favourable opportunity might occur.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7710/143/44]

No. 2.

*Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 275.)

My Lord,

*Athens, June 25, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the Greek Government's reply to the Allied proposals regarding the cessation of hostilities.

(Copy sent to Constantinople.)

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 2.

*Note from the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

Le Gouvernement royal hellénique a pris en très sérieuse considération la proposition que les Puissances alliées ont bien voulu lui faire, et a l'honneur d'exprimer ses plus vifs remerciements de l'offre de leurs bons offices, en vue d'éviter le renouvellement des hostilités dans le Proche-Orient et d'assurer une paix honorable et durable.

Le Gouvernement royal apprécie hautement les sentiments d'humanité, conjoints au désir d'arriver dans un bref délai à la pacification, qui ont inspiré ses grands Alliés, dans leur démarche, et que le Gouvernement royal partage dans la plus large mesure.

D'ailleurs, la similitude des sentiments dont la Grèce est animée avec ceux de ses Alliés découle nécessairement de la communauté de vues, qui ont prévalu alors qu'on combattait en commun et qui sont applicables à la situation actuelle. Cette situation n'est pas un résultat accidentel d'un conflit isolé, mais bien la continuation du conflit mondial que la grande guerre a définitivement jugé partout ailleurs en laissant pendantes seulement dans le Proche-Orient les sanctions spécifiées et déterminées par un traité signé par toutes les Puissances alliées d'un côté et les Turcs de l'autre.

En défendant les aspirations séculaires de l'hellénisme et les droits que lui a reconnus le Traité de Sévres, en compensation de ses sacrifices pendant la guerre, la Grèce a la conviction qu'elle défend à la fois les intérêts du monde civilisé dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée et les détroits. Et pénétrée de l'importance de sa double mission, elle est arrivée par une extrême tension de ses forces morales et matérielles à être sur le point d'imposer les décisions communes des Alliés, qui ont motivé préventivement son occupation en Asie Mineure et qui ne sont, en ce qui concerne les charges imposées à la Grèce, que l'émanation de la solidarité née de l'alliance, solidarité dont le traité a été une solennelle expression.

Cette conception de ses devoirs a amené la Grèce à souscrire à tous les sacrifices qu'on lui a demandés, jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, et à accepter d'entreprendre

par ses propres moyens, après la conclusion, une guerre nouvelle contre les Turcs qui essaient par des procédés diamétralement opposés à la bonne foi et aux obligations internationales de se soustraire à l'application du traité.

En s'adonnant tout entière et avec foi aux préparatifs et à l'action que les nécessités militaires lui imposaient, la Grèce se voit en face d'une situation dans laquelle seuls les intérêts militaires sont les guides de sa conduite et de ses décisions.

Pour ces raisons impérieuses, malgré son ardent désir de se conformer aux conseils de ses grands Alliés, le Gouvernement royal hellénique est dans l'impossibilité d'y accéder: car tout ajournement des opérations au delà de la limite indiquée par les chefs de l'armée, compromettra, au préjudice de la Grèce, la situation militaire et encouragera l'adversaire à opposer à l'injonction des Puissances une nouvelle résistance. Il est donc évident que le mode de procédure proposé par les Alliés, qui entraînerait forcément la suspension des hostilités, est incompatible avec le but à atteindre.

Les sentiments d'amitié, dont les Puissances alliées sont animées à l'égard de la Grèce, sont une garantie pour le Gouvernement royal qu'elles voudront bien apprécier à leur juste valeur les considérations énoncées plus haut, et tenir compte d'autre part que la Grèce en continuant la lutte met entre leurs mains l'outil le plus efficace pour la réalisation de leur dessein de pacification du Proche-Orient. Car le seul espoir de voir la Turquie se soumettre aux suggestions des Puissances et respecter les droits sanctionnés par leur signature et les intérêts qu'elles considéreront dignes de leur appui pour la sauvegarde de la paix en Orient, ne peut être fondé que sur l'influence exercée et à exercer par une action militaire.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement royal sera toujours prêt à écouter ses grands Alliés à n'importe quelle phase des opérations, et espère qu'ils voudront bien obtenir de la Turquie des propositions concrètes en vue de la réalisation des droits découlant des traités, et de la satisfaction des sacrifices subis par la Grèce et des intérêts que l'évolution des événements militaires et politiques rendra réalisables.

Le Gouvernement royal ne doute pas que les Alliés, dans ce rôle de médiateurs, voudront bien tenir compte de la mission des armées helléniques, qui, en se substituant aux forces alliées pour l'exécution d'une partie du programme commun, seront remplacées par toute la force morale de l'hellénisme quand elles déposeront les armes et lorsque le nouveau régime du Proche-Orient aura besoin d'appui et de sauvegarde. Et la Grèce saura tenir ce rôle avec honneur.

Car l'apparence de résistance que présentent les Turcs n'est due qu'aux cadres encore subsistant de l'ancien Empire ottoman et à l'inapplication des clauses de l'armistice relatives au désarmement. Mais le jour où les garanties stipulées seront rigoureusement appliquées et où l'expérience acquise imposera la prise de toutes les mesures que l'attitude des Turcs jusqu'ici a suffisamment indiquées, la Grèce montrera aisément la garde pour le maintien du nouveau statu quo en Orient.

*Athènes, le 12/25 juin 1921.*

[E 7932/143/44]

No. 3.

*Mr. Battigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 633.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 30, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry appointed to investigate atrocities committed on the Marmara Islands.

2. I am taking an early opportunity of discussing with the Allied High Commissioners the recommendations made by the Commission.

3. I am much indebted to Major-General G. McK. Franks, whose services were kindly placed at my disposal by General Harington, for the thorough and impartial manner in which he conducted this enquiry.

I have, &c.

FRANK BATTIGAN,

*Acting High Commissioner.*

Major-General Franks to Mr. Rattigan.

Sir,

June 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the report of the commission appointed to enquire into the atrocities committed in the islands of Marmara.

I have, &c

G. M. FRANKS, Major-General.

Report.

With the terms of reference received, the commission sailed at 1.30 P.M. on the 22nd June from Constantinople and arrived at Karabiga at 1.30 P.M. on the 22nd June.

The Greek harbour-master of Marmara, who had been arrested by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was also taken on board H.M.S. "Stuart."

2. On the morning of the 23rd June at Karabiga, the commission interviewed the refugees from Arablur, the two women who had been abducted from that village by brigands and who had since been sent back via Artaki, and inhabitants of Marmara who had been reported as having suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the Greek authorities.

The commission also interviewed the Mudir of Karabiga and certain inhabitants of the area who had various complaints to make against the Greek administration.

3. From the evidence received, the story of the events in question at Arablur and Marmara is briefly as follows:

At about 6 A.M. on the 10th June the village of Arablur was attacked by a combined force of brigands from Kapudagh and other places and by inhabitants from the Greek village of Afisia on the same island.

The villagers of Afisia appeared to have surrounded the village of Arablur, while a small party of seven brigands entered the village.

They collected the men into the mosque, robbed them and murdered two of them in the mosque. The blood marks are still existent on the floor. Three more men and two women were murdered in the village, and a considerable part of the village was burnt and pillaged.

4. Two women named Eminem Mehmed Oghlou and her daughter-in-law Tayibi, with the latter's baby, were carried off by the brigands together with seven men from the village in the direction of Afisia.

These women were informed that they would have to pay a ransom of £T. 2,000 for their release.

On the way to Afisia the seven men were murdered.

The women were then taken to Afisia and were here put on a caique and taken to a farm on the northern part of the island, and from thence to Karazak on the island of Marmara, where they were kept for two nights, and then taken to Afioni. From there the old woman was sent back by boat to Afisia, while the young woman with her child was taken on the 13th June across to the mainland at Vathi. She was eventually released, escorted to Artaki by land by a Greek man and woman, and sent back to Karabiga by the Greek authorities at Artaki.

She states that she was violated by the brigands.

5. The names of the brigand band were ascertained and are as follows:—

Yokou Takor Oghlou.

Nicket Oghlou Istrati of Afisia.

Sevdah Oghlou Istramos of Artaki.

Mali, or Heraki, a deserted soldier.

Yorgi of Pasha Liman.

Nicket Oghlou Istrati of Afisia was reported to have conducted the brigands and supplied them with necessary information for their purpose. This man until about a fortnight ago had been garde champêtre at Arablur, and had been dismissed by the villagers owing to incompetence and bad behaviour.

6. Events at Marmara appear to have been as follows:—

Upon learning of the fate of Arablur, the small Turkish population of Marmara became considerably perturbed. They had, in fact, been threatened with a similar

fate, and anticipated trouble, as a Greek brigand had been killed in that village about a

month ago. The harbour-master accordingly embarked in a caique at Marmara to report to the British authorities at Karabiga. He was fired on by order of the Mudir of Marmara, but escaped and reported himself to Lieutenant Cousens at Karabiga.

7. Eight Turkish residents at Marmara complained that they had been subjected to severe ill-treatment, amounting to torture, by the Greek harbour-master of Marmara, in order to extract information from them as to the reason for the harbour-master's flight.

The commission took the evidence of four of these men, on the arms of one of whom were still to be seen scars due to the cords with which he had been tied. They were sent to Afisia by the harbour-master for examination by a Greek officer who had now arrived on the scene, and were sent back by him to Marmara and released.

These men were confronted with the Greek harbour-master (John Pipis). They reiterated their accusations of ill-treatment, which he vigorously denied.

The commission have no doubt as to the truth of the statements made by the Turks.

8. The Greek harbour-master stated that he had been sent from Panderma to take up the duties of harbour-master at Marmara on the 10th June last. His duties were principally to see that no Turkish inhabitants left that island without passports. His appointment in writing was made by the Greek authorities at Panderma.

9. The evidence of Lieutenant Cousens was taken as to his experience of the events in the neighbourhood and the difficulties which had been placed in his way by the Greek authorities in the matter of the evacuation of the refugees.

A précis of his evidence is attached in the form of a letter.

10. Two boatmen who were examined confirmed the statement that they had been fired on at Pasha Liman and Vori when they were sent to evacuate refugees.

11. On the afternoon of the 23rd June the commission arrived at Panderma. Colonel Grivas, commanding the Greek troops in the area, was invited to come on board H.M.S. "Stuart," which he did.

Colonel Grivas stated that he had taken over command of the district in March last, that he had been given no written instructions defining the area under his administration, but that the verbal instructions taken over from his predecessor showed the area to include the islands of Marmara, Afisia and Pasha Liman.

The colonel expressed regret at the incidents which had occurred, but pointed out that brigandage had always been prevalent in the area, and stated that with the available troops at his disposal he was doing his best to cope with the situation and to arrest and punish the brigands implicated in the recent atrocities.

The commission saw no reason to doubt that he is in fact making dispositions for the arrest of the brigands.

12. On the morning of the 24th June the commission proceeded to Marmara, where they interrogated the mudir of that island. He admitted having fired on the Turkish harbour-master, and stated that he did so as he understood that he was starting for Karabiga to seek assistance from Turkish brigands in that area.

His statements as to the movements of the Greek brigands in their itinerary from Afisia were contradictory and unreliable.

He stated that a detachment of an officer and ten men of the Greek army arrived at Marmara on the 12th June, and that they had encountered the brigands of Afioni on the 13th June. When asked why they had not arrested the brigands he denied his former statement, and said that the only information he has as to the presence of the brigands on the island was from the inhabitants of Afioni, and was given to him after the brigands had left.

He denied all implication in the ill-treatment of the eight Turkish residents mentioned above, and put all the blame upon the Greek harbour-master.

He admitted that he had been appointed mudir by the Ottoman authorities two years ago, but that the administration of the islands had been in the hands of the Greek authorities for about eleven months.

No notification in writing was given by the Greek authorities when they took over the administration. He merely received verbal instructions from the Kaimakan of Artaki.

He stated that he dealt only with the civil administration, and that all military questions were dealt with by the harbour-master.

He appeared to the commission to be thoroughly unreliable and inefficient.

He was warned that he would be held personally responsible for the safety of the few remaining Turks on the island.

13. The commission then visited the village of Arablar, where a few of the Turkish inhabitants, who had temporarily returned from Karabiga, were found getting in their harvest.

The village was found to be largely burnt. One house had been wrecked by a bomb, by which one woman had been killed and one woman and child wounded.

Traces of bloodstains in the mosque, and were shown the spot where the seven men had been murdered and their bodies afterwards partially burnt. There were sufficient indications existing to confirm this statement. The bodies had been taken to the village and buried.

14. In the village of Afium the mukhtar was ordered to produce the rifles available in the village. These proved to be of a Russian pattern, and the ammunition corresponded exactly with the empty cartridge-cases picked up in the village of Arablar. Some of the rifles had been used recently and not all.

The mukhtar denied all knowledge of the details of the events at Arablar, and stated that he was ill in bed at the time, and that the atrocities were perpetrated by a band of brigands from Karabiga.

15. The commission were quite convinced of the truth of the statements made by the inhabitants of the village of Arablar that the villagers of Afium had taken a large part in the outrage.

The mukhtar was warned that he would be held personally responsible for any molestation of the villagers of Arablar, who were at present harvesting their crops.

16. As regards the question asked in No. 2 of the terms of reference, the commission have not discovered any earlier occurrences in the same or adjoining districts likely to produce feeling sufficient to account for the treatment of the Turkish villagers by their Christian neighbours.

17. As regards No. 3 of the terms of reference, the commission have found no evidence that Greek troops were in any way implicated in these outrages.

At the same time the commission have remarked that in all cases the Turkish villages have been disarmed while the Greek villagers are armed, thus leaving them entirely at the mercy of their Greek neighbours, whereas no steps appear to have been taken to safeguard their lives or property by the military authorities.

The commission consider the conduct of the Greek harbour-master of Marmara merits exemplary punishment for his abuse of authority and entirely illegal treatment of Turkish inhabitants.

They further consider that the suppression of personal liberty in the case of the Turkish inhabitants of the occupied area is carried to excess. An order issued by the Officer Commanding, Bagda, is attached.

18. As regards No. 4 of the terms of reference, the commission desire to make the following recommendations:—

Firstly.—That it should be strongly impressed on the Hellenic authorities that it is an important part of their duty to maintain internal order in the territory under their administration, and that the Turkish inhabitants are equally entitled to protection with the Greek inhabitants.

Secondly.—That it is essential that an effective civil administration should be introduced with a sufficient force of gendarmerie under Allied officers who are capable of maintaining the balance between the Greeks and Turks.

Thirdly.—That all villagers, Christian and Turkish alike, should be immediately disarmed.

Fourthly.—That, independently of the arrest and punishment of the individuals named, both as a measure of justice and as a preventive against similar cases in the future, a suitable fine should be levied upon the village of Afium as indemnification to the inhabitants of Arablar for the part taken by the inhabitants of Afium in the outrage and murder which took place at Arablar.

The commission, having considered to the best of their ability the extent of the damage and the ability of the villagers of Afium to pay, recommend that the amount of the fine should be £10,000, and that immediate steps should be taken to enforce the payment of the same.

G. M. FRANKS, Major-General (British member)  
GERBAUD (French member).  
DE MALSO (Italian member)

June 25, 1921.

## ANNEX I

Lieutenant Colonel to Major-General Franks.

Sir,

Karabiga, June 22, 1921

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on proceedings at the Marmara Islands on and since the 10th June:—

2. At Karabiga at 5 p.m. on the 10th June I received a report that the village of Arablar had that morning been attacked by a brigand (Savakli) and burnt, and that fifteen of the inhabitants had been killed.

At 10 p.m. on the same day the Turkish harbour-master of Marmara arrived and stated that the brigands had threatened to do the same to the Turks at Marmara. He also stated that whilst leaving to bring me this information he had been fired at by the Greeks of Marmara.

At 11 p.m. 100 refugees arrived and confirmed previous reports, also stating that two women had been abducted.

I immediately reported this to my officer commanding at Chanak.

3. At 8 a.m. on the 12th June H.M.S. "Stuart" arrived. Owing to constant petitions by the Turkish refugees it was decided to commence the immediate evacuation of the Turkish population of the Marmara Islands to Karabiga.

At 12.45 p.m. H.M.S. "Stuart," towing caïques, and the "Iuchouli" arrived at Arablar.

At 1 p.m. the caïques landed. The Turkish inhabitants offered resistance, but we landed without incident; we found more than half the village burnt, and that thirteen men and two women had been killed. The inhabitants demanded to be evacuated by us, which evacuation was immediately commenced.

The Greek lieutenant, Vasoulakis, arrived and was taken on board. He promised to assist in the evacuation of the Turks. However, later the same day he offered every obstruction to the evacuation.

The complete evacuation was completed by 8 p.m.

4. H.M.S. "Stuart" arrived Marmara at 8.40 p.m. It was found that all the Turks wished to be evacuated. The Greek mudir admitted having fired at the Turkish harbour-master on the 10th instant; also that by order of the Greek harbour-master eight Turks had been arrested and sent to Afium.

5. June 13.—Evacuation commenced and completed 1 p.m.

Greek mudir, on being interrogated by the captain of "Stuart," related he was under the thumb of the Greek harbour-master.

At 2 p.m. eight Turks arrested and sent to Afium returned.

6. June 14.—Evacuation of Afium commenced. At 11.30 a.m. H.M.S. "Iron Duke" and H.M.S. "Pegasus" arrived off Afium.

The Commander-in-chief in an interview with Lieutenant Vasoulakis gave him forty-eight hours to capture the brigands.

At Afium the mother of the abducted girl was discovered trying to collect £12,000 for her ransom.

H.M.S. "Stuart" left with H.M.S. "Iron Duke," and H.M.S. "Pegasus" remained to carry out the evacuation.

Evacuation was completed by 2 p.m. I then left in "Pegasus" for Lemnos, arriving at 3.30 p.m.

At 4 p.m. I received a report from the Greek harbour-master of Marmara that the Greek mudir, Vasoulakis, had been arrested by the British and sent to the prison at Chanak. I then proceeded to the prison at Chanak and found that the Greek mudir, Vasoulakis, had been arrested by the British and sent to the prison at Chanak. I then proceeded to the prison at Chanak and found that the Greek mudir, Vasoulakis, had been arrested by the British and sent to the prison at Chanak.

Proceeded Pasha Laman at 6 p.m. to superintend the evacuation previously ordered, but found Greek military had given orders to the contrary, and that caïques had been fired on at Pasha Laman and Vani.

At 7 p.m. evacuation completed.

8. June 16. Proceeded to Marmara and interviewed Greek officer commanding troops of Panderma, who placed blame for everything on to his major, left at Ataki; he also stated that he would punish Lieutenant Vassilakis.

Left Marmara noon for Ataki with Greek officer commanding, Panderma, and Lieutenant Vassilakis.

At 1.30 p.m. I was transferred to H.M.S. "Speedy" at Vari, who was evacuating Turks.

Owing to insufficient caiques being available, only three-quarters of the population were evacuated.

9 June 17.—Proceeded to Ismalia and released Greek Makda; proceeded to Karabigha for night.

10 June 18.—Completed evacuation of Vari. Visited Pasha Laman and found that Lieutenant Vassilakis, who was now officer commanding Ataki, had given orders that nobody was to enter or leave Pasha Laman—ostensibly in order to arrest Saylah.

Arrived Karabigha at 2.30 p.m., where I was ordered to remain owing to trouble in my own district.

I have, &c.

R. P. COLEMAN, Lieutenant

#### Annex 2

Officer Commanding Greek Troops, Bigha, to the Governor, Karabigha

(Telegraphic.)

All the people that have by any reason gone to the British area from the Greek area should return to their homes within ten days from date. Any man that does not at the end of said time his family is to be banished, his properties are to be burnt. Those who return will not be ill treated.

E 7942 1 44]

No. 4

Mr. Rathigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11)

(No. 1551.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 6, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 493 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the secret memorandum sent to me on the 4th July by Izzet Pasha.

2 The eagerness which Izzet Pasha has recently shown to promote contact between the British authorities and the Ankara Government, and the similarity between his memorandum and the verbal statement made to me the same day by Hamid Bey, give this document considerable importance.

As I have stated in my telegram under reference, Hamid Bey made no reference to the military clauses of the treaty, which are dealt with at length in Izzet Pasha's memorandum. The principal other discrepancy between the two documents is the desiderata of the Kemalists as to do with the Capitulations. Izzet Pasha's memorandum stipulates for the suppression of the economic Capitulations. Hamid Bey spoke of the suppression of the Capitulations as a whole, and in his conversation he laid great stress on the abuses to which the judicial Capitulations gave rise. He admitted that we British had not abused them, but he said that other Powers had used them in such a way as to make it impossible for Turks to obtain any sort of justice in cases against the nationals of those Powers.

4. Izzet Pasha's memorandum, though in many respects unacceptable, would be more reassuring if there were any reason to suppose that it was intended to serve as a basis for modification of the Treaty of Sevres, and indicated readiness on the part of the Kemalists to accept the stipulations of that treaty except in so far as it might be necessary to modify it in order to satisfy the desiderata formulated in the memorandum. Unfortunately, I fear it is certain that the Kemalists take as their starting point their own National Pact, and that the memorandum merely indicates the extent to which in their view the terms of the National Pact might be altered for the sake of a settlement with the Allies. If the questions of the territorial extension of Turkey and the Straits be put on one side, everything turns on the word "independence." Even the most moderate Kemalists undoubtedly aim at a degree of independence which would do

away with the Capitulations or any adequate substitute for them, would make any guarantees for the safety of the minorities illusory, and would pervert of the development of Turkey as a military Power. On the other hand, the Kemalists would bind themselves to an attenuated financial contribution to the Allies, and would pay a heavy rate for the time being. They would probably welcome an understanding with the Allies, and especially Great Britain, if only they could secure their desiderata as formulated by men like Izzet Pasha and Bekir Sami Bey. In internal affairs they would maintain Turkey as a constitutional monarchy, the sovereign of which would have little real power, but would retain the dignity of his two offices of Sultan and Caliph and the moral influence attaching to the latter.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATHIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Izzet Pasha to Mr. Rathigan.

L'EUROPE avait promis une Turquie indépendante capable de vivre dans ses limites ethnographiques, avec Constantinople comme capitale.

La réalisation pratique de cette promesse est subordonnée aux conditions énumérées ci-dessous, dans leurs généralités.

L'application de ces conditions fera disparaître la dualité qui existe en Turquie en ce qui concerne, au moins, pour effet immédiat de calmer, dans ce but, tous les éléments libéraux et patriotes du pays. Elle pourra seule assurer en Orient une paix durable.

Voici les conditions :

Attribution à la Turquie de l'Asie Mineure dans son intégralité, prenant en considération ses limites naturelles et sa majorité turque et kurde.

Constantinople a besoin pour garantir sa sécurité à l'ouest d'un hinterland et d'une ligne de défense naturelle pouvant lui permettre d'empêcher non seulement une invasion ennemie, mais aussi l'incursion des bandes dont l'action a troublé et dévasté depuis un siècle la péninsule balkanique.

Cette ligne naturelle est la ligne de la Mer Noire inférieure comprenant Andrinople, ville qui a, d'ailleurs, pour les Ottomans la plus grande importance au double point de vue historique et religieux.

Constantinople, capitale de l'Empire et siège du Khalifat, soit à l'abri de toute atteinte.

Les experts des deux parties pourraient arrêter les conditions nécessaires pour assurer cette sécurité.

Les dispositions du Traité de Sévres concernant la protection des minorités sont de nature à donner satisfaction à ces conditions. Dans leur esprit et dans leur lettre, ces dispositions placent la majorité sous la domination de la minorité.

Il faudrait donc adopter, pour les minorités en Turquie, les stipulations insérées dans les Traités de Saint Germain, de Neuilly ou de Trianon.

Suppression des Capitulations économiques. La Turquie doit avoir la faculté d'établir son budget. La Commission financière aura le droit de contrôler si les prévisions budgétaires vont à l'encontre des stipulations du traité en ce qui concerne le paiement de nos dettes.

Si toutes ces questions financières, dans leur ensemble, étaient étudiées par une commission composée d'éminents spécialistes de l'Europe qui ne seraient pas imbus de l'idée du régime capitulaire, il serait plus facile de les régler d'une manière juste et équitable.

Le budget de l'Etat ne permettant pas le recrutement par voie de volontariat, l'armée et la marine au moins de la gendarmerie doivent être, comme par le passé, soumises à la conscription. Augmentation judiciaire de l'effectif de l'armée en prenant en considération l'étendue des frontières ainsi que la conformation géographique et ethnographique du pays.

A l'ouest, la menace des Grecs, à l'est la propagande et les agissements des bolchevistes rendent la situation de la Turquie particulièrement délicate en ce qui concerne la limitation de ses forces armées.

Il serait de l'intérêt général de surseoir à cette limitation jusqu'au règlement de la question du désarmement général.

En échange, nous sommes disposés à prendre les engagements les plus formels vis-à-vis des Puissances mandataires de l'Arabie que nous ne poursuivrons aucun but égoïste dans leurs intérêts dans les pays limitrophes et que nous pourrions même leur assurer notre assistance morale et matérielle dans l'accomplissement de leurs missions, à condition pourtant que cette assistance n'aille pas à l'encontre des intérêts primordiaux de l'Islam et ne froisse pas l'amour propre des Arabes.

E 7992 60 44)

No. 5

Lord D'Abernon to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 12)

(No. 902)

My Lord,

Berlin, July 5, 1921.

I LEARN from a reliable source that the departure of Enver Pasha from Berlin, which was reported in my despatch No. 765 of the 26th May last, was partly, if not entirely due to a request conveyed to him by the German Government that he should leave German territory. My informant states that on the German Government becoming acquainted of the presence of Enver Pasha in Berlin an emissary was sent by Dr. Simons, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to request him to leave this country. Enver was very indignant and appealed to the right of asylum, but was informed that the German Government were determined to tolerate nothing which could be made to appear as if intrigues were being conducted on German territory against British interests; that they knew perfectly well that he, Enver Pasha, was in fact intriguing with German officers, and that he must therefore leave Germany of his own free will unless he wished to be expelled. Enver Pasha thereupon left, and is reported at present to be in Moscow.

Similar action has been taken in respect of other prominent Turks, who have all left Germany, including Nuri Bey, the envoy from Mustapha Kemal. Some of these Turks have, however, left of their own accord, as the result of the acquittal of the murderer of Talaat has been to make them fear for their own safety. Indeed the wife of Enver will shortly leave Berlin, if she has not already left, owing to the fact that she has discovered that an Armenian is living in the house adjacent to her own residence.

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs also despatched an emissary to Rome for the express purpose of warning the Turkish expert at the German Embassy there that he must keep clear of all intrigues with the Turks. This expert is apparently Dr. Diehl, who was formerly dragoman at the German Embassy in Constantinople. I am informed that Dr. Diehl has taken this advice to heart, and that there is no likelihood of any anti-British intrigue from this quarter.

My informant stated that, in his opinion and in the opinion of the German Government, the only policy for Germany was to keep clear of all complications of this nature, which could bring no useful result to this country, and to convince, by the absolute loyalty of their conduct, the British Government of their good intentions, and thus prepare the way for that which was coming to be considered as being the ultimate aim of Germany, namely, complete reconciliation and co-operation with Great Britain. My informant further stated that a mission was immediately despatched which had its headquarters in Kabul, where at the present time there was a mission of several Turkish officers headed by Djemal Pasha.

I have, &c  
D'ABERNON

E 8187/143/44)

No. 6

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 297.)

My Lord,

Athens, July 6, 1921.

With reference to my telegram No. 379 of to-day's date respecting the deplorable condition of refugees from Ismid I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a communication from the Vice-Consul at Volo respecting the refugees, mostly Greeks, who were killed there on the 24th ultimo.

As reported in my telegram under reference, I read extracts from the enclosed communication from the Vice-Consul at Volo, dated 1st and 5th July, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who promised to telegraph at once very strongly to the Minister of War at Smyrna on the subject.

I understand from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo that a storm of indignation has been raised in that town at the scandalous way in which the authorities have neglected to make any provision for the refugees. At least one case of small pox was discovered but on

I have, &c  
W. L. C. KNIGHT

Enclosure in No. 6.

Vice-consul Knight to Earl Curzon

N  
M

Volo, June 30, 1921.

I have the honor to report that the Canadian steamship "Belchers" arrived this morning from Ismid (Nicomedia) with 2,770 refugees, mostly Greeks, the remainder Armenians and Turks. More than a quarter of the total number were infants and young children, and nearly all appeared to be in a state of great misery and almost complete destitution, a few boxes of clothing and coverings being the most that any one family had been able to save or find room for on board. These unfortunate people were exposed for the whole day to the scorching rays of the sun, as well as the importunities of affluent householders in search of domestic slaves, this being the only active form of local charity known. The authorities, on their part, seem to have completely ignored the whole affair until the evening, when a representative of the prefect arrived by train from Larissa to make arrangements. To-day the pier, already becoming a menace to the public health, is slowly being cleared, and cart loads of wretched human beings, the more active following on foot, are now to be seen moving out of the town in various directions. A large additional number of refugees from the same locality have since arrived by a Greek boat.

According to the account given me by the master of the "Belchers," on the 27th instant the Greek troops in Ismid—the Kemalists being then only two hours distant from the town—warned the inhabitants, numbering about 45,000, that they had two and a half hours in which to evacuate their homes, as the town was going to be burned. For some time previously the soldiers had been driving into Ismid all the live-stock in the surrounding country, and for four days the shore was crowded with thousands of cattle, &c., which, exposed to the blazing sun and without food, were reduced to drinking sea-water, and dying, many of them, before the Greeks could ship them to Constantinople on boats brought for that purpose. Meanwhile, ten vessels, with the permission of the British authorities there, had arrived to take off the population, and in the confusion which followed many families were separated and put into different boats, none knowing whither they were bound. All are believed to have been conveyed to various parts of Greece, with the exception of those on board the one Turkish steamer, which is supposed to have returned to Constantinople. The Turks from the "Belchers," numbering over a hundred, assured me that they were given to understand they would be taken there, but, although the ship returned to Constantinople this morning, the master refused, no doubt rightly, to take them with him on the ground that it was most unlikely they would be allowed to land.

Before the "Belchers" left Ismid, the place had already been fired by the Greek troops, and as she sailed down the gulf one end of the town was observed to be blazing vigorously. The master had no doubt that, according to plan, its destruction would be complete a few hours later.

I have, &c  
W. L. C. KNIGHT

E 8217/1/44]

No. 7

*Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 653.)

My Lord,

(Constantinople, July 8, 1921.)

WITH reference to my despatch No. 542 of the 1st June and previous correspondence relative to the attitude of the Angora press towards Great Britain, I have the honour to transmit herewith a full translation of a motion submitted to the Grand National Assembly as published in the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" of the 14th June and a summary of an article which appeared in the "Yeni Gyun" the same day.

These publications show to what lengths the Angora press was allowed to go in abuse of Great Britain, even at a time of apparent *détente* in the official attitude of the Angora Government towards His Majesty's Government. It is true that the document as published by the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" is merely a motion signed by two persons recently released from Malta, but it was printed prominently on the front page of the paper, and the date of publication coincides with that of the principal telegram addressed to me by the present Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora, Yussuf Kemal Bey, regarding the release of the British prisoners (see my telegram No. 461 of the 25th June, 1921).

FRANK RATTIGAN

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7

*Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" of June 14, 1921.*

**A MOTION:—OUR COMPATRIOTS AT MALTA MUST BE LIBERATED.**

The British doctors who have purposely blinded 15,000 Turkish boys as well as the garrison commanders and officers must be condemned.

THE following is a copy which we have obtained of a motion ("takrir") concerning those detained at Malta, submitted to the Great National Assembly by Fâik and Hüseyin Boysa, Deputies of Adrianople, and referred after consideration to the Council of Commissioners ("Heyet-i Vekile").

"To the honourable Presidency of the Grand National Assembly,

"Following on the armistice which the Turkish nation, fully armed but desirous of obtaining peace in the name of suffering humanity, concluded with England on board the cruiser 'Agamemnon'—the England who, having set the world on fire, has thought of nothing but to gratify her insatiable appetite for the burning of homes and the shedding of blood—the British have spread themselves to the four corners of the country and, following a mean and insulting policy worthy of their history, ever-cruel and ever-destructive, have once again disgracefully deceived the manly Turk, who is incapable of villainy. Their first business in Turkey was to engage in a devilish pursuit, with burning torches in their hands, of the conscientious and honest children of our land, defenders of the altar ('mihrah') of Islam, after having previously disarmed them. Their conduct has always been that of the harlot and their works, like their history, always nothing but guile. At this time the Government at Constantinople consisted of British agents, who sought to satiate the appetite of the stomach and not of the conscience, and who wanted to have money in their pockets rather than honour—that Government handed over our Turkish boys to the English and transferred them to Malta.

"In all the history of the Turkish race, who have always been gentlemen, there is no such record of shame.

"We would remind your honourable Assembly how Yildirim Bayazid preferred to fall among the ruins of the mighty Ottoman Empire rather than hand over Ahmed Djelair and Kara Youssef to Tamarlane; how Abdul Mejd preferred war rather than hand over the Hungarian refugees to the terrible Romanof Cæars; how even Abdul Hamid, the faults of whose administration we are still striving to rectify, did not, in spite of the threat of war, hand over Mazhar Pasha and Shevket Bey to the British.

But let us add that these compatriots have been handed over to the British by the feeble personality of Constantinople, who is unworthy of the dynasty which has produced heroic Padishahs, and prefers that Turk should kill Turk, and Greek slavery and British chains to the independence of the Turkish nation.

"Some of these suffering ones who are groaning under British force in despotism in an island of nothing but jagged black rock in the middle of the Mediterranean, a thousand miles distant from the futherland, have by some means or other escaped to-day. But, if there is one accusation against the poor unfortunates there, it is that they love the Turkish fatherland and refuse to submit to British rule. What will happen to them? Just as the families of these miserable ones are to-day groaning in Anatolia and Constantinople under conditions of extreme want through inability to find bread, so they also there are in the same plight.

These men at one time administered the provinces and the armies of this Empire. If they are guilty, the Turkish nation has not transferred to England the power to try and to judge them or to let them live miserably under privations. This is a matter directly incumbent on the right of jurisdiction of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This magnanimous nation thinks of the families and of the present unnumbered sufferings of these men who are in the hands of that tyrannical nation, whose like for the invention of instruments of oppression God has never created. We therefore submit to your honourable High Assembly, which is the personification of virtue and patriotism, that the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey should take urgent and definite steps for their immediate liberation, and we propose that the British prisoners in Anatolia, like Ralston, be returned. We likewise propose the punishment of the British doctors, commandants and officers of the garrisons in Egypt who, by premeditated action, blinded 15,000 sons of Turkey by plunging them, under the pretext of disinfection, into baths of over strong crescol."

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

*Extract from the "Yeni Gyun" of June 14, 1921.*

SUMMARY

*In the British Prison Houses in Constantinople. Under British oppression in the British Prison Houses at Mouda and Hostonji.*

THE "Yeni Gyun," after referring to the innumerable atrocities committed by the British against Moslems and Turks since the armistice, and particularly since the occupation of Constantinople, and to the many acts of oppression from which Turks and Moslems have suffered, goes on to publish the first instalment of statements made by an unnamed Turkish officer, with the rank of captain in the Turkish army, who, after encountering many difficulties, succeeded in escaping from the British to Anatolia where at the time of writing he was on active service with the Nationalist army.

This officer stated that he had been arrested by the British in September 1920 on a charge of having relations with the Nationalists and of being involved in arms traffic. He was confined in the detention house at Mouda, where he had to live in filth and where he was subjected to all manner of insults and sufferings at the hands of the British troops who had charge of him. In the end he was brought before the British 2nd Divisional Court Martial held at the Army Medical School at Haidar Pasha, and sentenced to six months' hard labour.

After his trial he was again confined in the Mouda prison house. He then goes on to describe in detail the systematic persecution from which he suffered, even in his uniform, at the hands of the British officers and men, with the full approval of the director of the prison, Captain Baker, because of his refusal to empty buckets of refuse into the sea. At last he was unable to stand the beatings and kickings any longer and fell ill about the end of October 1920, when he was transferred to the hospital at Haidar Pasha. There, in spite of the utmost attention by the doctors, his health did not improve. He was still very weak, he was discharged and again returned to Mouda, where Captain Baker told him that he was to be sent to Hostonji. He was then removed to Hostonji under guard of an N.C.O. and two men.

After describing the Bostanj prison in detail, the officer states that on arrival he was registered under the number 568. He was obliged to change his clothes, which were replaced by filthy ones, and he was forced to wear round his neck a chain bearing his identification number. He then goes on to describe the terrible condition of his fellow-prisoners, and continues on the same lines regarding the severe oppression from which he suffered in his second prison.

E 8222 1/44]

No. 9

Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)

My Lord,  
Constantinople, July 11, 1921.  
With reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 24th instant, 1921, and previous correspondence relative to the hoisting of the Afghan flag at the New Afghan Embassy in Angora, I have the honour to state that the Angora paper "Hakimiet-i-Akram" of the 21st, published an account of the ceremonial hoisting of the Afghan flag over the new Afghan Embassy or Legation there. The flag was hoisted by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. I enclose free translations of the speeches exchanged at the ceremony.

2. Your Lordship will observe that, while strongly Islamic in tone, each speech refers to Soviet Russia as a member in a definite triple alliance, and that on the other hand there is no specific reference to any other Asiatic State. The whole performance is of interest in its bearing on the negotiations between Afghanistan and Great Britain on the one hand and Russia and Afghanistan on the other, which, I gather from printed correspondence had reached a critical stage at the time when the ceremony in Angora took place. Communications between Kabul and Angora are presumably so slow as to deprive the synchronising of the Angora ceremony with any particular statement of special importance but it would nevertheless appear that His Majesty's Government should be somewhat slow to believe in any real willingness on the part of the Amir and his Government to break with either Moscow or Angora. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's Ministers at Tehran and to the Viceroy of India.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 8

Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Akram"

(Free Translation, slightly condensed, of speeches exchanged at the Ceremony of Hoisting the Afghan Flag at the New Afghan Embassy in Angora on June 10, 1921.)

(1.)

Afghan Ambassador's Speech

I THANK all who attend this ceremony. The Afghan nation, which has at last achieved its wish and sent an official mission to the Turkish nation, always its guide and leader, has shown its love for the Turkish nation. This mission is happy to find itself among you as representative of 10,000,000 Afghans. Our religious ties are confirmed by the establishment of official relations, and the treaty between the two nations gives a great hope for the salvation of the Islamic world. The Imperialists of the West have stopped at no oppression of the Eastern or the Moslem world, and they have striven with all their might for the destruction of Moslems. Please God they will not attain their object of overrunning the Eastern world. The alliance of Turk, Afghan and Russian will break the hands of those who wish to overrun the East. We Moslems, ever exposed to the tyranny of the Imperialists, do not despair of the Koranic promise. The world of Islam has resolved to defend its rights against those who seek to destroy it. We are hopeful of the future. We may not possess means equal to those of the Westerns who seek to tyrannise over us, but we shall achieve

independence by our religious purpose and faith. I am certain that hereafter united Islam will one day save its rights and exalt the glory of the crescent and star. Our mission is proud of its reception by the Grand National Assembly on its arrival and its president. The hoisting of the Embassy flag was postponed until to-day because of Ramazan. We consider it a happy augury that this ceremony should fall on Bairam and a Friday. I express my happiness that the president should have accepted my request to hoist the flag in person. I pray God for the progress and exaltation of the East and Islam.

(2)

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Speech

My Lord,  
I thank you for your invitation to assist at the hoisting of your flag. In the name of the Grand National Assembly, I thank your Excellency in the name of the Grand National Assembly for this glorious day. Between Turkey and Afghanistan, as with the whole world of Islam, strong bonds existed in principle. As in Afghanistan, so in Turkey the whole heart of the nation beats fraternally. Certain causes prevented the conversion of these bonds into concrete form. Until lately official relations could not be established. But the struggle for independence in Anatolia has brought about a new era. The arrival of your mission is a source of pride to all of us. The joint efforts of Turkey and Afghanistan, working hand in hand, will achieve the independence of the world of Islam. We shall be proud to see every Islamic Government united in a common front. For those who labour under the yoke of the Imperialists, Afghanistan and the Russian Soviet Republic is, as you finely say, a source of gladness. Please God this alliance will produce more abundant results. We see with gladness that every effort of your Excellency here is devoted to this object. The flag hoisted to-day, the symbol of the independence of Afghanistan, will wave here for the friendship of Afghanistan and Turkey. That the first flag should be hoisted in your time is the cause of congratulation not only for Afghanistan, but for Turkey. I thank you for my own account for the honour of hoisting the flag. An Embassy will shortly proceed to Afghanistan to strengthen still further the bonds between the two countries and this mission will give proof thereof of the same purpose and sincerity.

8222/143/44]

No. 9.

Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 662.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 11, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 489 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the questionnaire drawn up by General Harington in regard to the ultimate policy of the Allied Governments should the Komalists advance upon Constantinople.

2. Copies have been sent to the French and Italian High Commissioners for transmission to their respective Governments.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 9

General Harington to Mr. Rattigan.

Secret.)

Your Excellency,

General Headquarters,

British Army in Constantinople, July 9, 1921.

IN continuance of the views which I expressed to the High Commissioners on the 4th instant, I am putting forward to you, for consultation with your colleagues, a request that I may, as commander-in-chief of the Allied military forces, be given an indication of the policy which the Allied Governments intend to pursue in the event

of a serious threat to Constantinople. I am, however, not responsible for the security of the troops entrusted to my command, and I must therefore submit that I should be glad to see the situation closely, and I have made such dispositions as I think necessary to meet an attack on the Ismail peninsula, and for dealing with such outbreaks as might be expected to occur at the same time in and around Constantinople. Broadly speaking, the situation is as follows:

Although the military situation is at the moment more steady, and the Nationalists at Ismail show no sign of advancing to break the line of neutrality, yet one must always reckon with the fact that a situation might arise whereby the Greeks were defeated or withdrew, and the Nationalists might develop the policy, so often reiterated from Angora, of driving all Allied soldiers off Turkish soil, urged on, as they would be, by the Bolsheviks.

I have, therefore, made such dispositions as I think necessary to meet an attack on the Ismail peninsula, and for dealing with such outbreaks as might be expected to occur at the same time in and around Constantinople. Broadly speaking, the situation is as follows:

- (a.) To advance on Constantinople from Ismail,
- (b.) To advance on the Dardanelles via Bursa; or
- (c.) Both the above together.

Either course would be simultaneous with a certain amount of internal trouble in Constantinople.

I understand that it is the policy of the Allied Governments that in the event of the Nationalists entering the neutral zone I am to resist their advance with all means at my disposal.

I wish to make it quite clear:-

1. That I have not sufficient troops to deal with both (a) and (b) at the same time.
2. That I would only be able to oppose (a) for a limited period of time.
3. Once engaged in opposing (a) it will be impossible for me to oppose (b).
4. That I have only sufficient troops to oppose (b) in a minor degree.

Before, therefore, committing the Allied troops to combating the situation depicted at (a), it seems essential that I should know whether:-

1. The Allied Governments intend me to deal with (a) or (b) alone.
2. The Allied Governments will reinforce me, and, if so, to what extent and at what stage?

It must always be remembered that, once engaged, the withdrawal of the Allied forces under my command, or a change of policy from (a) to (b), would be a very difficult operation, and would certainly have very serious consequences for the lives and properties of Christian inhabitants in Constantinople.

The extent to which either Constantinople or the Dardanelles position could be held must depend on the situation. If the Greeks were out of the field, and the whole weight of Turkey was thrown against the Allies, it would only be possible to hold the above positions as rearguard actions, unless reinforcements of considerable strength were available.

I am well aware that under present circumstances, owing to the uncertainty of the Greek offensive and other matters, it may be difficult for the Allied Governments to give me any guidance, but I ask that the matter may be seriously considered, and that arrangements be made to give me definite instructions without delay should the situation develop quickly.

C. H. HARRINGTON, Lieutenant-General,  
Allied Commander-in-Chief

E 8224 1 44]

No 10

Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 18)

(No. 964. Secret,  
My Lord,

Constantinople, July 12, 1921.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the policy of the Angora Government, I have the honour to forward herewith two documents of the greatest interest, the first of which has reached me from a very secret source, whilst the second is the uncensored version of an article in the Constantinople "Journal d'Orient" of the 3rd July, taken, I understand, from the semi-official Angora Telegraph Agency.

2. Your Lordship will not fail to be struck by the insistence of both Fevzi Pasha and Yussuf Kemal Bey in the determination of Angora to secure the whole of the programme embodied in the national pact, and by Fevzi Pasha's reaffirmation of the policy of collaborating with the Bolsheviks and building up an alliance of Islamic States.

3. It is possible to argue that such utterances are intended for home rather than for foreign consumption, and that Mustapha Kemal and his Minister, while anxious to show themselves not less zealous than the extremist group which looks to Enver Pasha, are in reality anxious to cut adrift from the Bolsheviks and to compromise with the Allies. This theory is so attractive that the Western observers are a little apt to be beguiled by its inherent charm. Personally, I am not prepared to accept it without more definite evidence than I at present have that Mustapha Kemal and his party are prepared to weaken on the essentials of the national pact, i.e., armistice frontiers, and complete independence within the territory so defined.

I think the position at present might be roughly summed up as follows:-

- (a.) The Bolsheviks might prefer Enver to Mustapha Kemal, but they do value the alliance of Angora too highly to break with Mustapha Kemal so long as he does not rule the roost there.
- (b.) The Kemalists do not want Enver back, and they do not want either Bolshevism or Bolshevik ascendancy in Asia Minor, but they value an alliance with the Bolsheviks too highly to risk any rupture.
- (c.) Mustapha Kemal and his adherents have uphill work to maintain their position in the national movement, but they are still strong enough and energetic enough not to contemplate any weakening on the essentials of the national pact for the sake of an easy settlement with the Allies.

5. I do not deny the possibility that the course of events may make it necessary to revise these three propositions later on. It is, for instance, possible that the Bolsheviks may lose their grip on the Caucasus republics. It is also possible, though, in my opinion, less probable, that Mustapha Kemal may be weakened to the point of seeking a compromise with the Allies rather than lose his power. I believe, however, that the above propositions accurately represent the situation to-day.

6. I have observed in the two Angora papers during June a rather marked absence of direct attacks against Great Britain except for the two onslaughts reproduced in my despatch No. 653 of the 5th instant and a leading article by Yunus Nadi in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 22nd June, which is entitled "The 'Times' and the 'Yeni Gyun,'" and which, though not intemperate in expression, is generally hostile. This restraint is not without significance, but I see in it rather a desire to avoid any provocation of Great Britain than any indication of a real change of heart. Angora as a whole is "out for" the whole of the national pact, and, while, as I pointed out in my despatch No. 651 of the 6th July, there are doubtless many Nationalists who would be glad to see the end of British influence in Turkey, the prevailing feeling is one of hostility to all foreign influence and of hope that sooner or later Turkey may find herself at the head of a combine of Islamic States.

7. The fundamental xenophobia to which I have just alluded is rather well illustrated by two articles in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 24th June and the "Hakimiyet-i Milliye" of the same date. The first reproduces in a mourning border, under the heading of "Two more Victims," an extract from the French paper "Stamboul," of Constantinople, relative to the execution of two Turks in Constantinople sentenced to death by a French court-martial for the murder of two French soldiers. The "Yeni Gyun" raises no question as to the truth or otherwise of the charge, but represents it as an intolerable situation that Turks should be "martyred" on Turkish soil under foreign law. The other article deals with the American missionaries, whom it attacks roundly on the ground that their charitable and educational activities cloak a desire to contaminate Islam by the spread of Christianity, and that they constitute both a religious and a political menace.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN

Acting High Commissioner

## Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

## Nationalist Policy.

SECRET

ACCORDING to information obtained from a prominent member of the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, secret sittings of the great Nationalist Assembly were held on the 24th and 27th June. On the first occasion, Mustapha Fevzi Pasha, in the course of his speech regarding the foreign policy of the Angora Government, stated that the Government still held to the national pact in its entirety. He referred to certain telegrams received from the national representatives regarding the Allied mediation proposals, and stated that, although the Government had not taken a definite decision in the matter, its policy was well defined by the national pact. As long as the Powers gave no guarantees for the fulfilment of the claims defined in the national pact, the Government could not commence negotiations. No official communications concerning the Allied offer had been received, but that was no reason why the Government should not inform its representatives in Europe of the Government's point of view regarding the matter. Mustapha Fevzi then stated that the Government possessed positive information to the effect that the Greeks would agree to no intervention before resorting to force once again, but the Turkish army was quite prepared to undergo the test, and he added that if the Greeks believed the Angora Government would still confine itself, after having been obliged to make further heavy sacrifices in blood and material, to the demands formulated hitherto, they were making a profound mistake.

On the 27th June, Fevzi Pasha replied, in the name of the Government, to a motion submitted by Veli Bey, Deputy for Burdur, to the following effect:—

"The widespread rumours which have reached even this Assembly, and according to which the Soviet Government on the one hand had failed to fulfil its obligations, and the Angora Government, on the other, has decided, in contravention of its Oriental policy as pursued since its creation, to cease to afford any further assistance to the Moslems of Syria and Mesopotamia, are nothing more nor less than the calumnious inventions of our interior and exterior enemies. The Government of Angora, following the necessity in the interests of the nation of shaping its general policy in accordance with the currents of European policy, has not hitherto regarded, and does not at present regard, it as advisable to publish an official denial of these rumours. As, however, the principle which we have practised requires this Assembly's being regularly informed of its true policy, certain explanations are necessary.

The Soviet Government has fully honoured its engagements, and in the last two months has advanced to our Government £1,200,000 gold. We have also received munitions for the heavy and light artillery transferred to the western front from Armenia and Georgia, more than 6,000,000 cartridges for rifles and machine guns, 3,700 chinis for cavalry and artillery, material for torpedoes and mines, together with large quantities of clothing and other equipment obtained and sent to us in various ways. All these articles are either in our depots or in the hands of our troops at the present moment. Furthermore, a mixed military commission has received the support of the Soviet Government for the organisation of an army consisting of two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, several battalions of storm troops, together with aircraft and automobiles. Our General Staff has not, however, considered it to be necessary for the moment that this army should be summoned to our frontiers. Moreover, in Azerbaijan, Daghestan and in Transcaucasia Turco-Russian military missions are actively organising recruiting centres. The new political and military mission which we recently sent to Moscow will make an effort to the end that this assistance may be still further increased. It will be seen from the figures I have given that the rumour upon which the motion is based is absolutely groundless.

With reference to the alleged abandonment of the Government of its Oriental policy, I may say that in this regard also the Government will under no circumstances depart from the policy adopted with the consent of the Great National Assembly. It is true that, within the limits of the powers accorded by the Government to the Assembly on previous occasions, we have attempted to harmonise our policy with the present necessities of the general political situation, but this does not by any means signify a departure from our true policy. As with Afghanistan, our Government is about to contract an alliance with the Persian nation, and thus to take another step in the direction of the ideal of an

Islamic United States of the Orient. With greater attention than ever we are following the course of events in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and we are proving our deep sympathy for our brethren in religion, who are striving to attain true independence. Evidence of this sympathy may be found in the circumstance of our having maintained upon the Mesopotamian front, in view of important events which may occur there, the troops which it had been proposed should be sent to the Western front.

"For various reasons connected with the higher interests of the nation we have not been able to believe that at the present moment we cannot openly exercise our continuous activity; in due time we will give the Assembly further details on this subject.

Our High Command is also very disappointed that, after the sacrifices made during the last three months, we cannot take the offensive immediately, although the combative spirit of the army has increased enormously. We know how much the Turkish nation has need of putting an end as soon as possible to this state of war in order that it may heal its wounds with the balm of peace, and we understand the impatience shown by certain deputies. We are not prevented from undertaking an offensive for military reasons, or out of fear that the offensive may fail, but for certain political reasons we are practically sure that the military success which we shall obtain when the Greeks commence their offensive will serve our national cause still better; for if we undertake an offensive, we shall be subjected to the slightest check that we may suffer, under no matter what circumstances, is greatly to the advantage of our adversaries. This has been clearly pointed out to us by certain friendly political circles, and under these circumstances we prefer to maintain a defensive attitude for a short time longer, and to await the Hellenic offensive, which will probably not be long delayed."

Fevzi Pasha's speech was much longer than the summary given above, but all the essential points have been included.

At the close of the sitting the Assembly unanimously recorded a vote of confidence in the Government.

Note.—With regard to the passage in the above report referring to the recruiting of Moslems in Eastern Caucasus and the Transcaucasian areas, there is evidence from a very sure source that Mustapha Kemal is in communication with Jemal Pasha, and his attitude towards the latter is described as most friendly. It is also certain that Bedri Bey is in communication with the Nationalist leaders as well as with Ali Fudat Pasha, and that the latter is also in communication with Jemal Pasha. Under these circumstances it would appear that the recent attacks upon Enver in the Angora press were not all that they seemed on the surface. Further, with regard to the alleged attitude of the Nationalists towards the Arabs of Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine, evidence has been obtained that preparations for the carrying out of a definite pan-Islamic campaign have been perfected by the Angora Administration, and that the Oriental policy to which reference is made in the above report is indeed an integral part of the Kemalist programme.

Constantinople, July 6, 1921.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of July 3, 1921.

## LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ANGORA.

YOUSSEUF KEMAL BEY, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement d'Angora, a fait à la séance du 27 juin de l'Assemblée nationale les déclarations suivantes :

"Je considère de mon devoir de fournir à votre haute Assemblée quelques renseignements généraux et succincts sur la politique extérieure de notre Gouvernement.

"Nous sommes sur le point de donner à nos relations politiques avec les Républiques du Caucase méridionale une forme plus précise et plus régulière. Nous espérons établir sous peu des relations régulières avec notre voisin l'État persan.

"Vous savez que les conventions qui ont été signées en Europe par mon honorable prédécesseur Bekir Sami Bey, charge selon les pleins pouvoirs à lui remis, lors de son départ pour Londres, de défendre les droits du peuple turc et—comme cela a été clairement précisé dans lesdits pleins pouvoirs—autorisé à ce titre de signer la convention et toutes qu'il jugerait nécessaires, ont été repoussées par votre haute Assemblée, les conventions ayant dépassé la compétence et les instructions qui lui avaient été remises.

"Notre Gouvernement, considérant cependant le fait en lui-même que le Gouvernement de la République française avait accepté de conclure une convention en vue de mettre fin à l'état de guerre existant, à un devoir de faire certaines propositions dans les bruits du serment national.

"Jusqu'à maintenant aucune réponse officielle ne nous est parvenue au sujet de l'acceptation ou du refus de ces propositions. Nous avons appris entre-temps que la plus grande partie des troupes françaises se trouvant à Zoungouldak ont été retirées. Au cours d'entretiens privés avec deux honorables personnalités françaises venues de ces peuples.

"Nous attendons aussi l'exécution des promesses qui nous ont été faites par l'Italie concernant le retrait de ses troupes se trouvant encore en territoire turc. Dans ces conditions on nous reproche de ne pas tenir notre parole.

Le Turc musulman est essentiellement un homme de parole. Cette qualité est reconnue par le monde entier; mais on en exige à lui rendre cet hommage. Mais pour qu'il soit valable il doit être pris dans les conditions requises. Nous ne pouvons être aucunement tenus par des paroles ou des faits qui ne sauraient nullement être attribués à notre Gouvernement et à notre Assemblée. Au cours de la séance du 30 mai, notre Président du Conseil avait exposé les lignes principales de notre politique étrangère. A mon tour je ne ferai que répéter ses paroles.

"La politique que nous suivons et que nous sommes fermement décidés à suivre à l'avenir est connue de tous. Elle est connue et on en parle généralement par tout le monde. Notre politique étrangère ne peut pas viser d'autre but que la reconnaissance de nos droits nationaux et de notre indépendance complète dans les limites de nos frontières, à notre souveraineté entière, et notre libre développement à l'abri de toute intervention étrangère. Pour cette raison, nous nous ferons les amis de ceux qui reconnaissent officiellement et effectivement la légitimité de notre cause. Nous nous efforçons de défendre notre droit contre ceux qui veulent nous l'arracher par force.

Nous sommes convaincus que les peuples qui connaissent la valeur de la liberté et de l'indépendance reconnaîtront ainsi, tôt ou tard, notre bon droit.

Nous aussi nous voulons progresser dans le domaine de la civilisation.

"Mais le peuple turc desire être le maître sur le sol natal."

A l'issue de ces déclarations, Youssef Kemal Bey a demandé à l'Assemblée un vote de confiance sans réserve ni conditions en faveur du Cabinet.

La motion a été acceptée à la majorité des voix.

Angora, le 28 juin 1921.

E 8228/1/44]

No. 11.

Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 679.)

My Lord.

Constantinople, July 13, 1921

CONSIDERABLE prominence was given in the Constantinople press a few days ago to an account of the reception of the new Russian Ambassador in Angora by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on the occasion of the presentation of his credentials on the 27th June.

2. I have now procured a copy of the "Hakimiet-i Milliye" of Angora of the 28th June, which gives the speeches exchanged on the occasion. They are not of sufficient importance to have translated in *extenso*, but a summary may interest your Lordship.

3. The Ambassador, Comrade Nachekanof, began by saluting the people of "Revolutionary Turkey" engaged in a triumphant struggle against the black and yellow internationalists of capitalism. He emphasised the greater scale of the effort now

imposed on them desirous of freedom, as compared with the past, and the need for common action. The Moscow Treaty of the 16th March was a guarantee that neither Russia nor Turkey would endure bondage. They were the first to have raised the standard of revolution, and would be an example to other nations in the revolutionary struggle for the salvation of the world. Russia, having broken the chains of capitalism, had relinquished the blood-stained legacies of Tsarism, and put aside all treaties concluded by it. It had adopted the principle of freedom and self-determination for small peoples, and substituted for the old treaties pacts freely concluded between equals. It had become the natural ally of all nations fighting for freedom, first and foremost the eastern nations, and consequently of Turkey. It was not the Russian people but their despotic rulers and aristocracy desirous of world conquest who had sought to raise the cross on the domes of St. Sophia. The new treaty must be, and would be, the guiding star of the two peoples who were at last enabled to know each other. Difficult stages on the road had still to be traversed.

4. The Ambassador, after some references of the usual kind to the struggle of the Russian people against their enemies at home and abroad, went on to call upon the Turkish nation to play its part and to defend its country against Western Europe. The Treaty of Sévres sought to reduce Turkey to the level of a small power. Its capital was to be taken from it. The Marmora basin was to be usurped. Two-thirds of Asia Minor was to pass into French and Italian spheres of influence. In the shreds of territory to be left to it, it was to be condemned to perpetual slavery and indebtedness to the bankers of Western Europe. Turkey had already, by an admirable effort, broken a part of its chains. It needed but a little blow to shatter them completely, and the time was not far distant when, undefeated and proud, it would direct its new life as it pleased. That this should be so, the Ambassador concluded, was Russia's fervent wish, and he begged Mustafa Kemal Pasha to accept his expression thereof.

5. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, after welcoming the Ambassador, echoed his language as to the importance of the joint struggle for life and independence, and the naturalness of the alliance between nations engaged therein. He commented with satisfaction on the renunciation by Russia of the old treaties, the blood-stained legacy of Tsarism, the establishment of a new basis for Turkey's international existence, and the treaty concluded at Moscow in March. He spoke of the difficulties of the past and the future, and expressed confidence that the latter would be surmounted like the former. An attempt had been made to reproduce the restrictions imposed on the old Turkish Empire in a death sentence, namely, the Treaty of Sévres. The nation, realising the calamities which it had suffered before from not being master of its own destiny, and, perceiving that the Treaty of Sévres aimed at re-creating the same state of affairs, had asserted its own sole sovereignty. It had set up a Government on this basis. It had assured and would retain control of its own destinies. The new form of administration was entirely suited to the needs and social conditions of the people. He concluded by thanking the Ambassador for what he had said, and expressed the hope that his efforts would strengthen the friendship between the two peoples.

6. The letters of credence contain nothing of particular interest.

7. It is significant that while echoing to the full the Ambassador's language as to co-operation between Russia and Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha made no use of the words "revolution" and "capitalism" which occurred so frequently in the Ambassador's speech, much less did he refer to anything in the nature of world revolution. He made it perfectly plain that, so far as Turkey was concerned, the basis for the future must be a national basis. He several times mentioned the Ottoman Empire as a thing of the past, but rather as a victim of restrictions imposed by Europe than as a counter-part to the blood-stained Empire of the Tsars. His language throughout his speech was that of a conscious equal, not that of a grateful client. His reference to the suitability of the new Anatolian system to the needs and social conditions of the people was too pointed not to have been intended as a warning that Turkey was an ally, not a new source for communism. It is noteworthy that no mention was made on either side of Islam or of other Asiatic States, except for a very sketchy reference to the latter in the Ambassador's speech.

8. I venture to think that, so far as anything can be inferred from these public utterances, they bear out the theory of the present position as between Turkey and Russia which I have set out in my despatch No. 664 of the 12th instant.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Signor de Martino.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1921.

CALCULI consideration has been given to the note No. 629, which you were so good as to address to me on the 16th March, regarding the Franco-British Oil Agreement signed at San Remo in April 1920, and I now have the honour to offer the following observations, with which the French Government are, I understand, in complete agreement.

1. It is noted that the Italian Government do not desire at this stage to discuss application of this agreement in territories under a mandate. His Majesty's Government accept such a limitation of the discussion, and I would therefore request that nothing in my present note should be regarded as in any way relating to those territories, except where they are expressly mentioned.

2. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the importance to the economy of Italy of an increased supply of fuel and they sympathise with the anxiety of the Italian Government to secure this object. Indeed, as the Italian Government will doubtless remember, His Majesty's Government gave practical evidence of their sympathy last year, not only by supporting, during the course of the negotiations at San Remo, the inclusion in the tripartite agreement of a provision giving Italy a practical monopoly

and ties to Italy in the supply of coal from this country.

3. As I have already explained in previous correspondence with your Excellency and your predecessor, the intention of the San Remo agreement was not in any way either to establish a Franco-British monopoly in certain oil fields or to prejudice the liberty of companies or individuals of other nationality to secure concessions or purchase oil. The objects of the agreement were simply to offer official support to the

French oil interests in the countries falling within the scope of the agreement, and at the same time to afford facilities for the development, in certain circumstances, of the oil resources of Mesopotamia on the basis of reciprocal concessions.

4. In view of the misapprehension on these points which appears from certain passages in your note under reply still to exist, in spite of the explanation already offered by His Majesty's Government, I cannot sufficiently emphasise the fact that nothing in the San Remo oil agreement gives the right to any consumer in Great Britain or France, whether through the British or French Governments or through private interests, to purchase oil except on a strictly commercial and competitive basis. The Italian Government and the Italian nationals will have precisely the same facilities and will possess that "safety-valve," to which you also refer, in a source of supply which will become more effective as oil production in the east is developed. Further, the economic advantage which Italy possesses in her comparative proximity to the Eastern fields will remain entirely unprejudiced, if not enhanced, by any such increase in the world's production of oil as may result from Franco-British co-operation under the said agreement.

5. In the last paragraph of my note of the 15th January, an invitation was tendered to co-operation in the development of existing oil interests in whatsoever country situated. I regret that no trace of any such proposals can be found in your note. Indeed, apparently dissatisfied with the full and frank explanation which His Majesty's Government have already offered, the Italian Government, far from offering any suggestion which might form the basis of a subsequent Italo-British or Franco-Italo-British agreement, merely propose that His Majesty's Government should make a public communication to the Italian Government, amounting in practice to an admission of Italy to the full benefits of the San Remo oil agreement, which is to be conceded by Italy either to France or Great Britain in return.

The Italian Government suggest that this public communication should prize four distinct points, concerning which I have the honour to offer the following observations:—

As regards—

(a.) I would observe that His Majesty's Government are quite unable even if they were so willing, to prevent individual British groups and firms from competing for concessions in any country, and the San Remo agreement does not in any way interfere

with the liberty of British or French nationals who endeavour to acquire oil rights without enlisting official assistance. His Majesty's Government regret that they could not, therefore, give any such assurance as that proposed.

(b.) I would recall to you that His Majesty's Government have already informed the Italian Government that the San Remo agreement gives no privileges to French interests in British colonies which are not in practice equally available to Italian nationals, and in the circumstances they do not feel that any repetition of their assurance can be required.

(c.) His Majesty's Government possess no interest in ex-enemy concessions or shares in any ex-enemy oil interests so far as the territories covered by the present note are concerned. Such interests, if any, are held by British groups and firms in whose commercial arrangements His Majesty's Government cannot properly interfere. In any case, His Majesty's Government understand that, even if they were in a position to acquire such interests, they would be of little value, since no ex-enemy oil properties

are believed to be now in the least likely to become available for acquisition.

(d.) I have already expressed surprise that the British and French Governments should be asked to admit the Italian Government to all the benefits of the Franco-British agreement without being offered any corresponding advantages in exchange.

6. For the above reasons His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to make the formal communication to the Italian Government suggested in your note. At the same time they do not wish that Italian public opinion should interpret this refusal as evidence of any lack of sympathy or goodwill on the part of His Majesty's Government towards the economic welfare of Italy, and they are anxious to do what they can to give further tangible proof of their sympathy. I would therefore draw your attention to the fact that, while the San Remo agreement provides for the joint support of British and French nationals in any common negotiations entered into by them, the opening of such negotiations is left entirely to private initiative. There is nothing whatever in the agreement to preclude British and Italian commercial groups of good standing making similar joint arrangements and receiving the joint support of their respective Governments in cases where the support of either Government has not already been accorded to other interests. It is essential, however, that the groups should take the first step and agree to act in concert. On that understanding and provided no pledge of official support has been already given elsewhere, if an Italian group and a British group, both of good standing, either alone or preferably in association with French interests, can arrange to enter into common negotiations for the acquisition of oil properties, His Majesty's Government would be ready to extend their support to the joint undertaking.

7. I should be glad if you would bring the foregoing to the attention of your Government and express to them the willingness of His Majesty's Government to make public a communication to the Italian Government by an exchange of notes or by some other means on the lines of the preceding paragraph.

I have &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

*Mr Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 27)*

(No. 535.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 26, 1921.

ALLIAN High Commissioner informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has approached him with proposal to negotiate settlement between himself and Allied High Commissioners. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he can guarantee support of 65 per cent. of army in Anatolia and 65 per cent. of National Assembly.

Italian High Commissioner asked for my views on proposal.

He himself, at first sight, was in favour of it, as there was nothing to lose by it, and he thought it might be a means of effecting a settlement.

I replied that it seemed to me that best course was for Central Government to come to a preliminary agreement with Ankara.

Italian High Commissioner agreed, but said that Minister for Foreign Affairs had, on this being pointed out, replied that there was nothing to be done with Ankara.

This is significant in view of repeated rumours as to Karabekir's assassination.

No. 14

My Lord,

Berlin, July 20, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram of 19th instant, I have the honour to report that Mr Addison has received the following information from a reliable

1. Nazim Bey and Behaeddin Shakir (the former of whom had been Minister of Culture) have both gone to Moscow, and Esdras has gone to Kabul via Moscow.
2. Practically all the other prominent Turks have now established themselves in Munich. This they have done because the German Government cannot get at them in Munich or order them to leave Bavaria, and also because they feel that, if one of their number were murdered, he would not be acquitted by a Bavarian jury - hence a greater feeling of security.

Nodjoudin M. Idris, a former Minister of Justice.

Kennedy Be

Fetay Bey, formerly Turkish Minister in Sofia

Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, formerly Turkish Ambassador in Berlin

Ahmet Hasan Bey, a big publisher and printer in Constantinople

Colonel Roussé Hey, formerly aide-de-camp to the Sultan,

3 During the last few days General Ismail Hakki Pasha has been living at the Eden Hotel in Berlin. With him is a Spanish Jew from Constantinople, called Chamber. The object of Hakki Pasha's visit is to obtain deliveries of material ordered under Turkish contracts made with the Germans. This material was paid for, but was not delivered. Hakki Pasha has come from Switzerland and is charged by the Angora Government with the duty of getting this material out of Germany to the Nationalist Government. It is not known precisely to what these contracts refer, as Hakki's negotiations are with the industrial firms in Germany. It is supposed that he will attempt to get deliveries sent to Angora via Italy.

Djomal's chief job is to supervise and co-ordinate this traffic

Further, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a report on the relations existing between the Russians, Turks and Afghans, which I have received from Major Breen.

I have, &c  
D ABERNETHY

Enclosure on No. 14

*Report by Major Hecch on Russian-Turkish Afghan Relations.*

THE Emir Chekikb Arslan, president of the Oriental Club and leader of the Turkish Nationalists, arrived in London on the 27th of June. After Enver's recent visit to Berlin the Emir informed me that Enver had invited him to visit Moscow, to make the acquaintance of the members of the Government and to discuss the Eastern situation generally with the envoys from Austria and England. He further stated that he had been consulted by the Emperor of Russia in the matter of Russian-Turkish co-operation and that he had accepted the Russian proposal unreservedly. In view of the value of first-hand reliable information from Moscow I urged him to go, on the ground that he could not afford to remain aloof in Berlin if important negotiations were taking place in Moscow. I met him yesterday in Berlin and learned that he had gone to Russia on the 18th June and returned here on the 4th July, having spent four days in Moscow. His reception in Russia was most flattering. A special railway car and good quarters in the Savoy Hotel, Moscow, were provided for him. Food was fairly good, his ration cards being those of a diplomatic representative of the first class.

This last coincided with the Congress of the Third International. Owing to the ~~new~~ into force of the new Soviet regulation, permitting retail trade on certain ~~days~~ shops were opening in Moscow and a slight revival of life was evident. The tram and train system still remains Socialist; no fares are paid.

He interviewed Trotsky and Chicherin, but Lenin was busy with the Third International and did not see him. Ever explained that Lenin was primarily an exponent of Communism and that in view of the Emir's known dislike of the Soviet system, an interview might be embarrassing. Chicherin impressed him as a very able diplomat without any socialistic convictions. The Turkish and Afghan questions were treated from a purely Nationalist point of view and he was struck by the fact that there was little difference between the attitude of the Soviet Foreign Minister and his Tsarist predecessors when Turkish or Afghan relations were discussed.

The Emir had three interviews with Chicherin during his visit. He emphasized the need for further financial help for Angola, as hitherto only small sums had been advanced in gold. Chicherin replied that his Bolshevik colleagues were loath to advance more money owing to the effect on Russian public opinion of the recent murders at Trebizond. (A clause in the Turkish-Russian Agreement forbade Bolshevik propaganda. Nevertheless, a certain Turk, Mustapha Sub Hei ?), who had adopted Russian nationality and Soviet principles, arrived at Trebizond from Moscow with twelve supporters and ~~had been~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~one~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~executed~~ ~~there~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~Turks~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~French~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~other~~ ~~allied~~ ~~forces~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~French~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~other~~ ~~allied~~ ~~forces~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~French~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~other~~ ~~allied~~ ~~forces~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~French~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~other~~ ~~allied~~ ~~forces~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~French~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ 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July 14, 1921.

I have 8.  
CRANVILLE

7360]

together, it looks as if the Turks had always intended to retire before the Greeks and the only rear-guard actions have been fought to protect the retirement. There must have been time by now to have made a pretty accurate estimate at least of the numbers of prisoners, guns, &c., captured, and the fact that no such estimate has been officially published—except a reference to forty guns, which may refer to total captures or only to those captured during the Turkish counter-attack north of Eski-Shehr—seems to indicate plainly that the captures have not been great. I gather, in fine, that the captures of Alama-Karahissar, Kutahia and Eski-Shehr were great moral successes, as they must have had a great effect, in opposite senses, on the moral of the Greeks and Turks, but that they were not important military victories. On the other hand, if the Greek official account of the Turkish counter-offensive on Eski-Shehr on the 21st July and its conversion into a rout is true—and I do not think we have the right to doubt it—that would seem to be a great military victory.

The Greek press and Greek public opinion, here in Athens at all events, have not been so much affected by the Turkish counter-attack as they were by the capture of Eski-Shehr, which may be regarded as one of the decisive victories of the world and as having already put an end to the Nationalist movement and secured the Greek position in Asia Minor. It is in the Greek nature to exaggerate and always to speak in superlatives, but I think they really are convinced that all this is at least very nearly true. This leads of course to very extravagant articles in the papers. One paper declares, "The Near East is ours; we are there alone, and in future our will alone will count in Eastern affairs. The districts which we have watered with our blood, and which are bound to us by the traditions of centuries, are ours and will remain ours." Another says, "All the nations have bent under the burden of the great war, only the Greek people has kept its moral force intact." Almost all the papers suggest, with varying directness, that the road for the Greek army from Eski-Shehr leads to Constantinople rather than to Angora, and one at least loudly declares the necessity for Greece, in these new circumstances, to include the rich valley of the Meander in her Asiatic annexations. Even the Venizelist papers admit that their great leader was hampered by international complications and was not able to secure for Greece those full rights which she must now, after her glorious victories, claim and vindicate; but they insist with truth on the fact that it was Venizelos who opened the door of Asia Minor for them and to whom the greatest credit is due for all they may achieve.

I enclose a French summary of an article in the "Politika" of the 21st inst. which is a very good example of the prevailing train of thought.

The Royalist papers are especially concerned to prove that the victories are the effect of the King's leadership. They report that the King, the true soldier, sharing the dangers and discomforts of his men at the front (he remained in his villa at Smyrna till after the capture of Kutahia, and then went only as far as Ushak; the papers say that he is now at Kutahia). They argue that the Greek soldier has a superstitious devotion to King Constantine, which leads them to imagine that they see him among them dressed as a subordinate officer or a corporal or even a common soldier, and that it is this which gives them the strength and valour before which no Turk can stand. They maintain that the plan of campaign was prepared no doubt by the General Staff, but received the final touches which made it perfect from the King himself. Finally, they declare that it is only thanks to his insistence on maintaining neutrality during the first three years of the war that Greece is able to play her part to-day.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Extract from the "Politika" of July 21, 1921.

REVUE DE LA PRESSE ATHÉSIENNE.—LES REVENDICATIONS HELLÉNIQUES.

EN même temps que les premières nouvelles des victoires helléniques, la presse européenne a commencé à exprimer des craintes sur nos exigences. Ces craintes ne sont pas tout à fait injustifiées. Certainement, nous ne combattons pas pour le Roi de Prusse. Nous avons été laissés, sans aucun appui, à mener à bout une dure lutte, qui est et devait être considérée une continuation de la guerre européenne. La Turquie avait signé un armistice et un traité. Cependant, elle n'a pas déposé les

armes, mais elle a continué la guerre. Le mouvement fut qualifié au début comme une rébellion contre les décisions des Puissances, contre la volonté des vainqueurs. Mais, petit à petit, la politique européenne l'appela un mouvement nationaliste et a fini par le considérer comme une question concernant les Turcs et les Grecs.

Après de longues luttes, nous pourrions invoquer nos droits sur la solidarité nationale, mais nous ne l'avons pas fait. D'ailleurs, des malentendus ayant trait à nos questions intérieures, qui n'ont aucune influence sur notre politique extérieure, ont été considérées comme de justes causes pour des points de vue opposés à ceux que nous défendons la lutte commune. Nous combattons donc seuls aujourd'hui et cette guerre qui se poursuit, sans la participation mais avec la tolérance des Puissances, est une affaire purement gréco-turque. Ce qui doit être seulement particulièrement relevé, c'est que nous prenons en considération les grands intérêts mondiaux; non, certes, les intérêts de chaque Puissance, ce qui est impossible, étant donné qu'ils s'opposent les uns aux autres sur de nombreux points, mais les intérêts de tous les peuples, les intérêts de la paix et surtout de la paix en Orient.

Si la guerre en Asie Mineure n'est pas considérée par les Puissances comme une continuation de la guerre européenne, nous la considérons avec raison comme la dernière phase de la lutte d'indépendance commencée il y a 100 ans. Nous ne comprenons pas ce que la presse européenne entend par exigences exagérées. Nos exigences sont depuis un siècle les mêmes. Les pères des Européens d'aujourd'hui les considéraient alors très justes et s'enthousiasmaient de nos idéaux. Si leurs descendants, aujourd'hui transformés en matérialistes, ne s'enthousiasment plus, ce n'est pas de notre faute. Pour prouver combien ces idéaux sont grands et élevés, il suffit de considérer qu'ils ébranlent un peuple de 10,000,000 et qu'ils concentrent une armée de 300,000 hommes accomplissant des miracles de vaillance, d'endurance et d'impétuosité. Ces idéaux ne seront réalisés que quand le dernier Grec et le moindre pouce de territoire hellénique seront libérés, quand la Grèce comme État s'étendra jusqu'à ses frontières nationales.

E 9282 143/44]

No. 17

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)

(No 734.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 6, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a note, dated the 16th July, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Angora Government, and addressed to the foreign representatives at Constantinople.

2. A verbal protest has been made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Porte against the entirely false statements made in the concluding sentence of the penultimate paragraph.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Foreign Representatives at Constantinople.

A SON Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire de France, M. le Haut-Commissaire d'Angleterre, M. le Haut-Commissaire d'Italie, M. le Haut-Commissaire du Japon, M. le Haut-Commissaire des États-Unis, M. le Ministre d'Espagne, M. le Ministre des Pays-Bas; à son Excellence Mgr. Dolei (délégué apostolique), M. le Ministre de Suède, M. le Ministre de Danemark, à Constantinople :

Le Gouvernement grec, par les ententes de la paix, a été obligé de se conformer avec une rigueur implacable : d'un côté, l'armée grecque suit le desert dans toutes les régions qu'elle occupe et massacre la population sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe ; d'autre part, les sociétés secrètes grecques et, entre autres, la fameuse société dénommée "Pontus," dans le but de constituer sur les rives de la mer Noire un État hellénique, où une petite minorité grecque dominerait comme à Smyrne la majorité musulmane turque, sont en pleine activité.

Ces sociétés ont provoqué et y a quelques semaines de cela l'expédition dans la province de Samoun afin d'attirer l'œil du théâtre principal de la guerre le plus de

forces turques possible et de faciliter ainsi l'offensive du Roi d'Espagne. Les Grecs, de leur côté, ont copieusement ravitaillé en armes, munitions, etc., où de nombreux dépôts clandestins avaient été constitués au lendemain de l'armistice de 1918, ravageant le pays et massacrant tous les villageois musulmans qui leur tombent sous les mains.

Si l'on rapproche de ces événements le fait que le "Journal officiel" du Gouvernement turc publie le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet dernier, l'ordre de mobilisation de toutes les personnes de la race grecque, y compris les Grecs — sont citoyens turcs vivant en Anatolie — appartenant aux classes 1920-21 incluses — et de rendre compte que les sociétés grecques secrètes en provoquant les soulèvements précités ne font qu'obéir aux ordres d'Athènes et attaque par derrière notre armée, que l'armée grecque attaque d'autre part par devant. De plus, les autorités britanniques de Constantinople dans la zone neutre qu'ils ont fait déclarer autour de cette ville, attaquent des bandes de part et d'autre avec l'intention de faire massacrer la paisible population de la capitale.

Devant ces attentats contre sa vie et contre son indépendance, l'exaspération du peuple turc a atteint son paroxysme. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie constate le degré de sur-excitation extraordinaire où se trouve le pays, déclare que toute la responsabilité de représailles qui pourrait être exercée par le peuple turc retomberait entièrement sur les Grecs, dont les crimes ont comblé toutes les mesures. A tous ces crimes nous pouvons opposer avec fierté la parfaite discipline dont font constamment preuve nos troupes et l'humanité dont témoigne à tout moment notre peuple. Nous ne voulons pour preuve que le témoignage et les déclarations des représentants même de l'Entente et, entre autres, celles des membres du comité d'enquête venu dernièrement à Ispahan et dont faisait partie le Général anglais Franks, le Colonel italien Vitale et le Capitaine français Lucas.

YOUSSEF KEMAL

Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Angora, le 16 juillet 1921.

E 9284 143 44

No 18

Sir H. Humboldt to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received August 16.)

No. 7391

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 6, 1921

I RETURNED to Constantinople on the 31st ultimo and was immediately informed that Marshal Izzet Pasha the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wished to see me the next day.

2. The Marshal came accordingly, accompanied by Hamid Bey, President of the Ottoman Red Crescent. I have reported in my telegram No. 549 of the 1st instant the substance of what passed at this interview, and I would only propose in the present despatch to amplify that telegram in one or two particulars.

3. In view of the fact that this was the first occasion on which I had received Izzet Pasha in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, I considered it strange that he should have been accompanied by an unofficial person such as Hamid Bey, whom we have every reason to suspect is a French agent. It is alleged, in fact, that in this capacity he is concerned to prevent as far as possible any rapprochement between the British and Turkish authorities, and, all the more, a settlement of the Turkish question partly through the good offices of His Majesty's Government.

4. Both Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey seemed depressed, though not to the point of making any concrete proposal for mediation. It was obvious that they were merely throwing out feelers as to whether intervention at this stage would be considered by His Majesty's Government. They themselves had no concrete policy to propose, so I confined myself to telling them that the first step would be to bring Angora into line with the Constantinople Government, and, above all, to face the facts of the situation and decide what it might be possible to obtain from the Allies and the Greeks. I pointed out the fact that Hamid Bey declared that the Nationalist Government still took its stand on the Nationalist pact and that Izzet Pasha said that Constantinople must have no elbow-room, i.e., an extension of territory in Thrace, I inferred that the Turks have not yet put any water in their wine.

5. I took the opportunity at this interview to remind Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey that the attitude of the Angora Government in connection with the Prisoners Agree-

ment had caused great irritation in England and was bad policy on the part of the Nationalists.

6. I saw the Grand Vizier on the 3rd instant, on which occasion his Highness informed me that he meant to get into touch with the Angora Government and ascertain the terms on which they would be willing, on their part, to put an end to the present war. Tewfik Pasha distinctly stated that if, in the opinion of his Government, the terms had a chance of being accepted by the Allied Powers and the Greeks, he would address the three Allied Powers with a formal demand for intervention. He stated that he did not believe in the Bolshevik bogey with which the Nationalists were trying to frighten the Allied Powers. On the other hand, he maintained that the Greeks had not accomplished what they had set out to do, i.e., the destruction of the Nationalist army.

7. The Grand Vizier further informed me that the Sultan had shown an interest in my movements and wished to see me. I am to be received in private audience by His Majesty this afternoon.

8. On leaving the Grand Vizier I proceeded to return the visit paid me by Izzet Pasha, to whom I reported what had passed between Tewfik Pasha and myself. Izzet Pasha was much more vague in his statements. He said that he had sent Fethi Bey to Angora to sound the Angora Government. He also thought of sending some other person, but I derived the impression that he is really only temporising in the expectation that the Greeks will have shot their bolt in perhaps a month from now, and that the situation will by then have turned to the advantage of the Nationalists.

9. It is evident that the Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha are recovering from the shock caused by the initial Greek successes.

10. I impressed on Izzet Pasha that the Nationalists would be well advised to show moderation, and that after the experience the Allied Governments had had of the Angora Government in connection with the London Conference of March last, they would be well advised to be careful of their relations with it. I said that the Angora Government could give proof of their good intentions by immediately releasing the British prisoners of war still detained by them.

11. Izzet Pasha replied that an all-for-all exchange might be effected, as we were still detaining a certain number of Turks at Malta. I pointed out that several of these Turks were definitely accused of atrocities against the Armenians and ill-treatment of British prisoners of war, and would be tried eventually. Izzet Pasha stated that we were detaining one Mustafa Abdul Khalik Bey, whom he described as a "saint," incapable of doing any wrong. I subsequently looked up the record of this alleged saint, and found that he was a brother-in-law of Talaat and was implicated in the massacre.

12. Speaking of the conference in Paris in June, Izzet Pasha maintained that the Greeks had been warned by the Allies that they would not be allowed to benefit by any success they might obtain. I said that this was an incorrect statement. The Greeks had been warned that if they decided that they were not prepared to accept outside advice the Allied Powers could not persevere in an action which would be useless. The responsibility for the consequences of the resumption of hostilities would in that case rest exclusively on the Greeks themselves. Finally, Izzet Pasha apologised for the fact that he had done so.

13. The Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha called on me yesterday afternoon. The fact that Izzet Pasha accompanied the Grand Vizier led me to suppose that the two would pursue the conversations which had taken place on the 1st and 3rd instant, but although I tried to lead the conversation in the direction which I believed they wished it to take, they made no reference to the war in Anatolia. This confirmed my belief that, in spite of their statement that they could not sit with folded hands and watch the further progress of the struggle, they are not seriously thinking of an immediate appeal for intervention.

14. It may be that the Sultan has been bringing pressure to bear on his Ministers to take some steps to try and bring the war to an end, and that the Ministers consider that they have done all that is necessary in holding the language which they have held, first to Mr. Rathbone and then to myself.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

(No. 742.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 9, 1921

2 I then delivered to the Sultan a message which the King had authorised me to give him to the effect that His Majesty hoped that the Sultan would soon reign over a united Turkey at peace with her neighbours. The Sultan expressed great gratification at the King's message and enquired after His Majesty's health, saying that Sovereigns took a natural interest in each other. He also said that he knew that the King and his Ministers had a sympathetic understanding of the Near Eastern question.

1 The Sultan asked why England had not intervened to stop the present hostilities once and for all. I said that I failed to perceive what practical means the Allies had of stopping the war in Asia Minor or of ordering ~~enough~~ the ~~cessation~~ ~~of~~ the Nationalists. The Allies were heartily tired of war and disorder, and desired peace above all things.

6 His Majesty asked how it was that Germany, a nation of 80,000,000, obeyed the purposes of the Allies whilst I, a tiny, little Greece appeared able to defy them. I pointed out that Germany was a former enemy and was now defeated whereas I fought on our side towards the end of the war and preserved

8. He then said that his Government had tried every means of getting into contact with the authorities at Angora and had failed. The Constantinople Government were now as a last resort sending Salih Pasha to France and Italy to get into contact with Kemalist agents in those places. This statement has been confirmed to me from other

9. The Sultan showed me marked friendliness and courtesy throughout the interview. He excused himself for having mentioned the distress of his country to me, and then said that he was a Turk of the old school. I replied that anything connected with His Majesty's Empire and person was naturally of the greatest interest to myself.

I have, &c.

HORACE. RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

No 20

(No. 745)

My Lord,

111

[illegible]

2. Your Lordship will see from it that the number of Christians at present in the empire is 100, the exact number being 102. These figures are taken from the lists made by the authorities of the prisons in which the Christians are imprisoned, and checked by comparison with the lists furnished by the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates. Mr. Matthews put before Lord Palmerston the usual arguments that the figures of the Christians in the empire were based upon uncorroborated documents, and were

8. With regard to the last paragraph of the memorandum respecting the reported deportation of a number of Greeks from Adalia on the 15th ultimo, and the deportation of 200 (?) from [redacted] to the interior on the 21st idem (my telegram No. 529 of the 8th instant to your Lordship), the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he could take no action, as he was not in communication with the Anatolian Government. In view of this attitude on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and as soon as my colleagues have received the instructions forwarded in your Lordship's telegram No. 424 to Paris of the 2nd instant, [redacted] as [redacted] it will probably be necessary for us to address the authorities at Adalia direct.

I have, &c.

HORACE HUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

enclosure in No. 20.

Sir H. Rumbold to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs

[illegible]

D'après le rapport parvenu à ce Haut-Commissariat de deux sources sûres, le 15 juillet, déporté à l'intérieur un certain nombre de Grecs de l'endroit et les autorités de Trébizonde ont, le 21 juillet, déporté 300 Grecs à l'intérieur.

*Haut Commissariat, Constantinople.*

16 9 août 1921

E 9268/143 44]

No. 21

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 746.)

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State and begs to have the honor to transmit herewith copies of correspondence respecting the deportation of Christians into the interior.

Constantinople, August 10, 1921.

United States High Commissioner to Mustapha Kemal

July 18, 1921

I am informed that the Greek women, children and old men are to be transported from Samsoun to the interior. There is much evidence that when the Greek men were recently transported many perished on the journey. The transport to the interior of men of military age may be considered as a military measure, but the transport of old men, women and children does not seem justified by military necessity. This proposed transportation of about ten thousand people under the present conditions must subject these people to great suffering and privations; likewise there will be great danger of their personal safety in transit. Therefore I trust, for the sake of humanity, you will prevent this forced transportation from Samsoun of these women and children. The world at large is bound to consider that the killing of those transported for military reasons was a neglect of the humane laws of war. Any transportation of women and children with loss of life would certainly be viewed with consternation and create a most unfavourable impression against you and your people. I hope for the best interests of Turkey you will reconsider this decision, if it has been made. I would be pleased to receive from you an early and favourable answer which I could convey to my Government.

BRISTOL

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora Government, to United States High Commissioner

(Undated)

I HAVE the honour to advise you of the following consideration in reply to your telegram to Mustapha Pasha. The information which you have received relative to the transport to the interior of women, children and old men of Greek race of Samsoun is completely in error. Absolutely no measure of this kind has been taken. This information may have had its origin from the fact that the Greeks who were able to carry arms were transported to the interior as consequence of activities of secret Greek societies, and especially the society whose name is Pontos. The inhabitants of certain villages which had hidden bandits in the pay of these societies, and which had aided them in carrying out their misdeeds, have been treated in the same way. I can assure you that no military necessity was taken, and that in no case on our side would we go further than justice or the obligation to guarantee the safety of the country demanded.

I take this occasion to ask you to be so kind as to interest yourself equally in the Mussulmans of all ages and of both sex at the mercy of the incredible acts on the part of the Greek army and Greek population in all parts of our country which are occupied by the enemy. What happened at the end of June at Ismidt, both known and unknown to the world, is a reflection of the horrors which the Greeks have committed and are committing daily in the interior of Anatolia where very few outsiders can witness against them. The massacres and the devastation perpetrated by the Greeks, both on the coast and in the interior, have been verified by numerous American citizens, French and others, and the Greek Government has not yet taken any steps to stop them.

Consequently my Government will be grateful to you if you will have the kindness to take effective steps with the Greek Government regarding the misdeeds of the Greek army and Greek population. I am sure that the world will be grateful to you for your life and independence and who are fighting against all manner of aggression, will be grateful to you for your efforts to save the Turkish children and women whom our enemy is killing daily.

YOUSOUF KEMAL

Extract from Prime Minister's Speech of August 16, 1921

ASIA MINOR

I COME now to another very difficult problem that is the problem of Asia Minor. I would like first to give a short summary of the events which led up to the present position. The basis of the Treaty of Sèvres was that the parts of the Turkish Empire that were Turkish should remain Turkish, those that were Arab should be Arab, those that were Armenian should be Armenian, and those that were Greek should be Greek. I will not deal with the Armenian or the Arab question, because they do not arise at the present moment, but I will refer first to the question of the dispute with Greece. Commissioners were appointed by the Allies to investigate questions of frontiers, questions of population, and, to a certain extent, to go into questions of the Greek question.

There could not have been an able more impartial, or more judicial Commissioner. He represented the British Empire on the Commission to investigate these three questions. By his report, and the reports of the various experts assisting him, Smyrna and Thrace were assigned to Greece. This was accepted by the Supreme Council. The French experts came to exactly the same conclusion. There was danger of anarchy and its consequences in the various areas. So France occupied Cilicia with a view largely to protect the Armenian population, the Italians occupied Southern Anatolia, from Adalia up to Scala Nuova, for the same purpose, and the Greeks were invited by the Supreme Council to occupy Smyrna and Thrace. If any part of those territories had been assigned to us for protection it would have cost us scores of millions.

Then came the Treaty of Sèvres, followed by the Nationalist insurrection. The Greeks were anxious to deal with it immediately, but were held back by the Allies. What has happened since shows that Venizelos was quite justified in the view which he took that he could have disposed of that insurrection without the slightest difficulty, because since then the Nationalists have gathered their forces, and in spite of that the Greeks have not encountered up to the present any serious difficulty. The Allies attempted mediation but unfortunately the Sultan and his Government have lost control and authority. And when we made certain proposals with a view to compromise, unfortunately both parties refused to accept them. I want to put to the House the dilemma with which the Allies were faced. The Greeks and Turks refused the compromise suggested by the Allies.

There were two alternatives before us. The first was to compel both, because I could not compel the one without compelling the other. Two questions came up: "Should we compel the Greeks?" and "Should we compel the Turks?" You might say you would compel the Greeks by threatening to bombard their towns, but what about the Turks? Is there anyone who would have suggested that we should have sent an army up to the mountainous areas of Asia Minor to quell the Turkish insurrection, and to force the Turks to come to terms, to chase them from Eshkoshahr to Angora, from Angora onward, wherever it might be? It was an utterly impossible proposition. Therefore the first alternative, compulsion, was ruled out. There is only one other alternative, and that is to leave both of them to fight it out. Some say we might have referred the matter to the League of Nations. What would have been the use of that? That would have been an unkindness to the League of Nations. How could they have dealt with it? They had only the means which the Allies could have placed at their disposal, and there was no Allied Power which would have sent an army for the purpose of enforcing a decision. Therefore you had to leave both of them to fight it out.

There is not a single gun, rifle or shell which has been supplied to either side not one. These battles have been fought without any assistance from us either way. I am sorry to say that not only do I think that that was the only course but I am afraid it is the best course. I will tell the House quite frankly why I think so. One reason that applies to the Turks and the other a reason that applies to the Greeks. I will take the Turks first. The Mustapha Kemal Turks undoubtedly had an exaggerated idea of their own prowess. They conquered Asia Minor very easily. They gained some very easy victories in Cilicia, and they had a very exaggerated view of their own prowess and a contemptuous estimate of the Greeks' military

capacity. Their realisation that they were wrong in both those instances will make them none the worse neighbours for Greeks or Italians or Frenchmen or British. The Turk accepts a fact in the end when it is really driven into his mind.

I come now to the Greeks. There are Greek enthusiasts, on the other hand, who, I have no doubt, will realise soon that there are limits to what Greek resource and Greek valour and Greek skill can accomplish in the fastnesses of Asia Minor. War has one merit, in that it does in the end teach a respect for facts. I think both these races will be easier to deal with when their own limitations have been brought thoroughly clearly to their minds. That is what is being done. The time for mediation has not arrived; when it does, I have no doubt that the Treaty of Sévres will have to be reconsidered. You cannot expect a country which has waged a successful war to be satisfied with the same terms as a country which is prepared to forgo its full claim in order to avert the terrors and risks of war. May I say this, as one who has never in the least concealed the fact that at any rate he was not hostile to the Greeks? I sincerely trust that the Greeks will not make the mistake which Bulgaria made in 1913, when after a series of very brilliant victories, which dazzled her people and blinded the vision of some of her statesmen, she insisted upon exaggerated terms and put forward extravagant claims which raised for her the best of enemies.

As a sincere friend of Greece, I trust that Greek statesmanship will not repeat that error. If it does, I am certain it will end in disaster to Greece. Moderation in victory is not less important than victory itself. I go beyond that. I think moderation in victory is more important to a nation even than victory itself, for there are so many tragedies written across the page of history which have arisen from victory turned to a bad use, a victory immoderately used, and it would have been better for those nations had they never won that victory. I therefore almost entreat Greek statesmanship not to put its claims too high, but to show its quality by displaying a temperance in victory which will win greater respect for them and for their country, greater renown for their native land as well as for them, and greater security for the country itself, than the most dazzling victory which they could win.

E 9489/143 44]

No. 23

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo).*

(No. 172)

(Telegraphic.) H.

Foreign Office, August 19, 1921

MY telegram No. 263 of 1920. Arms Traffic Convention.

Supreme Council decided at Paris on 10th August that attitude of strict neutrality in present hostilities between Greeks and Kemalists Turks should not infringe rights of private firms to freedom of trade with either belligerent. His Majesty's Government regard this decision as overriding provisional application of article 6 (2) of Arms Traffic Convention so far as Asia Minor is concerned, and they therefore intend to issue licences for export to either belligerent of arms and ammunition, &c., except poison gas shells. Any other attitude would amount to breach of principle of neutrality, since Greeks and not Kemalists would be able to secure arms.

French, Italian and Belgian Governments are being informed of our view.

Please inform Japanese Government

[E 9489 143 44]

No. 24

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).\**

(No. 2275)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 19, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 263 of the 5th August, 1920, and to other correspondence relative to the application of the Arms Traffic Convention, and in particular of article 6 (2) thereof, whereby the importation of arms and ammunition into certain territories, including pre-war Asiatic Turkey, is prohibited, I have to draw

\* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome), No. 699, and Sir G. Graubne (Brussels) No. 609, *mutatis mutandis*.

your Excellency's attention to the resolution taken by the Allied Governments at Paris on the 10th instant to the effect that the Allied attitude of strict neutrality in the war between Turkey and Greece in no way infringes the rights of private firms to freedom of trade (see your telegram No. 587 of the 10th August).

2. His Majesty's Government have decided that this resolution must be taken to override the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Governments to apply the terms of the Arms Traffic Convention so far as the importation of arms, &c., into Asia Minor is concerned, and they therefore intend to issue licences for the export to Greece or to the Kemalists of all arms, ammunition and similar goods enumerated in the prohibition export list which was published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of the 31st March last. His Majesty's Government do not, however, intend to grant any licences for the export of poison gas shells to either belligerent.

3. To avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I shall be glad if you will inform the French Government of the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government, which appears to be the only possible one if the principle of neutrality is not to be infringed.

4. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Brussels, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo is being similarly instructed by telegraph.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 9489 143 44

No. 25

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

S r :

\* Foreign Office, August 20, 1921

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 11th August, 1920, and subsequent correspondence relative to the application of the Arms Traffic Convention, and, in particular, of article 6 (2) thereof, whereby the importation of arms and ammunition into certain territories, including the pre-war Asiatic possessions of Turkey, is prohibited, I have to draw your attention to the resolution taken by the Allied Governments at Paris on the 10th instant to the effect that the Allied attitude of strict neutrality in the war between Turkey and Greece in no way infringes the rights of private firms to freedom of trade.

2. It has been decided that this resolution must be regarded as overriding the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, the Italian Government, the Japanese Government and the Belgian Government to apply the Arms Traffic Convention so far as the importation of arms into Asia Minor is concerned. Any other attitude would in principle amount to an infringement of neutrality, as the Greeks, but not the Kemalists Turks, would be enabled to obtain arms, &c., from private traders in the Allied countries. There is, therefore, no objection to the issue of licences for the export of arms, ammunition and similar goods enumerated in the prohibition export list which was published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of the 31st March last. His Majesty's Government do not, however, intend to grant any licences for the export of poison gas shells to either belligerent. It has been decided to grant no licences (see the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons, N. 17 of the 11th August, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain's reply to Commander Kenworthy's question, No. 53 of the 16th August, on this subject).

3. I am to request that the Board of Trade will cause measures to be taken in order to carry this policy into effect.

4. The French, Belgian, Italian and Japanese Governments are being informed of the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter, and copies of this letter have been sent to the Cabinet Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Treasury, Home Office, Colonial Office and Board of C.

I am, &amp;c.

F. G. FORBES-ADAM

E 9560 143 44

No. 26

Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22)

(No. 1)

My Lord,

Athens, August 10, 1914

I HAVE the honour to report that the president of the Council of Ministers returned to Athens from Smyrna early on the 7th instant. The same day a Council of Ministers was held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Afterwards the president addressed some representatives of the press in the following words:—

The operations in Asia Minor would, he said, be continued until the complete annihilation of the remains of the Turkish army. This was the objective of the new

If in order to realise this objective, it was necessary to occupy Angora, the occupation of Angora is not the objective of the operations. If the enemy can be reconquered before that, there will perhaps be no need to advance to that town.

M. Gounaris is further reported to have expressed his entire confidence in the success of the Greek operations, but he could not foresee when the struggle might reach a conclusion. He advised the press to be careful to check the information which they were about to publish as the publication of uncontrolled news might injure national interests in view of the present "very delicate situation."

In connection with the above statement, I have the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to my telegram No. 444 of the 8th instant reporting that M. Gounaris used the words "very critical and delicate" in regard to the present position of Greece. These words were a member of my staff was told by a press representative present actually used by the president of the Council but, in view of their presumptive tone, it was decided to water them down before publication. It is probable that in using these words M. Gounaris was referring to the diplomatic and financial rather than to the military situation.

This is, as I had the honour to point out, the first time that I have heard of the president of the Council having admitted anything but optimism, and these pessimistic words should be contrasted with the language used by the Minister of War to the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, reported in my telegram No. 445 of to-day. Both statements, however, agree as to the destruction of Mustapha Kemal's army at Angora or beyond would seem to have been provided for.

Although the press has been full of reports of an advance on Constantinople as being the ultimate goal of Greek aspirations and great disappointment was shown when it was made clear that Great Britain would object to this (see my telegrams Nos. 441 and 440 of the 3rd and 6th instant), it appears to me quite possible that the Greek Government did not really contemplate such a step, but hoped by encouraging reports to obtain the twofold end of keeping up Greek spirits and moral and deceiving Kemal as to their real intentions and the direction in which they would eventually advance.

Now, however, that the true position has been made quite clear to the Greek people by the two Reuter telegrams and the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to in my telegram No. 446 of the 10th instant, the President of the Council is reported to have authorised Mr. Beaumont, correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," to state that Greece never thought of marching against Constantinople against the wishes of the Allies. In the so-called second Reuter communiqué (my telegram No. 446), which I have ascertained was sent in a telegram from the Greek Government, it is stated that the Greek Government has no hostile intentions towards Greece. "Patrias" (Venizelist), commenting on this, demands that Great Britain shall cease to protect the Turkish Government and shall permit the Greek army to capture them. England, it says, is intervening between the belligerents to save Greece's enemy. Greece was England's ally during the war whereas Turkey was the enemy of the Powers. England, the article continues, forgets all this in order to maintain the solidarity with her Allies. She avows that it is impossible for her to obtain anything favourable for Greece without the consent of

France. This shows that it will be necessary for M. Gounaris to conciliate France. The British friendship will not be able to favour Greece.

M. Stratos's organ refers to the *démarche* by Great Britain as having been made in order to show harmony amongst the Allies. It adds that nothing prevents the discussion of the question of Constantinople by Greece provided she exhibits clearly by diplomatic means her national claims and the necessity for her to

(Government) declares that in acting thus independently of her allies England poses as championing the principle of respect for treaties. She has thus gained a moral victory over her allies which will give her a predominant position and entail the realisation of Greek national aspirations.

In this connection I may mention that, in answer to a question on the subject, the Minister for Foreign Affairs denied to the press representatives that any similar *démarche* had been made by the French Chargé d'Affaires. As your Lordship is already aware, I have informed my French and Italian colleagues of the action which I have taken.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE

E 9560/1/44]

No. 27

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22.)

Constantinople, August 17, 1914.

SINCE the conversations which I held with the Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha, recorded in my despatches No. 739 of the 8th August and No. 742 of the 9th August, there have been no developments of importance in the situation here.

2. Fik Nuzhet Bey has been appointed Minister of Finance in the place of Abdulah Bey, who has resigned. The new Minister was Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance about a year or eighteen months ago when he became Minister of Finance for a few days. I understand that he has been a Financial Inspector at the Ministry of Finance. No political significance is attached to this change in the Cabinet.

3. The Constantinople Government are awaiting the result of the military operations in Asia Minor, which were resumed on the 14th instant by the advance of the Greek troops in the direction of Angora.

4. The Constantinople Government are as obstructive as ever in opposing the measures designed to put their finances on a better footing, and in general may be said to be imbued with chauvinistic feelings and have for the moment forgotten the depression caused by the first Greek successes.

5. An observer cannot fail to be struck by the entire inability of the Turkish Government to appreciate the situation or to take steps to better their own position. They seem content to drag on a miserable existence, living from hand to mouth. This is due mainly to two causes, namely, fear of Angora, and the fact that there is not a single man of prominence in the Cabinet or outside it.

6. The Grand Vizier, whilst capable of resisting proposals, is too old to put through any reforms. The Minister for Foreign Affairs openly proclaims that he is only a soldier and knows nothing of diplomacy. Discussions with these persons are unprofitable and the High Commissioners are reduced to wondering how long the crazy machine can continue to work.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

E 9553 22/44]

No. 25

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 17, 1921.)

No. 767. Confidential.

My Lord,

(Constantinople, August 17, 1921.)

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 577, I invited the French and Italian High Commissioners to meet General Harington and myself at this High Commission on the 15th instant. I then communicated to my two colleagues the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to General Harington's powers and position *vis-à-vis* the Allied High Commissioners. I made it clear that His Majesty's Government regarded their view as the only possible one if, as they certainly understood, General Harington had been entrusted with the Supreme Allied Command when the Allied front at Constantinople. General Felle endorsed this view.

Both my colleagues took exception to the view that General Harington is in no way responsible to the High Commissioners. They quite agreed that he was free to act on his own initiative in all purely military questions and they disclaimed any desire to interfere with his discretion in these matters. But if he were to be responsible for all matters affecting the safety of the Allied troops and the maintenance of order, and the administration of martial law in the area under his command, there was no question in which he could not interfere if he wished to do so. Sanitary measures, for instance, affected the health of the troops, and yet these had hitherto been dealt with by the High Commissioners. Then again there was the question of the inter Allied police. They could not admit that General Harington could exercise executive command over that force. They instanced the recent arrests of Bolsheviks by General Harington without previous consultation with them as a case in which he had clearly exceeded his duties.

In speaking of these arrests, the Italian Commissioner said that if anything in the nature of a revolutionary or subversive movement were discovered at Constantinople, it would obviously be the duty of General Harington to act. I pointed out that what had happened in the case of the Bolsheviks was precisely of the character indicated by the Marquis Garron, and that General Harington had had every justification for his action, but my Italian colleague either would not or could not see this point.

The Italian High Commissioner developed the thesis that the High Commissioners were the supreme authority at Constantinople and constituted the *de facto* Government of that country. As such, the army of occupation was necessarily subordinate to them. He appeared to consider that the assumption by General Harington of the Supreme Command had modified, to the disadvantage of the Allied Commissioners, the relations which had hitherto existed between the three Allied Generals and the three High Commissioners.

I replied that nothing had been modified. It was questionable whether the three High Commissioners did constitute the *de facto* Government of this country. Turkish Government existed and carried on the government of Constantinople and its neighbourhood, whilst the High Commissioners urged measures on that Government in political and sanitary matters took direct action. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to define the exact powers of the High Commissioners, since in the course of time and owing to the prolonged duration of the armistice, they had, perhaps involuntarily, assumed powers which they would never have thought of assuming at the time of the armistice.

I may mention at this point that the Italian High Commissioner invokes the armistice as it suits him. As regards the question of the Supreme Allied Command, he contends that the three Allied Governments are really in a state of peace with Turkey and that the armistice is a mere fiction. On the other hand, he recognises that the powers of the High Commissioners are based on the armistice. He tries to have it both ways. He finally pointed out that in every constitutional country the military was subordinate to the civil power.

After the Italian High Commissioner had gone over familiar ground and repeated, in very indifferent French, arguments which are well known to General Harington and myself, I said that it was necessary to recognise that we were here under armistice conditions, and that there was an army of occupation which constituted an authority side by side with that of the High Commissioners. There was no comparison between the relations existing between civil and military authorities at Constantinople and those prevailing between these authorities, say, in Italy or in England. One thing was

certain, and that was that if there were no army of occupation here, the High Commissioners would never have been able to put through the various measures which they have put into force.

I then asked General Harington to make a statement.

General Harington repudiated all idea of encroaching on the duties of the High Commissioners or of mixing himself up in political questions. He gave instances of the manner in which he proposed to exercise his functions, and it was clear that his statement impressed my Allied colleagues very favourably.

Finally, I said that it would seem desirable to reach some solution on the spot rather than have to refer the whole question to our respective Governments. I then proposed the formula which I telegraphed to your Lordship in my above-mentioned telegram. My French and Italian colleagues and General Harington expressed themselves satisfied with this formula, and I trust that matters will now run smoothly. Should there be friction, however, I do not hesitate to say that it will be due to the desire of my French or Italian colleague, preferably the latter, to seek for causes of complaint.

There is no doubt that the assumption by General Harington of the Supreme Command was a great relief to the High Commissioners. They appear to be looking for trouble between the Supreme Command and themselves. They were also unfavourably impressed by a letter addressed by General Harington to the War Office of the 6th ultimo, and communicated to them by Mr. Rattigan, in which he gives a definition of the responsibilities of a general commanding an army of occupation and defines the duties of an High Commissioner. I have pointed out to General Harington that, in practice, the High Commissioners at Constantinople exercise considerably more extended powers than he has stated, but this particular paragraph gave umbrage to my colleagues, who professed to see in it an indication of the spirit in which General Harington meant to interpret his new duties. They were firmly convinced that he intended to clip their wings and to encroach on their sphere of activity. But I am hopeful that we have succeeded in effacing this impression, and that the French and Italian High Commissioners are now satisfied that General Harington has no such intention.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

(High Commissioner.)

[E 9509 49/44]

No. 26

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(N. 894.)

Foreign Office, August 24, 1921

WITH reference to Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 554 of the 3rd June last, I enclose herewith, for your information and for the information of the British community, a memorandum setting forth the present position as regards debts owed to British nationals by Turkish nationals and as regards the claims of British subjects against the Turkish Government.

2. A copy of this memorandum has been sent direct to Sir H. Lamb.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure in No. 25.

Memorandum

THE present position as regards claims in respect of damage to the property or person of British nationals to Turkish nationals is as follows:—

#### 1. Claims in respect of Damage to Property or Person.

In so far as claims in respect of damage to property or person are claims by British nationals against Turkish nationals, they are dealt with in clauses 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 of annex 1 to the reparation chapter of the Treaty of Versailles, these claims are, in view of Germany's liability under the reparation

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The following would, generally speaking, rank under the terms of the annex in question, i.e. that they are persons who have been taken into custody by the authorities or directly in consequence of hostilities or operations of war;

- (b.) Claims by individuals in respect of personal injury by dependents of persons who lost their lives.

As regards claims against the Turkish Government which do not fall within the foregoing categories, applicants must in such cases rely upon their future remedies under the Treaty of Sevres which is not yet in force.

Article 302 of the Treaty of Sèvres reads as follows: -

" For the purpose of this provision the pre-war rate of exchange shall be defined as the average cable transfer rate prevailing in the Allied country concerned during the month immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the said country and Turkey.

the proceeds of liquidation of enemy property, rights and interests and the cash assets of enemies referred to in this section shall also be accounted for in the currency and at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the liquidation.

British nationals are at liberty to recover directly by law from the Turkish Government the claims of British subjects against the Turkish Government. The claims of British subjects against the Turkish Government are not made use of to

When the Treaty of Sèvres comes into force it will be possible to take proceedings in the Turkish courts against the persons who remain Turkish subjects.

Debts due from Turkish nationals to British nationals, provided they fall within article 302, but not otherwise, may rank, after the coming into force of the treaty, ~~in the same way as~~ in the same way as Turkish property and claims by article 391. But it is unnecessary that any debts would be permitted to rank against any charge which may be created, unless the creditor had made all reasonable efforts to recover the debt directly from the debtor.

\$2.50

(No. 785.)

Constantinople, August 24, 1931

I began by alluding to the resignation of three members of the Turkish Cabinet, which had followed on the resignation of the Minister of Finance. Izzet Pasha stated that ~~the resignation was due to~~ these changes. The resigning Ministers merely resigned owing to a feeling of solidarity with their colleague. The latter had shown that he had not possessed sufficient knowledge for the exercise of his functions, and the new Minister of Finance was much more conversant with financial problems. Izzet Pasha dismissed these changes in the Cabinet somewhat lightly. The public, however, has taken them rather seriously. I do not personally believe that they amount to much, as the leading spirits in the Government remain in office.

4. 1920 Pensioners and the Turkish Government were in agreement to a new agreement for a new pension for the number of the pensioners. I mentioned as Hagmann that the pensioners were estimated but the Turkish Government was not able to pay the pension as £100 a month. A new pension of £100 a month was put on the pension list. 1920 Pensioners and the Turkish Government agreed to effect economies under the above heading to the extent anticipated, but economies would be effected. Thus he said that he could reduce the expenditure in his own department by £T. 5,000 a month.

6. I said that the Turkish Government had hitherto been able to carry on owing to the receipt of various windfalls. No more windfalls were to be expected and the Turkish Government would be thrown back on their ordinary sources of revenue, which were quite inadequate to meet their expenditure. The position was therefore a gloomy one, but it had to be faced. Izzet Pasha admitted this, and I made a general statement as to the desire of the Turkish Government to improve their financial position.

7. I then spoke to Izet Pasha about the continued detention of Ottoman Christians on the ground of the theft and pillage of Moslem property in the Yalova and Gemlik districts, &c. Izet Pasha admitted that it was difficult to obtain evidence against the persons who had been arrested. I suggested that, as they should be released. His Highness observed that certain Turks had been in prison since the armistice on the charge of excesses against Armenians. No evidence had been obtainable against these Turks. They should also, he thought, be released, as the cases were parallel. As Izet Pasha appeared to be suggesting something in the nature of a bargain, I replied that I could reflect over his statement. I promised to inform His Highness that I would

agree to connect the two categories of individuals, and that I must maintain my demand for the release of those Ottoman Christians against whom there is no evidence.

8. Finally, I asked Izzet Pasha whether he had any news from Anatolia. He replied in the negative, and it was evident that he was much pre-occupied by the absence of news from the interior. I said that every patriotic Turk, whether Nationalist or not, must be asking himself what was the best course to pursue in order to extricate Turkey from her difficulties. I asked Izzet Pasha what he thought Mustapha Kemal ought to do in present circumstances. He replied, "Address himself to you," meaning His Majesty's Government.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

E 9788 143 44]

No. 31

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 796.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 24, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter addressed by General Harington to the three Allied High Commissioners on the 10th August, 1921, asking them to notify the Greek High Commissioner of the orders General Harington had issued prohibiting armed individuals belonging to the Greek and Nationalist forces from crossing the boundary of the neutral zone as defined in the proclamation of neutrality published by the Allied High Commissioners on the 13th May last.

2. At a meeting held at the French High Commission on the 12th instant, my colleagues and I decided to comply with General Harington's request, in order to remove any doubt in the mind of the Greek High Commissioner that Greek troops would not be allowed to occupy Constantinople.

3. The Allied High Commissioners have therefore addressed a note to M. Votas, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold

Your Excellency,

Constantinople, August 10, 1921.

IN continuation of my letter of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to forward, for your information, copies of letters which I have addressed to M. le Général commandant le Corps français d'Occupation de Constantinople, and to the Comando del Presidio Italiano, Constantinople, on the subject of the preservation of neutrality in the Allied neutral zone. Similar instructions have been issued to the General Officer Commanding, British Army of Occupation.

Your Excellency will realise, I am sure, the necessity for Allied action to preserve neutrality, and also the possible situation which might arise if belligerent armed forces cross the neutral boundary.

I would request your Excellency to represent this matter most strongly to the Hellenic High Commissioner, pointing out how deplorable it would be if the Allied forces were to be forced to take any action against the Greek forces which would be in violation of the terms of the armistice.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARRINGTON, Lieutenant-General,  
Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to the French and Italian Officers Commanding,  
Constantinople.

August 5, 1921.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to confirm in writing the decisions I informed you of verbally on the 1st instant.

In view of the neutral attitude taken up by the Allies with regard to the war between the Greeks and the Nationalist Turks, no armed individuals of either of these nationalities will be permitted to cross the boundaries of the neutral zone, as laid down in the proclamation of neutrality issued by the Allied High Commissioners on the 13th May, 1921.

Any armed persons or parties, either Greek or Nationalist Turk, who are found within the neutral zone referred to above should be disarmed and arrested.

Cases of arrest should be immediately reported to these headquarters.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARRINGTON, Lieutenant-General,  
Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation.

Enclosure 3 in No. 31

Allied High Commissioners to the Greek High Commissioner.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce que, vu le fait que les Alliés ont adopté une attitude neutre dans le conflit entre les Grecs et les Nationalistes turcs, le Général Harington a donné les ordres pour qu'il ne soit permis à aucun individu armé ressortissant d'une des deux nationalités de franchir les limites de la zone neutre telle qu'elle a été définie dans la proclamation de neutralité publiée par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés le 13 mai dernier.

M. Votas se rendra, sans doute, compte de la nécessité qui incombe aux Alliés de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir la neutralité, et aussi de la situation qui pourrait résulter si les armées appartenant aux belligérants franchissaient la zone neutre.

Les Hauts-Commissaires alliés se permettent d'attirer l'attention de M. Votas sur l'effet déplorable qui serait produit si les forces alliées de Constantinople se trouvaient dans l'obligation de désarmer ou même d'entrer en conflit avec les forces helléniques qui ont combattu à leurs côtés dans la grande guerre.

PELLE  
HORACE RUMBOLD  
GARRONI

Constantinople, le 20 août 1921.

[E 10030 143 44]

No. 32

Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 370.)

My Lord,

Athens, August 21, 1921.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 239 of the 17th instant, instructing me not to approach the Greek Government directly with regard to their true intentions, only reached me on the 18th, and I had already, on the 17th, taken advantage of my first conversation with M. Gounaris to question him on the subject, as reported in my telegram No. 456 and 457 of that date. I do not regret this, as I was able to assure him truthfully that I had received no instructions to enquire into the matter and was not going to pass any decision upon it. I have had the honour to say before, no information obtainable here from any source can be regarded as reliable, but the only people whom I can approach and whose remarks may be useful and interesting, even though not reliable, are the President of the Council and the Minister for War.

I was agreeably surprised by the moderation expressed by M. Gounaris, though of course I cannot determine how far it was genuine or only produced for my benefit.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE

\* Also to Netherlands, Norwegian, and Swedish Ministers, *mutatis mutandis*.

"droits de péage" and taxes or navigation dues. The former represent a survival of the recognition of the right of the riparian sovereign to close a passage, should he so desire, or alternatively to derive a revenue from the users, should he engage to keep it open. It is true that such tolls have been practically abolished, and that any tendency to revive the system would be retrograde. Taxes or navigation dues, on the other hand, may not in any case provide a revenue for the riparian sovereign. The necessity for the imposition of navigation dues was, for instance, specifically recognised in article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In virtue of that article and subsequent treaties, the European Commission of the Danube, which is responsible for the control of navigation and the maintenance of the channel of the river at its mouth, levies dues to cover the expenses of the commission and the cost of maintaining and policing the channel. The commission has incidentally been forced since the war to increase the dues charged by them by 200 per cent on account of the great rise of their expenses. In the case of the Danube, on that part of the Danube which has been declared international, the point at which the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube begins, article 16 of the draft Act of Navigation for the Danube, as adopted at the first reading, provides for a moderate tariff of dues to be applied exclusively to the works for which they are levied, and not for purposes of revenue, and to be charged without discrimination based on nationality or similar considerations.

4. At the same time His Majesty's Government would refer to the Statute on the régime of the waterways of international concern, which was negotiated at the recent Conference of Nations at Barcelona. Article 4 of this convention provides that in "the exercise of navigation . . . nationals, property and flags of all contracting States shall be treated . . ."

"No dues of any kind may be levied anywhere on the course at the mouth of a navigable waterway of international concern, other than dues in the nature of payment for services rendered and intended solely to cover in an equitable manner the expenses of maintaining and improving the navigability of the waterway and its approaches, or to meet expenditure incurred in the interest of navigation. These dues shall be fixed in accordance with such expenses, and the tariff of dues shall be posted in the ports. These dues shall be levied in such a manner as to render unnecessary a detailed examination of the cargo, except in cases of suspected fraud or infringement of regulations, and so as to facilitate international traffic as much as possible, both as regards their rates and the method of their application."

It was . . . that two . . . in the treatment of navigable waterways of international concern during the last half century the first demanding the abolition or reduction of all dues not specifically levied in respect of services to the shipping on which they were imposed, and applied to those . . . footing of absolute equality between all vessels, whatever the port of origin, destination or departure, their flag or ownership, or the nationality or ownership of their cargoes. The first of these principles, as will be shown below, is not in any way contravened by the dues to be levied on shipping using the waterway of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, and is indeed specifically laid down in the first paragraph of article 53 of the Treaty of Sévres, while the second principle is embodied in article 34 of the same treaty.

6. His Majesty's Government are glad that the special provisions of the Treaty of Sévres, providing for absolute equality and impartiality in the imposition of the Straits' dues have been noticed by the Netherlands and Scandinavian Governments. Apart from the administrative expenses of the commission, these dues are primarily to be devoted to necessary works and the provision of material facilities for all shipping and . . . to the unobstructed passage of vessels through the Straits should generally be welcomed. This consideration, connected as it is with the local political conditions, is again evidence of the difference in treatment which the problem of the Straits calls for as compared with the Scheldt, the Sound and the Elbe.

7. With regard to the composition of the commission, the Principal Allied Powers, in drafting these provisions of the treaty, were unanimous in considering that, in the interests of efficient administration, the size of the commission should be reduced as much as possible. It was inevitable, however, that those countries should be represented or invited to be represented on the commission who either, by their sacrifices in

the recent war, have at last made it possible to open this waterway to the commerce of the world and are now primarily responsible for guaranteeing that it should so continue open, or who, by their geographical position, are vitally interested in the free flow of trade through the Straits.

8. In these circumstances, the mere presence on the commission of the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, whose vessels together formed the bulk of the shipping using the Straits before the war, and who are deeply interested in the prosperity of Mediterranean commerce, should afford to those Governments who are not actually represented on the commission sufficient guarantees that the dues on vessels using the Straits will not be so raised as in any way to hamper the free movement of trade and shipping.

His Majesty's Government . . . the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments will not desire further representations.

The French and Italian Governments concur in the terms of this note.

I have, &c

CLAUDE OF KEDLESTON

E 10261,1/44]

No. 35

Sir H. Humboldt to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 812.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 2, 1921

ON the occasion of the Courban-Bairam festival I followed the usual procedure in sending the first dragoman to the palace and also to the Heir Apparent to convey my . . .

2. The Heir Apparent sent me a message in return to say that he would be pleased if I would take tea with him. I had not previously made the acquaintance of His Imperial Highness, though I had heard that his relations with the Sultan were not cordial, and that he was strongly Nationalist in sympathy. I did not feel that I could disregard the Heir Apparent's message, and I therefore asked him to appoint a day for an audience, at the same time causing the Sultan to be informed of the circumstances leading up to the audience, as I wished His Majesty to be cognisant of the matter.

3. I was received by the Heir Apparent on the 31st ultimo at the Dolma Bagtche Palace, which is assigned to him as a residence. The Prince appears to be a man getting on for 60 years of age, rather stout of pleasing appearance and . . .

4. After he had made some preliminary remarks regarding his former . . . with Sir Gerard Lowther, we passed to the discussion of the political situation. The Heir Apparent implied that the Sultan had been badly advised by Damad Ferid Pasha, and as much as said that His Majesty had been foolish in the confidence he had reposed . . .

As his reference to the Sultan was somewhat disparaging, I . . . Kemal. The Heir . . .

... I always held us up as the . . . they had behaved very . . .

... of war. I reminded the Heir Apparent that . . . received in London, and that modifications of the Treaty of Sévres, advantageous to . . .

... had apparently unanimously rejected them, thereby bringing a satisfactory settlement . . .

Enclosure in No. 30.

Allied High Commissioners to Youssouf Kemal

(Télégraphique.)

LES Hauts Commissaires soussignés n'ont pas manqué de transmettre à leurs Gouvernements la protestation des autorités d'Angora contenue dans le télégramme qui a été adressé par son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, en date du 6 juillet dernier, contre des attentats commis par les troupes helléniques lors de l'évacuation d'Ismid.

Dès le reçu des nouvelles qui leur étaient parvenues antérieurement relatives aux tristes événements d'Ismid, les Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople ont décidé de nommer immédiatement une Commission interalliée, non seulement pour s'enquérir sur le lieu, mais aussi pour assurer la protection de la vie et des biens de tous les musulmans qui pourraient s'y trouver en péril. Le rapport de cette commission, arrivée à Ismid le 28 juin, communiqué de suite aux Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, qui ont invité leurs représentants à Athènes de protester de la façon la plus énergique auprès du Gouvernement hellénique contre ces attentats et contre l'impuissance des autorités militaires helléniques d'assurer la protection des musulmans dans les districts occupés par elles. Par suite de cette démarche, le Gouvernement grec s'est engagé à ouvrir une enquête de l'espèce et d'imposer les sanctions nécessaires.

Les autorités d'Angora reconnaîtront sans doute que l'action prise à cet égard par les Gouvernements et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés démontre suffisamment leur sollicitude envers des musulmans opprimés et leur intention de veiller à ce qu'aucune injustice à l'égard des musulmans ne soit tolérée.

Les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées et associées regrettant, toutefois, de constater que, d'après les rapports circonstanciés qui leur parviennent, la population chrétienne des villes du Pont est exposée actuellement à des attentats du même ordre.

Ils expriment l'espoir que les autorités d'Angora, pour leur part, se feront un devoir d'instituer une enquête immédiate et rigoureuse pour vérifier les allégations répétées de représailles, de massacres, vols et autres attentats de tout genre qui auraient été commis à l'encontre de la population chrétienne d'Iacobli, Samoun, Kerasunde, Ordon, Tripoli, Trébizonde, et d'autres villes et villages du Pont ainsi que de l'intérieur d'Anatolie. Ils auront gré à son Excellence Youssouf Kemal de leur communiquer le plus tôt possible le résultat de cette enquête, qui devrait concerner notamment

De nombreux crimes commis dans la région de Samoun et de Kerasunde par les bandes d'Osman Agha.

La deportation vers l'intérieur au cours des mois de juin et juillet derniers de très nombreux sujets ottomans de religion chrétienne appartenant aux populations de la côte anatolienne, sans excepter même les femmes et les enfants. Ces représailles ont donné lieu aux pires exodes. Une partie des déportés auraient été massacrés à Kavak et dans les environs. Plus de soixante-dix villages auraient été détruits dans la région de Samoun, parmi lesquels les villages d'Aida, Karabeyin, Dere, Ardon, Dzenhari, Tmandir, &c., et plus de 3,500 chrétiens auraient péri.

La disparition et le massacre de la population arménienne de Saitoun et de Merzifoun au cours du mois de juillet dernier.

Les faits présentés, au cas où ils seraient confirmés, démontreraient l'incapacité de l'Administration ottomane à assurer la liberté et la sécurité des minorités chrétiennes et ne pourraient que provoquer dans l'opinion publique une indignation extrêmement nuisible à la cause de la Turquie.

E 10271 1/44

No. 37

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received September 12.)

No. 826 (Confidential)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 7, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report for your Lordship's information that M. Hermitte, "chef du cabinet particulier" of M. Brund, arrived here at the latter part of last month, ostensibly on a holiday.

2. Accompanied by my French colleague, he had an audience of the Sultan, which lasted about half an hour, on the 27th ultimo. According to a person in touch with the

[7760]

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the French authorities at Constantinople had already been informed that M. Hermitte had gone to Angora in any official capacity, and that he should not negotiate agreements with the Nationalists behind our back.

7. His Imperial Highness admitted that the Nationalists had been foolish in their political conduct, but said that they were only soldiers fighting with their backs to the wall. They were short of arms and ammunition. The Greeks were committing grave excesses, and were conducting the campaign with great ferocity.

8. As it had been suggested to me that the Nationalist movement was in reality being directed from Constantinople, though I do not believe that this is the case, I asked the His Imperial Highness whether, in his view, the centre of gravity was at Angora or at Constantinople. He replied without hesitation that it was at Angora, and that the Constantinople Government had no control over the Angora authorities. He then developed at great length the theme that England and Turkey must eventually work together for their mutual advantage.

9. Finally the His Imperial Highness alluded to the Armenian movement, and said that he had personally intervened during the war to prevent excesses. He then thanked the Armenian Patriarch for his action. The Patriarch then thanked the His Imperial Highness for his action.

10. The conversation took place in a room in the palace. As we were talking a tender towing two barges full of Greek soldiers was proceeding towards the Greek battleships. His Imperial Highness had his back to the window and did not see this tender, otherwise the sight of the Greek sailors might have inspired additional remarks about the Greeks.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

E 10267 143/44

No. 36.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received September 12.)

My Lord,  
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 10th inst., addressed to the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to inform you that the French, Italian and Japanese High Commissioners have been informed of the contents of the same.

2. I regret the delay which has occurred in dispatching this telegram and which has been caused, firstly, by the difficulty in obtaining unanimity as to its text, and, secondly, by endeavouring, finally without success, to induce the United States High Commissioner to join in the proposed representation.

3. The French and Italian High Commissioners, whose consent I consider to be indispensable in the first place to obtain, were unwilling to adopt, as being too categorical, the original text of the telegram which I had drafted and which followed more closely the lines indicated in your Lordship's despatch. After agreement had been reached on this point, Admiral Bristol expressed his unwillingness, on the general grounds of the dislike of his Government to identic communications, to associate himself in our common protest without previous instructions from the State Department. The Japanese High Commissioner likewise felt obliged to take the instructions of his Government on the subject.

4. Though eventually authorized by his Government to use his own discretion in the matter, Admiral Bristol finally declined to participate, and the accompanying telegram was signed only by the French, Italian and Japanese High Commissioners above mentioned.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Palace, General Pelle and M. Hermitte laid emphasis, in their conversation with His Majesty, on the knowledge of the French language possessed by Turks of the to-day derived their inspiration and form from French models. The Sultan, who had a suspicion that an endorsement of these views by him would be exploited by the press of Paris, is reported to have changed the conversation without expressing an opinion.

3. Reports, which are probably based on nothing more than surmise, are current, that M. Hermitte's visit is connected with the Franco-Kemalist Agreement, which M. Franklin Bouillon has been endeavouring to negotiate. It is stated that M. Hermitte has full power to sign without reference to Paris.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner

[E 10272 143 44]

No. 38

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (Received September 12)

(No. 827)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 7

THERE have been no developments in the political situation at Constantinople since I last had the honour of addressing your Government and of the European community here has been engrossed by the progress of the struggle in Anatolia. The public have had to rely on the communications issued by both sides. These communications do not show any particular regard for the truth. One or two days the Greek commander in chief did not issue any communiqué at all, and his silence was significant as indicating that nothing decisive had occurred.

The main object of the Greeks seems to have been to outflank the left wing of Turkish army and cause that wing so to bend back as to endanger the whole of the Nationalist forces. In order to perform this operation the Greek column had to advance into that country, where it suffered greatly from thirst. The Turks were at one time in a critical position, but skilfully extricated themselves from it, the struggle still continuing beyond the Sakaria river. I do not believe that the Greeks have expected such a determined resistance on the part of the Kemalists as they have encountered. Fighting has been proceeding for twelve days, and it is known that losses have been heavy on both sides. Although it is dangerous to draw conclusions from the present operations ending in a stalemate, both sides being too exhausted to be able to press any advantage. Such a state of things might form a favourable moment for intervention. On the one hand, the Greeks cannot view the prospect of a winter campaign with much equanimity, especially after the exhausting nature of the effort they have just made. Their financial embarrassments should come home to them with greater force when they reflect that they have not been able to crush the Kemalist army. The wiping out of that army could alone lead to a termination of the struggle.

The Kemalists, on their side, will be no less exhausted. They have to face the fact that they will be unable to raise revenue from a large part of the country. It is known that they are very short of arms and ammunition.

4. Constantinople presents a curious spectacle these days. The Greek fleet is very much on evidence, and everybody realises that the passage of Greek warships through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea portends the seizure of some Turkish steamer. The action of the Greek ships in removing from Turkish ships articles such as carpets and jewellery, which cannot be classed as even conditional contraband, and of imprisoning old men and children taken off ships so searched, does not fail to add to the bitterness of the Mohammedan population.

5. The following incidents throw an instructive light on Greek mentality —

When the hostilities were at their height I received a request from the Association of Greek Boy Scouts for permission to hold a flag-day in Constantinople in aid of the Greek war-orphans. This request was naturally refused.

An imaginative picture, portraying in most lurid colours the battle of Eski-Shehr and the slaughter of panic-stricken Turks, was put into circulation by a Greek artist.

No. 38A.

(No. 828. Confidential )  
My Lord,

Constantinople, September 6, 1921.

Mr Uchida recently came to see me to ask whether the Allied High Commissioners would communicate to him the agenda of their meetings. I replied that we could not do this as we could not treat the Japanese High Commissioner in this matter more favourably than the United States High Commissioner. The latter claims, with great insistence, to be consulted on all questions relating to trade, but we do not communicate the agenda of our meetings to him. I am aware that after the ratification of the treaty the Japanese Ambassador will occupy a somewhat different position to that of the United States Ambassador, but it would not be wise from the local point of view to communicate between the two High Commissioners at the present juncture.

the Turks towards securing the release of the British prisoners of war. It is difficult to see what influence Mr. Uchida can possibly have with the Nationalist, and I have told General Harington that I do not think it necessary for him to accept Mr. Uchida's offer.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

During the battle of Eski-Shehr a large portrait of King Constantine, surrounded by his family, was placed in the middle of the main street of Persia. General Harrington caused this also to be removed.

Finally, I notice in a recent letter from the *locum tenens* of the Patriarchate that his Beatitude now refers to the Ottoman Greeks as "our mat-

I have, &c.

HORACE R. MBOLO

11. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1967, 201: 1212-1213.

E 10414 143 441

No. 39

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(Received September 16.)

No. 416.)

My Lord,

Athens, September 8, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Corle, President of the Committee of the League of Nations for the repatriation of Greek and Bulgarian populations, consulted me some three weeks ago as to whether there would be any objection to his accepting an invitation from the Greek authorities to visit the front in Asia Minor. I said that I saw no objection whatever, provided that he made it clear that he went, not as a British officer, but as a private individual or an alien.

concludingly went, and returned a few days ago. He is a Greek papers stating that the "Daily interview granted by King Constantine to of Nations on the Asia Minor front;" in the

the King is stated to have declared, amongst other things, that Greece was not nim at getting Constantinople, that the Greek army could have been there, but the Allies did not desire their assistance, so it was useless to discuss the matter "for the present." Colonel Corfe begs me to assure your Lordship that this report is a pure invention, although he cannot judge whether it was invented by

authority at Eskisehir. It is true that he received a hint to write his name and was immediately received by the King, who naturally talked a certain amount about the military situation, but never mentioned Constantinople or any political subject. The King had personally requested the Commander-in-chief not to destroy more in Angora, when

Colonel Corfe was not able to go right up to the front, but he saw a good deal at the base and on the lines of communication, visited all the hospitals he could, had many long conversations with various officers, including, in particular, General Dousmanis, and motored about in the country visiting Turkish villages. His

equipment in stores, munitions, &c., and, what interested me most, their behaviour. I was assured me that, so far as he had been able to judge (and he was accompanied by an Englishman who spoke Turkish), there was practically no looting or ill-treatment of the inhabitants, and that nothing was taken without an official receipt being given. He had asked one Turk in a village about this, and he had replied that though they naturally did not like the Greeks, or want them there, they nevertheless preferred them to the Communists; that he did not know whether the official receipts would ever really

the individual Greek goldsmith bought and paid for what he wanted

(Colonel Corfe's view of the immediate future is that the Turks probably cannot stand much longer, and that when the real retirement begins it will be rapid and complete, and that the Greeks will take Angora without much more resistance, as an alternative, he sees the possibility of the Turks standing too long, with the result that the Greeks may be able to surround them and capture the bulk of the army; and he is of the opinion that the Greeks will be able to come back to the Sangaria and make that their military works, railways, &c., to come back to the Sangaria and make that their

provisional frontier, but he fears that with the advent of winter they will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain such a long line of communications, open to attacks by guerilla bands. Colonel Nairne agrees in general with these views, though he regards the alternative of the capture of Kermanshah as just as remote as the present state. As regards the danger from guerilla bands, the Greeks are confident that they can deal with them, thanks to past experience, and it is probable that they will

removing (not ill treating) the women and children until the men make their submission and give undertakings to keep quiet.

I am sorry to hear indications, from at least two sources, that the Greeks are themselves forming bands. If that is true and they try to rule the country by that method, I fear that we shall hear of atrocities, reprisals &c.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

September 9.—I took an opportunity to mention to M. Baltazzi this morning the points referred to in the last paragraph. He assured me most positively that he had no information whatever confirming the stories, and that he personally agreed most fully that it would be a fatal policy for the Greeks to adopt. At my suggestion he undertakes to keep me informed of anything of the kind that might be done by subordinates.

E 10539 1 44.

No 40

Mr Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 20.)

My Lord

Angora, September 6, 1921

IN the course of my first visit to M. Chicherin, for the purpose of presenting to him my credentials, he took occasion to inform me that Ali Fuad Pasha, the Angora Ambassador in Moscow, was anxiously awaiting my arrival in order to put before me his point of view on the subject of Anglo-Turkish relations. I informed M. Chicherin that I had no authority to discuss such matters, but would refer to your Lordship and ascertain whether it was desired that I should meet Ali Fuad informally and listen to such statements as he might wish to make.

My first interview with Ali Fuad took place in the presence of M. Chicherin. It was difficult to arrange otherwise without appearing desirous of giving gratuitous offence. The interview was interesting as indicating the closeness of the relations between the two. During more than an hour's conversation Ali Fuad hardly took his eyes off M. Chicherin, from whom he was evidently taking his cue. When once or twice his schooling was at fault, M. Chicherin intervened and gave a new turn to the conversation.

My second interview with Ali Fuad took place in his house, and he then handed to me the memorandum of which I am transmitting herewith a copy.\* He was evidently much more at his ease, and spoke more frankly and with less restraint. He informed me that these conversations had been none of his seeking, but were the result of M. Chicherin's initiative. He had been told by M. Chicherin that it was I who was anxious to meet him and discuss the Angora situation. Of the two accounts I incline to believe that of the Angora Ambassador.

The trend of Ali Fuad's arguments will be clear from his memorandum. The points that he principally emphasised in the course of our interview were the following—

He complained eloquently of what he regarded as the unjust treatment to which Turkey was subjected upon the conclusion of the armistice. The terms which Turkey had put forward, based upon the principles propounded by President Wilson, had, he

said, been favourably received by the British naval commander-in-chief. They had, however, led to nothing, and Turkey, having laid down her arms on the understanding that they were agreed, felt that she had been tricked into a position of impotence.

Popular demonstrations held to protest against this unfair treatment had, Ali Fuad said, been throughout of a perfectly peaceful nature, no armed outbreak of any kind occurring. The Allies had, however, used these exhibitions of popular feeling as a pretext for taking punitive measures in the shape of the capture of Constantinople, the occupation of strategic points on the mainland, the suppression of the Constantinian Parliament and the expulsion of its members. In this, and in fact throughout

its relations with Turkey since the armistice, Great Britain had been the initiator of repressive measures and has played largely an executory role.

Since the creation of the Angora Government Great Britain had pursued it with relentless hostility. Yet Angora was the expression of Turkish national feeling, and the only object it sought was the independence of Turkey within her ethnographical boundaries. The sincerity of its motives was demonstrated by its refusal to accept either Talaat or Enver, on the ground that they were associated with plans tending to

the oppression of the Armenians. Great Britain, with her great interests in the Mussalman world, to follow a policy of oppression towards a Nationalist Turkey, which only sought to live in harmony with her and to shape its existence in accord with the spirit of friendship which had animated relations between Great Britain and Turkey in the past.

To count any longer with Constantinople was useless. The Government, by its vacillation and weakness, had lost all hold over the Turkish nation. Angora alone is the embodiment of national sentiment.

Ali Fuad spoke at some length upon the attitude of Angora towards the races which had formed part of the former Turkish Empire. Over these, he said, Turkey had no desire whatever to impose her domination, the lesson of respecting the rights of others having been taught her by the war. The line of Alexandretta-Aleppo-Hage had constituted, in his opinion, the ethnographical boundary of Turkey, and the tribes to the south of this line were free, as far as Turkey was concerned, to govern themselves as they wished and to place themselves under the mandate of whatever Power they chose. Angora was not connected with the anti-British risings in Mesopotamia, which were the result of spontaneous movements among the tribes.

In the matter of the present Greco-Turkish war, Ali Fuad appeared to be in no way less sincere. He expressed his opinion that the Greeks are acting as the instruments of the Allied Governments. He was aware that a declaration of neutrality in the conflict had been made by the

Angora Government, but he said that the Allies were not themselves taking part in the war, but were deposing the Greeks to act for them. He laid stress upon the fact that the Greek army was found to be equipped with British artillery, British rifles and British aeroplanes, and deplored the employment of the Greeks, the historical enemies of Turkey, for executing the coercive policy of the Allies.

Ali Fuad spoke of the relations between Angora and Soviet Russia. These are regulated by the *Traité d'Amitié* which exists between the two countries. He denied the existence of an alliance and refused to admit that Russia had been supplying the Turkish forces with military equipment or armed support. It was certainly the case that large quantities of Russian war material had found their way to Angora, but this material was supplied by the Germans out of the stores and equipment captured by them in the course of the war. Also—an admission which to some extent incriminates the Soviet Government, in whose hands all the foreign trade of this country is supposed to be concentrated—he referred to a fairly large contraband trade in Russian arms and ammunition carried on by private dealers through Black Sea ports.

The Angora Ambassador is a man of from 35 to 40 years of age, short of stature, but noticeably broad and powerful. He is obviously a soldier and disclaims any diplomatic ability. His manners are distinctly attractive and give an impression of straightforwardness. He has an excellent knowledge of German and speaks French fluently and fairly correctly.

I have, &c.

R. M. HODGSON

\* Not printed

*Foreign Office to Lord Curzon of the Crown*

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, September 1921

I HAVE the honour, by the direction of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, to request you to favour him with your early opinion on certain questions raised by the apparent intention of the Russian Soviet Government to deliver warships to the Kemal Turkish Government of Angora.

2 With a view to explain the somewhat complex issues of international law involved, it seems necessary to call attention to the following facts:

His Majesty's Government concluded on the 16th March last a trade agreement with the Russian Soviet Government a copy of which is transmitted herewith for convenience of reference.

Herewith is M. K.

M.

The agreement is still in force, but His Majesty's Government have recently instructed the British Trade Commissioner in Moscow, in a despatch to draw the attention of the Russian Soviet Government to the agreement. It should be noted that the agreement was signed by the Russian Soviet Government and the Turkish Government of Angora, as a Government separate from the Turkish Government of Constantinople, with whom His Majesty's Government were still technically at war, suspended by the armistice of 1918. His Majesty's Government have had, since then, no direct official relations with the Kemal Government. Warfare between the two Governments has continued, but the Kemal Government have not attempted to attack the British people of Asia Minor.

4. The principal Allies concluded an armistice with the Turkish Government at Constantinople in October 1918. Certain parts of Turkey were occupied by the principal Allies, and this occupation was extended in March 1920 to Constantinople. On the 10th August 1920, a Treaty of Peace was signed at Sevres with the Turkish Government. This treaty has not yet been ratified either by the Turkish Government or by any of the principal Allies.

5. Meanwhile a separate Government in that part of Asia Minor not occupied by the Allies had been constituted in 1920 by a certain Mustafa Kemal. This Government subsequently styled itself the Grand National Assembly. The seat of the Government is at Angora. This Government, while not formally renouncing allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey regards itself as the sovereign Government of Turkey, in distinction to the Government of Constantinople, with which, however, it does, in fact, maintain friendly relations.

6. In the autumn of 1920 the Government of Venizelos fell in Greece, and the succeeding Government ordered the evacuation of the Greek forces who had been sent to occupy the Smyrna area of Asia Minor by the Supreme Council in 1919, an occupation which was subsequently extended in July 1920 in order to drive back the Kemal forces from the area of the Straits, and force the Turkish Government to sign the Treaty of Sevres.

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Enclosed series of confidential print.

delegation representatives of the Kemal Government. It was with such a united delegation that the Supreme Council subsequently negotiated. At the London conference certain proposals were put before both the Greek and Turkish Governments, and it was made clear to both Governments that if hostilities were resumed in Asia Minor the Supreme Council rejected all responsibility. Before final answers to the Supreme Council's proposals were returned, hostilities were resumed in Asia Minor between the Greeks and Kemal Turks, and towards these hostilities the Supreme Council decided to adopt an attitude of neutrality.

9. Since this renewal of hostilities had taken place in quasi-defiance of the Supreme Council and while the questions at issue were still *sub judice* by the Supreme Council, the principal Allied Governments originally decided to interpret their neutrality in such a way as to prevent any export of arms from the countries of the Allies to either side of the ordinary rights of a belligerent in the matter of the visit and search of the vessels of the principal Allies at sea. By this decision as to neutrality it was decided that the Kemal Government should be regarded as a Government separate from the Turkish Government of Constantinople, with whom His Majesty's Government were still technically at war, suspended by the armistice of 1918. His Majesty's Government have had, since then, no direct official relations with the Kemal Government. Warfare between the two Governments has continued, but the Kemal Government have not attempted to attack the British people of Asia Minor.

10. His Majesty's Government have since then maintained a permanent attitude towards Great Britain, without, however, going to the length of a declaration of war. Although His Majesty's Government had, after the London conference of March 1921, made plain their neutrality towards the Greco-Turkish hostilities, the Kemal Government have preferred to regard His Majesty's Government's attitude of neutrality as hypocritical. Some hostile measures, such as the seizure of British subjects as prisoners and have rejected an agreement made by their representative at the London conference in March 1921 for an exchange with Turkish prisoners detained by His Majesty's Government at Malta—an agreement which on their side His Majesty's Government had begun to carry out.

11. Without burdening the Law Officers of the Crown with further details, Lord Curzon is satisfied that upon the facts a good case could be made out in support of the thesis that the Kemal Government has been guilty of some "form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire," but he is doubtful whether action under the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement based upon that case would be consistent with the maintenance of a policy of neutrality towards the Kemalists as belligerents and in harmony with the international practice governing the relations of neutrals towards belligerents.

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[7360]



3. The remainder of Yousouf Kemal's letter raises the question of the use of Greek warships of Constantinople as a base for operations in the Black Sea. I am of opinion that if your Lordship authorises me to reply to Yousouf Kemal, as proposed above, it would be preferable to ignore the latter part of his communication.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

*Yousouf Kemal to Allied High Commissioners*

Le 27 août dernier, deux torpilleurs anglais pénétrèrent dans le port de Samsoû et arrêtaient, pour visiter, le navire à moteur d'Ah Reiss, originaire de Rize. Un embarcation britannique montée par dix hommes armés se détacha de l'un des torpilleurs, accosta le moteur, et tous les marins anglais qui se trouvaient dans l'embarcation fouillèrent de fond en comble le navire turc, et interrogèrent l'équipage pour savoir si le navire transportait des armes et des munitions. N'ayant rien trouvé de leurs recherches, qu'un seul revolver, les marins anglais quittèrent le moteur et rentrèrent à bord de leurs navires de guerre.

Or, le 10 août, le communiqué officiel du Conseil suprême annonçait que les grandes Puissances avaient décidé de persévérer dans leur politique de stricte neutralité vis-à-vis de chacun des deux belligérants, d'autre part, Mr Lloyd George, dans son discours du 10 août aux Communes, affirmait que l'Angleterre n'aidait en aucune façon aucun des deux adversaires. La perquisition effectuée par les torpilleurs anglais à bord du moteur turc pour chercher des armes et des munitions vient démontrer encore une fois au peuple turc la façon dont on complot à son égard les

cette occasion que c'est précisément après la proclamation toute aussi solennelle faite de la stricte neutralité de la zone de Constantinople et du Bosphore que les navires helléniques ont commencé à utiliser ce port comme base de leurs raids dans la mer Noire.

Il me devient à ajouter que, même strictement appliquée, nous ne saurions considérer comme bien sincère la neutralité de ceux qui, après avoir mis la main sur l'approvisionnement comme ils l'entendent en matériel de guerre. Il est évident pour tout le monde que la Grèce, ayant conservé sa marine militaire, est seule appelée à profiter de cette liberté.

Au nom de mon Gouvernement, je proteste de la façon la plus énergique contre tous ces faits par lesquels on tâche, d'un côté, de calmer les appréhensions musulmanes, inquiet de voir atteinte à l'indépendance de la Turquie, et, de l'autre côté, de priver dans la mesure du possible la Grèce dans sa lutte contre nous.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
YOUSOUF KEMAL

Angora, le 4 septembre 1921

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Your Excellency, "Iron Duke" at Constantinople, September 12, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my observations on your letter of the 10th September. The facts are as follow

2. On the date named, viz., the 27th August, a caïque under sail was met outside the port of Samsoû by two British destroyers. One of these lowered a boat and proceeded alongside for the purpose of obtaining news. No search of the cargo took place—merely some conversation carried on with the aid of an interpreter. The English boat's crew was naturally armed, as it has been reported more than once recently that many caïques are used by armed brigands. The orders given to the British destroyer were, *inter alia*, to acquire news of what was going on on the coast, and, as all information was denied them by the Turkish authorities at the port visited, recourse had to be had to interrogating passing vessels. The British officer behaved perfectly correctly and courteously, and his visit lasted less than five minutes.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the next Turkish caïque visited (in the neighbourhood of Bender Ereklî) had a sick man on board, who received medical attention and was given a supply of quinine.

I do not know whether your Excellency intends to answer this communication from Yousouf Kemal, or, in view of its tone, to ignore it, but I welcome the opportunity of restating the naval point of view.

3. Under the terms of the armistice with Turkey, I maintain that His Majesty's ships have a perfect right to detain and search any Turkish vessels, and that right will continue until a peace with Turkey has been ratified. In order not to create further an already difficult situation, this right has not been exercised since Britain's declaration of neutrality as between Greeks and Kemalists, but the right exists, and it would have to be shown that its exercise operated unfavourably against the Kemalists in their conflict with Greece before a charge of breach of neutrality could be preferred with justice. Special care had been, and will continue to be, taken to ensure that no grounds for such a charge will be furnished through the action of any of His Majesty's ships.

4. To describe the trivial incident cited by the writer as a disregard of "promises most solemnly made" of strict neutrality is merely playing with words. Does Angora not think that a reciprocal neutrality is incumbent on them? Touching matters within my knowledge as naval Commander-in-chief, why are not the usual courtesies and facilities accorded to His Majesty's ships in Nationalist ports? Why is British trade boycotted? Why has no redress been made for the forced entry and brutal murder on board a British ship at Adaha, and in regard to matters of common knowledge, but outside my official sphere, why are British prisoners still held by the Nationalists?

It all becomes thus "Minister" to talk of neutrality when every action of his

As regards the complaint that Greek ships continue to use Constantinople as a base for their raids in the Black Sea, this is, of course, outside my province to justify or explain.

The ships are there, however, with the consent of all the Allies, not that of the British only. As far as I am aware, no "waters" have been proclaimed neutral, and therefore exception cannot be taken to Greek ships using Constantinople and the Bosphorus on the ground that the neutrality of these zones, "solemnly proclaimed," has been infringed. The writer chooses to forget that, as a result of the great war in which Turkey ranged herself on the side of the enemies of Great Britain and her Allies, Constantinople to-day is in the military occupation of those Allies, and the fleets of those Allies—of which Greece was one—can scarcely be excluded from its waters.

5. Finally, with regard to the penultimate paragraph of the letter under reply, no one knows better than the writer how little the fact of possessing or not possessing a navy has affected the supply of arms and munitions to the Kemalists forces. It is not a fact that Greece, by virtue of her navy, has alone been able to reap the advantage of unrestricted imports of war material.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, Admiral,  
Commander-in-chief

E 10702 143 44]

No. 44.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)

No. 864)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 20, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 745 of the 10th August last, reporting the action taken by me to obtain the release of certain native Christians imprisoned in Constantinople for alleged participation in excesses in the district of Ismidt, I have the honour to report that since writing that despatch I have made verbal representations several times weekly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the 30th ultimo İzzet Pasha informed me that he hoped to give me a favourable answer in a few days. On the 1st instant I visited the Ministry of Justice to endeavour to find some means of releasing those Christians against whom

no evidence was available. On the 6th instant he stated that a number of the  
ed, on the 17th instant that seventeen had been released, and yesterday  
that forty-seven had been released. I propose to continue pressing for the release of  
such of the remainder as to whose guilt there is insubstantial evidence

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner

E 10706 143 44

No. 45

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston - (Received September 26.)

(No. 86)

I find that my colleagues share my impression that the Nationalists would be  
glad to make peace, as they realise their exhausted state. But I personally do not  
believe that they would be satisfied with less than the solution contemplated at Paris.  
That with regard to Smyrna. On the other hand, my colleagues and I have no  
to show that the Greeks would welcome mediation at this stage, and we  
of opinion that it will be necessary to await the effect on Greek public opinion of  
the inevitable disappointment caused by the failure of the Greek army after their  
great effort to reach Angora and to crush Mustapha Kemal's army. A report in the  
press states that the Greeks have failed to obtain a loan abroad and that they will  
have to recourse to an internal loan, which presumably means the printing of more  
notes.

Looking at the situation from here, it would seem that we must await the  
further development of the military operations and see whether the Greeks will be

Angora and creating a kind of desert between themselves and the Nationalists without  
hindrance from the latter. A few weeks should be sufficient to judge of the effect on  
the internal situation in Greece of the serious check which the Greeks have received.  
We therefore think that towards the end of October the Allies may find the moment  
favourable for action.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

E 10707 1 44]

No. 46

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston - (Received September 26.)

(No. 86). Confidential)

My Lord,

Constantinople September 20, 1921.

M. FRANKLIN-BOUILLON arrived at Constantinople from Paris a few days  
ago.

2. I learn confidentially in the above connection that a certain person called  
gave him any information about the convention between M. Franklin-Bouillon  
and the Nationalists. The French officer at the time of the convention was  
behalf of the Allies.

My informant infers that there is a secret military clause attached to the  
convention, which would allow the Kemalists the use of their  
also believed that the French would consent to allow the Kemalists the use of their

railway line, i.e., the section of the Bagdad Railway in the French sphere running east  
through Biredjik and Ourfa towards Mosul, in the event of hostilities between the  
Kemalists and King Feisal.

4. It is difficult to check the accuracy of the foregoing information. There is little  
doubt in my mind that M. Franklin-Bouillon's negotiations cover a wider ground than  
the exchange of prisoners. My French colleague, who must be perfectly well aware  
of what is going on, spontaneously informed me a few days ago with a shrug of his  
shoulders that M. Franklin-Bouillon had passed through Constantinople on his way to  
Angora. He knew quite well that I had no doubt already heard about M. Franklin-  
Bouillon's movements, and it is evident to me that he wished to convey the impression  
that he is in no way associated with that gentleman's activities.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner

E 10708 476 44]

No. 47.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston - (Received September 26.)

(No. 871)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 21, 1921

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 848 of the 9th August, asking  
Judge Sir Lindsey Smith's proposal to try in the Supreme Court actions  
between British and Ottoman subjects, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of  
a letter given by him containing his reasons for recommending jurisdiction.

It had a useful effect upon the Turkish Government, which has  
entered into serious negotiations with the Allied High Commissioners  
for the creation of the Mixed Court proposed in our judgment of the  
12th August, of which copy is enclosed herewith for purpose of reference.

The French Government has also been moved by our judge's action to do so  
with great eagerness in carrying through these negotiations, with a view to removing  
complaint made by French nationals that they have still to wait, while British cases are  
already being tried.

1. Three meetings have already taken place at the Sublime Porte between the  
Juridical Commission of the Allied High Commissioners and the Turkish delegates, and  
an agreement has been reached on all points save one. The Juridical Commission has  
accepted the Turkish proposals on the following points:

The court will be called "Temporary Mixed Judicial Commission" instead of  
"Temporary Mixed Tribunal." This change of title will not affect its powers in  
any way.

Judgments will be pronounced in the name of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

The administrative service of the commission will be directed by one of the  
Ottoman members as administrative president. There are also several modifications  
of minor importance.

5. The one point on which the Turks insist and which the Juridical Commission  
is unwilling to yield is that the court, consisting of two Allied and one Turkish  
member, should always be presided over by the Turkish member.

6. At yesterday's meeting the Turkish delegates declared that this is a condition  
sine qua non of their Government's acceptance, and that if it is not yielded they will  
leave the Allies to do what they please. They sought to justify their claim as a matter  
of international courtesy.

7. The Juridical Commission holds that it is contrary to the dignity of the  
Allies to allow a Turkish judge to preside over a European court. Under the French system, on which  
the Turkish is based, the president exercises a predominant influence in directing the  
course of the trial. To concede to the Turks the direction would give to the Mixed  
Court the character of a Turkish, instead of an inter-Allied, institution. Sir Lindsey  
Smith agrees in this view.

8. It may be possible to find some way out of the deadlock, and so far as British  
interests are concerned there is no harm in delay, as British subjects can have their

cases tried in the Supreme Court while the negotiations proceed, but the French and Italians are so anxious to bring the negotiations to a conclusion that they may be tempted to yield the point.

3. I will keep your Lordship informed by telegram of the further development, but at present my view is that we should refuse to yield, and that the French and Italians should follow our lead if the negotiations fall through and should give jurisdiction to their own consular courts.

10. It is important that we should have a judge of high standing ready here to sit on the court as soon as it is formed, so that the court may inspire from the start confidence in its procedure and judgments, and so pave the way for the judicial reform.

qualified for the post, but I understand that the six months term for which he was appointed to come out expires on the 1st October. I venture to urge that every effort should be made immediately by telegram to induce him to stay to inaugurate the new court if it is found possible to establish it.

I have, &c.

HORACE R. LALORIE,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47

*Judgment by Sir Lindsay Smith*

(Ernest Mili v. Asseo & Merkulian.)

It is not without interest, as it is typical of so many cases that have come within the knowledge of the court, to allude shortly to the steps which the unfortunate plaintiff then took to get back his money.

As there was no Mixed Court, and the British court had not reopened, he went to the High Commissioner, who returned his application, and it went to the Allied police court at Stambul.

Arbitration was then suggested, and each side put up an arbitrator. After a time the arbitrator chosen by the defendant resigned. The plaintiff then applied to the police again, but they were unable to help, as they had instructions not to interfere with commercial cases. The plaintiff then went back to the High Commissioner, who could give him no assistance, as by this time Asseo claimed to be an Italian subject. The plaintiff then sent a lawyer to the Italian judge, who referred it to the Carabinieri. This necessitated many visits to Stambul, lasting over a month. The Italian police then told the defendant he must allow the arbitration to finish. He objected, as the plaintiff had chosen a lawyer and not a merchant as arbitrator. The plaintiff then nominated a merchant. The defendant's next objection was to a certain clause in the submission to arbitration, and finally the Italian police declined to have anything more to do with it.

The plaintiff then went to the Italian judge, and the Italian judge asked the defendants to agree to arbitration. They refused on the ground that they were an Ottoman firm.

The plaintiff finally applied to this court for a summons, and the court, having formally ascertained from the Italian authorities that they did not consider that they had jurisdiction to deal with the matter on the ground that, though Asseo was an Italian-protected subject, the firm was an Ottoman one, allowed the summons to be issued.

When the case was opened by the plaintiff, the defendants' firm, who were represented by a foreign lawyer, submitted that the court had no jurisdiction to deal with the case, as defendants were Ottoman subjects, and that even if the British court were technically competent to try the action such powers had never been exercised by this court before, and should therefore not be exercised now. This raises a very important issue, and it is helpful, in order to arrive at the true meaning of the present Order in Council, to consider the various Orders in Council from which this court derives its jurisdiction.

The first Order in Council was in 1860, but unfortunately no copy appears to be in the possession of the court. The amending Order in Council is dated 1863, and article 65 therein provides: "Where a British subject desires to entertain a suit against a foreigner, the Supreme Court shall entertain the same, and shall hear and

determine it," &c. Then comes the important proviso which is all part of the same section: "Provided that the foreigner first obtains and files in the court the consent in writing of the competent local authority on behalf of the Sublime Ottoman Porte or of the consul of his own nation to his submitting, and does submit to the jurisdiction of the court, and, if required, gives security to pay fees and abide by and perform such decision as may be given by the court." The next article that article this court had no jurisdiction unless the foreigner formally submitted to it. The next Order in Council, 1873, article 81, contains provisions to the same effect, the only alteration being that Ottoman subjects are mentioned therein as well as foreigners, and it reads: "Where any Ottoman subject or foreigner desires to institute a suit," &c., and the proviso commences: "Provided that the Ottoman subject or foreigner first obtains and files a consent in writing."

But the Order in Council, 1899, article 150, extended the scope of the court's jurisdiction and for the first time the words "if so required by the court" were inserted before the words "first obtains and files in the court," so that it was left to the court's discretion to say whether it required submission before it would entertain the action. Further, the proviso was no longer part of one continuous paragraph, but was separated from the main provision by a full stop. The Order in Council, 1910, which reads as follows:—

139.—(1) Where an Ottoman subject or foreigner desires to institute or take in the court an action against a British subject, or a British subject desires to institute or take in the court an action against an Ottoman subject or foreigner, the court shall entertain the same, and shall hear and determine it, either by the court sitting alone or, if all parties desire, or the court, having regard to its jurisdiction, thinks fit to direct a trial with a jury or assessors, then with a jury or assessors, but in all other respects according to the ordinary course of the court.

(2) Provided that the Ottoman subject or foreigner, if so required by the court, first obtains and files in the court the consent in writing of the competent authority on behalf of the Sublime Ottoman Porte or of his own nation (as the case may be) to his submitting, and does submit to the jurisdiction of the court, and, if required by the court, give security to the satisfaction of the court, and to such reasonable amount as the court thinks fit, by deposit or otherwise to pay fees, damages, costs and expenses, and abide by and perform such decision as shall be given by the court or on appeal.

It appears to me that the plain meaning of this article as it appears in the two last Orders in Council is as follows: Where an Ottoman subject desires to bring an action against a British subject, or vice versa, this court is bound to hear and determine it, but the court may, if it thinks fit, require the Ottoman subject to (1) file a consent of his Government to his submission and to actually submit; (2) give security for damages and costs. It has been suggested that the words "if so required by the court" apply only to what I may call the Government consent, and not to the words "and does submit," and that therefore the actual personal submission is still essential before the court can entertain the action. I do not think the subsection can be so construed. I think that the words "Provided that the Ottoman subject" down to the "jurisdiction of the court" must be read and is actually one continuous sentence, all governed by the proviso "if so required by the court." If this part of subsection 2 is divided into two distinct sentences, the first of which is governed by the words "if so required by the court" and the second not so governed, the second sentence would then consist of the words "and does submit to the jurisdiction of the court," whereas the first sentence would have to end with the word "submitting," which leaves it incomplete.

Further, the word "first" implies a second or some further action which the party is to do "if so required by the court." The first thing is "obtain and file the Government consent." What is the second? "To submit," I take it, "to the jurisdiction of the court."

I am therefore of opinion that this court has, by virtue of the Order in Council, jurisdiction to try this case. Next comes the question whether the court should in the circumstances exercise such jurisdiction. I am informed by Mr H. E. Peare, who, as leader of the bar, has an unrivalled experience in the practice of these courts, and who has very properly acted as *amicus curiae* on this point, that this court has never before exercised jurisdiction in a case where the defendant, an Ottoman subject, has failed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.

I can well understand that before the war this court declined to hear such cases unless the party submitted to the jurisdiction and gave security, (1) because there was an alternative court open to the parties (the Tijaret); and (2) if a decision was given here, there might be great difficulty in enforcing it. There was, in fact, no inducement to the plaintiff to sue in this court an Ottoman who objected to the jurisdiction, for, in the absence of security or sanction of the defendant's Government, his judgment might be useless to him. It was far safer to proceed against the defendant in the Mixed Court, which was then open to him. But like many other excellent things, the Tijaret vanished with the war, and the British merchant has at the present time no tribunal whose assistance he can invoke other than the Ottoman courts, which have been tacitly admitted by the Capitulations to be quite unsuitable to deal with modern commercial actions. It would seem superfluous in the 20th century to point out how important it is that merchants should have courts to recourse to which can deal, and deal promptly, with actions of this nature. If there is no tribunal which can enforce commercial contracts when made it is useless for the merchant to make any, and an end very soon comes not only to commercial security and stability, but even to trade itself. This cannot but be a disadvantage to the country and everyone in it. It is therefore my considered opinion that, until other courts are established, it should be the policy of this court where it has a discretion, to exercise that discretion in the direction of admitting rather than of refusing to entertain such cases. I am strengthened in that view by article 308 of the Treaty of Peace with Turk where it is laid down that all contracts concluded before the coming into force of the Treaty (as this was) between British subjects and Ottoman subjects shall be decided by the British court to the exclusion of the Turkish courts.

That treaty has been signed but not ratified, therefore it is not yet in force, but it is the desire of the British Government that the jurisdiction of the British court should be extended to cover such cases as these.

I have already held that the submission is a question for the court's discretion, and I think that the present situation and the facts of this particular case are more than sufficient to justify this court in declining to require any such submission. I therefore propose to hear and determine this case forthwith on its merits.

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 47

#### Joint Allied Note to Turkish Government

A DIVERSES reprises et notamment par ses notes des 5 mai 1919, 9 juin 1919 et 13 juillet 1919, la Sublime Porte a bien voulu appeler l'attention des Hauts-Commissaires alliés sur les graves inconvénients qui résultent, tant pour les intérêts des ressortissants alliés que pour ceux des sujets ottomans, de l'absence en ce moment de tribunaux régulièrement constitués également reconnus par les Puissances alliées et le Gouvernement ottoman.

Tant à la suite de ces notes que de leur propre initiative et pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la justice gravement lésés par cette regrettable situation, dont la responsabilité retombe d'ailleurs entièrement sur le Gouvernement ottoman, les Hauts-Commissaires ont engagé avec la Sublime Porte des pourparlers en vue d'instituer à Constantinople un Tribunal mixte provisoire composé de juges alliés et ottomans qui se serait prononcé sans appel ni autre recours sur les différends en matière civile et commerciale présentant un réel caractère d'urgence entre Alliés et Ottomans ou entre Ottomans et Alliés. Un délégué ottoman avait été désigné pour conférer à ce sujet avec les délégués des Hauts-Commissaires alliés et une base d'entente avait été établie en vue d'un accord définitif. La Sublime Porte a ignoré pas que c'est à elle seule qu'incombe la responsabilité de l'échec de ces pourparlers.

Préoccupés de mettre fin à une situation qui s'aggrave de jour en jour, les Hauts-Commissaires autorisés par leurs Gouvernements ont décidé de s'adresser de nouveau à la Sublime Porte en vue d'instituer à Constantinople un Tribunal mixte provisoire composé de juges anglais, français, italiens et ottomans qui, sans préjudger le régime définitif, pendant la période actuelle d'armistice et jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du futur traité de paix, de tous les différends en matière civile et commerciale ayant un caractère d'urgence qui s'élèveront entre ressortissants anglais, français et italiens d'une part, et ottomans d'autre part, de même qu'entre sujets ottomans d'une part, et ressortissants anglais, français et italiens d'autre part.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de communiquer sous ce pli à la Sublime Porte l'exposé des dispositions préparées par eux "dans les limites de l'équité et en tenant compte des droits et intérêts de l'Empire ottoman," conformément au vœu exprimé par le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères dans sa note verbale du 9 juin 1919. Ils espèrent fermement que le Gouvernement ottoman, reconnaissant l'esprit d'équité qui a inspiré ces dispositions et les garanties de justice impartiale qu'elles présentent pour toutes les parties intéressées, s'empressera de leur donner son adhésion et de désigner des juges ottomans appelés à participer au Tribunal mixte provisoire qui sera ainsi constitué.

Les Hauts-Commissaires feront connaître à la Sublime Porte, avant le 31 de ce mois, les noms des juges alliés qui auront été désignés par eux. Ils prient le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères de leur faire la même communication avant la même date en ce qui concerne les juges ottomans.

Dans le cas où la Sublime Porte le jugerait préférable, elle pourrait rétablir d'urgence les chambres mixtes commerciale et maritime du Tijaret, qui devront être rétablies dès l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix et qui connaîtront, dans les mêmes formes qu'avant la prétendue abolition des Capitulations de tous les différends en matière civile et commerciale entre ressortissants alliés et ottomans ou ottomans et alliés, sous réserve cependant des dispositions de l'article 308 du Traité de Sévres, soit que les parties alliées se réservent de s'adresser à leurs Tribunaux consulaires conformément à cet article, après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, soit que, n'étant parvenues devant le Tribunal de Tijaret pendant la durée de l'armistice, ce tribunal n'ait pas rendu un jugement qui aurait été régulièrement revêtu de la signature du dragoman allié.

Les Hauts-Commissaires laissent à l'appréciation de la Sublime Porte la choix de la solution qu'elle voudra adopter. Ils tiennent à l'avertir des maintes fois que, si elle ne prend pas de décision dans un délai de trois ans, ils jugeront nécessaires pour assurer, sans le concours du Gouvernement ottoman, le règlement des nombreuses affaires civiles et commerciales urgentes entre Alliés et Ottomans et Ottomans et Alliés qui restent actuellement en souffrance par suite de l'absence de tribunaux réguliers compétents, soit que ces affaires soient portées devant le Tribunal mixte provisoire dont il est question ci-dessus, jugeant avec le concours des juges alliés seuls, soit qu'elles soient portées devant les Tribunaux consulaires alliés conformément aux dispositions de l'article 308 du Traité de Sévres. L'exécution des jugements ainsi rendus serait assurée, selon le cas, par l'autorité consulaire des parties intéressées ou par la police internationale, ainsi que cela a lieu des maintenant pour les affaires mixtes entre Anglais et Ottomans.

Les Hauts-Commissaires sont décidés à appliquer l'une ou l'autre de ces dispositions en cas de refus du concours du Gouvernement ottoman, mais ils espèrent que la Sublime Porte, comprenant la nécessité de mettre fin à une situation qui lèse aussi gravement les intérêts des Ottomans que des Alliés, et qui ne profite qu'aux gens de mauvaise foi, ne voudra pas, par une abstention que rien ne justifierait, priver les parties ottomanes des garanties que les Hauts-Commissaires entendent leur assurer.

Les Hauts-Commissaires prient le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères, en raison de la gravité et de l'urgence de la question, de vouloir bien leur faire connaître sa réponse le plutôt possible et en tous cas avant le 31 du mois courant.

PELLÉ.  
HORACE RUMBOLD  
GARRONI

Constantinople, le 12 août 1921

#### Enclosure 3 in No. 47

#### Memorandum by Allied High Commissioners.

PENDANT la période actuelle d'armistice et jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, sans préjudger en quoi que ce soit le régime judiciaire qui sera établi en Turquie après la paix, un Tribunal mixte provisoire siégeant à Constantinople connaîtra contradictoirement ou par défaut de tous les différends en matière civile et commerciale ayant un caractère d'urgence entre ressortissants anglais, français ou italiens d'une part, et sujets ottomans d'autre part, de même qu'entre sujets ottomans d'une part, et ressortissants anglais, français et italiens d'autre part.

Chacun des Hauts-Commissaires désignera pour faire partie de ce tribunal un des trois juges alliés et, s'il l'estime à propos, un juge suppléant. Le Gouvernement ottoman désignera de son côté trois juges ottomans et, s'il le juge à propos, un, deux ou trois juges suppléants.

Dès que le tribunal sera régulièrement constitué, il recevra les requêtes des parties alliées ou ottomanes. Ces requêtes seront transmises au tribunal par l'autorité dont relèvera la partie demanderesse.

Les jugements seront rendus à la majorité des voix par trois juges: un de la nationalité du demandeur, un de la nationalité du défendeur et le troisième de nationalité différente désignée par le sort. Celui-ci exercera la présidence du tribunal.

Dans le cas où deux Alliés de nationalité différente seraient parties aux débats, le sort désignera celui des juges alliés de l'une ou l'autre nationalité qui seront appelés à siéger. Le président en ce cas sera le juge allié de la nationalité non partie au procès. Dans le cas où des Alliés des trois nationalités seraient appelés en cause, le sort désignera le président et le juge allié, qui seraient appelés à siéger. Les jugements devront être toujours rendus par trois juges dans les conditions ci-dessus indiquées.

Le Tribunal mixte provisoire appliquera la loi ottomane et les usages locaux. Il réglera lui-même sa procédure en prenant pour base la procédure employée autrefois devant les tribunaux du Tidjaret en la simplifiant et en en diminuant les délais le plus possible. Ses décisions seront sans appel, requête civile ni recours en cassation, seront seulement susceptibles d'opposition devant lui en cas de défaut de l'une des parties.

Les frais judiciaires seront versés au Trésor ottoman après prélèvement des dépenses occasionnées par la constitution du Tribunal.

La procédure se fera en français. Les débats auront lieu également en turc. Des interprètes pourront être données aux parties ottomanes qui seront personnellement entendues.

Le tribunal décidera souverainement sur le rapport d'un de ses juges des affaires qu'il jugera nécessaire de retenir comme présentant un réel caractère d'un. Pour les autres, il renverra les parties à se pourvoir après la paix comme il appartiendra.

Chacun des Hauts-Commissaires désignera un greffier pris dans le personnel de chancellerie des Hauts-Commissariats respectifs. Le Gouvernement ottoman désignera, de son côté, deux greffiers ottomans. Le tribunal choisira parmi ces différents greffiers celui qui assurera la direction du greffe.

Les significations des actes de la procédure et l'exécution des jugements seront faites, en ce qui concerne les parties alliées, par l'autorité des Hauts-Commissariats dont elles relèveront et, en ce qui concerne les parties ottomanes, par l'autorité ottomane.

Le Tribunal mixte provisoire ainsi constitué continuera, après l'entrée en vigueur du futur Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, à juger les affaires dont il aurait été saisi antérieurement, à moins qu'il n'en soit décidé autrement par le Traité de Paix.

[E 10710 143, 44]

No. 48

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26)

(No. 875.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 21, 1921

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 820 of the 5th instant, to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the text of a telegram addressed by the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French, Italian and Japanese High Commissioners and myself\* in reply to our joint telegraphic protest against anti-Christian outrages in Pontus and Asia Minor.

2. As your Lordship will observe, this telegram has been communicated to us through the Turkish Commandant of Ismid. I have, however, no doubt as to its authenticity.

3. The general tone of the telegram is reasonable and moderate as compared with other communications which have been received from the same source.

\* Not printed.

1. Youssef Kemal thanks us for our spontaneous action on behalf of the Mussulman population of Ismid, but strenuously denies the inability of the Turks to govern non-Mussulman peoples.

5. He ascribes the measures taken by the Nationalist Government against the Christians of the Black Sea districts to the actions and activities there of the Greek population itself; to the organisation there of Greek secret societies, the existence of which was proved as the result of a raid on the premises of the "Pontus" Club last spring, to the formation of Greek bands which devastated the Mussulman villages of this region; to the revolt which broke out as the result of the steps taken by the Turkish authorities for the disarming of the population; and to the bombardment by the Greek warships of Ineboli. With considerable justification he argues that measures of precaution were necessary to guard against spying and the possibility of a Greek landing, and to put an end to the embarrassment caused to the Turkish operations elsewhere by a perpetual state of disaffection and danger on the Black Sea littoral.

6. Youssef Kemal denies, however, that these measures of precaution resulted in massacres or atrocities, or were harsher than the circumstances required. They consisted in the deportation of all Greeks who were not natives of Pontus, in the transfer into the interior of all capable of bearing arms and consequently of actively assisting the Hellenic forces in the event of a landing and in a search for arms, large numbers of which were discovered. Where no resistance had been offered no blood had been shed, and only those women who had been proved guilty of participation in secret societies had been sent into the interior. In such circumstances they had naturally been accompanied by their children.

7. After furnishing explanations in regard to certain telegrams, Youssef Kemal makes certain original cause, he declares, of

not only the Christians but also the Mussulman population of Asia Minor, lies in the occupation of Smyrna two and a half years ago. The Turks say in this step the

determination. Asia Minor, as the result of that occupation, was being turned into a desert. The Greeks themselves were almost equally sufferers with the Turks, and were suffering in vain, since if she Greece would have to wage perpetual war.

9. Youssef Kemal states in conclusion that the Near East can only be pacified if Smyrna be restored to Turkey. No palliative will, he says, be of any avail. A complete end must be put to the invasion of Asia Minor by the Greeks. And, he adds almost as an afterthought, a similar course must be adopted in respect of the Greek occupation of Thrace.

I have, &c.

MORAVE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

E 10970 22 44]

No. 49

Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe.

THE French Ambassador came to see me to-day in order to take leave, preparatory to a four or six weeks' holiday in France. He asked me to convey to Lord Curzon his sincere regrets at not being able to appear personally on this occasion, but as he understood his Lordship was not in town, he did not think it right to trouble him.

Count Saint-Aulaire began by handing me a note (which is now being dealt with by the department) recording the official acceptance by the French Government of the mission to bring to an end at once the customs sanction on the Rhine. I expressed the great satisfaction which His Majesty's Government entertained at this solution, and begged him to thank M. Briand for having so promptly accepted our last communication in the spirit in which it was made. I promised that the necessary instructions would be sent without delay to the British High Commissioner at Coblenz, and to the expert who would represent this country on the inter-allied commission.

The second subject approached by Count Saint-Aulaire was General Harington's recent action in dealing with the Turkish plot. He read to me an official telegram from his government in which they renew in rather strong language, their protest

must the action of the British general as having been taken in defence of the allied High Commissioners who, although they had not thought it necessary to enter a formal protest, had nevertheless made it quite clear that they entirely disapproved of General Harington's action which moreover, they reported had the approval of Sir Horace Rumbold. The French Government must insist to have been fully accepted that General Harington was in all political matters subject to the three High Commissioners; the French Government were unable to admit to contention that the action actually taken was not of a political kind.

I told Count Saint-Aulaire that I sincerely regretted receiving such information. From all the reports we had received from Constantinople two things appeared to be clear: (1) that the action taken had been exceedingly salutary, as well justified in the merits of the information at General Harington's disposal; (2) that the allied High Commissioners so far from protesting, had at first approved the action and later when on further consideration they thought it necessary to dissociate themselves from approval of it they had nevertheless agreed that it was for General Harington to take such action as he thought right on his military responsibility. I found it difficult to resist the conclusion that the objections so persistently put forward their origin not so much at Constantinople as at the Quai d'Orsay, and I thought it was a pity that the reluctance so constantly shown for a long time by the French Government in acting up to their promise to recognise the supreme command of the British general at Constantinople seemed even now not to have subsided, but to give

at Constantinople exceedingly difficult without, so far as I knew, serving any useful purpose.

Count Saint-Aulaire pretended to be very surprised at my taking this view. He thought it was quite obvious that General Harington had exceeded his powers and he said it was notorious that he had been completely misinformed as to the existence of a plot, and that the steps he had taken were perfectly futile, irritating and unnecessary.

I asked Count Saint-Aulaire to endeavour to place himself for a moment in General Harington's position and to imagine what he would do if he were a French general invested with the powers of supreme command. If in that position, he had convinced himself on careful and honest consideration of important evidence furnished to him that the military position was seriously menaced, that a traitorous plot was on the point of breaking out, and that the persons implicated were known, would he have hesitated to take any action whatever, and if so, what? He answered that whatever his information was they forbade him to take any action whatever, and at the same time this obstructive attitude was loudly proclaimed to the public that it came to the ears of the implicated traitorous persons? I said that I could not for a moment believe that in such circumstances the French general would refrain from taking the measures which he considered necessary for the safety of his forces.

I then mentioned the complaint about the unwarranted attitude of the British and Italian obstruction ended by saying that I thought the incident on the spot was now considered as settled and even satisfactorily settled, and I therefore hoped that the French Government would refrain from reviving such an unpleasant controversy. The Ambassador ended by putting his paper in his pocket instead of handing it to me, as he had apparently been his original intention.

In the course of a general conversation which followed Count Saint-Aulaire touched upon the Greco-Turkish situation. He was anxious to know whether we had any information to indicate the probability of the Greeks now being ready to accept the mediation of the Powers.

I said we had nothing very decisive on this point, but there seemed to be a much uneasiness at Athens at the existing state of affairs. Whether this feeling was so pronounced as to induce either this, or a future, Greek Government to approach the Powers and to express readiness for a compromise, was a question on which I could not express an opinion. Count Saint-Aulaire asked what truth was there in a report that we invited M. Gounaris to come here, and when was he expected? I explained to him that what happened was that a good many weeks ago M. Gounaris had suggested paying a visit to London, and we had intimated to him that at the moment was not then a suitable one for such a visit, and M. Gounaris had accepted the hint. So far as I knew, nothing further had been done in this connection, it was most probable that M. Gounaris still cherished the hope of coming to London, and I ventured to think that if the Greek Government were really inclined to come

for advice and help in their present dilemma, M. Gounaris's visit might be useful. I had no doubt that if, and when, such a visit were definitely decided upon, the allied governments would be informed, but, I said, it is not only the attitude of Greece that is important—it is equally essential to know the frame of mind prevailing at Angora; about this we were in equal uncertainty, and I asked Count Saint-Aulaire whether his government could throw any light upon this side of the question. I observed that they had the advantage of having an agent at Angora in the person of M. Franklin Bouillon, who, according to all our reports was exceedingly active and in the closest touch with Mustapha Kemal. I presumed therefore, that the French Government were in a position to form a fairly reliable estimate of the state of mind at Angora. I said I and M. Gounaris would welcome any information which might be available from this source.

Count Saint-Aulaire said he was unfortunately in entire ignorance. He did not know how far Paris was informed, but he himself had been told nothing, and no particulars of M. Franklin Bouillon's proceedings had been communicated to him. He promised, however, that any information of interest derived from Angora by the French Government would be placed at our disposal.

The Ambassador then touched upon the question of the Jaffa Jerusalem railway. He reminded me that under the Treaty of Sèvres the mandatory authorities in Palestine had powers to expropriate the French railway company on certain conditions. He understood that the British authorities in Palestine had offered to buy out the company for £11,000,000. The company had rejected this offer as inadequate, and it had been agreed to have the matter settled by arbitration. The arbitrators had been appointed and the proceedings were expected to be opened before long, nevertheless, it was to be feared that those proceedings would, as in all similar cases, be protracted, so that a final settlement was not likely to be reached for a considerable time. Meanwhile the railway company was in a state of financial straits, and the British Government earnestly hoped that this request of the company would be granted at an early date. I promised to refer the matter at once to the Colonial Office.

The next subject touched upon was the Suez Canal. The Ambassador told me that his government warmly supported the proposal of the Suez Canal Company to take the opportunity of the present negotiations between the British and Egyptian Governments should be taken to obtain a definite prolongation of the Suez Canal concession. The Ambassador was instructed to ascertain whether in fact this question formed part of our negotiations, or, if not, whether we would not agree to include it.

I said this question had not so far been included, and I was not in a position to undertake any undertaking that the prolongation of the Suez Canal concession would be included in the agreement which it was hoped to negotiate with the Egyptian delegation. Just how much it would be possible for the British Government to demand on this point was a matter which must be decided by the Egyptian Government, and all I could say was that this question had not been overlooked, and would continue to be carefully borne in mind.

The last subject touched upon by the Ambassador was Albania. He expressed the gratification of his government on learning that we had come to an understanding with Italy about the frontier of Albania, and that so the whole matter was practically settled.

I said we had done our very best to meet the views of Italy as far as we possibly could. We had first of all made important concessions to Italian views which we understood were shared by the French as to the southern frontiers of Albania. We had withdrawn the support which we had previously and consistently given to the Greek claims to southern Albania, we had done so in order to facilitate the negotiations between France and Italy.

He explained that, as France and Italy had agreed to the slight rectification of the

northern and eastern frontiers which we had thought it right to indicate in the interests of the peace and tranquillity of those regions, we withdrew our previous suggestion for the cession of southern Albanian districts to Greece, having been assured that thereby the desired unanimity would be established. It was at that stage that the Italian Government came forward with a further demand to the effect that they would not agree to the definite settlement of the frontiers until they had been given satisfaction concerning their "formula." This satisfaction they had now obtained and it was with intense surprise that I read in a telegram received from Paris to-day that the Italian Government, having obtained the passing by the Assembly of the "formula," refused to bind

Albania. I said I could not see how it was possible for Italy to insist on a settlement in this matter.

Count Saint-Aulaire said that the Italian Government were quite

an indifferent matter as long as the "formula" concerning the future of Italy's interests in Albania was acknowledged. I said I did not take this view. We had been ready to pledge ourselves under the "formula" to take a certain view of Italy's interests in Albania but that view was clearly conditioned on an Albania without

different question to allow this. For instance, we were not prepared to accept the Italian Government's proposal to give Italy a free hand in the Albanian coast. I said I did not take this view. We had been ready to pledge ourselves under the "formula" to take a certain view of Italy's interests in Albania but that view was clearly conditioned on an Albania without

message given to the Italian Government that Count Saint-Aulaire was in agreement with us on the subject of the internationalisation of Tangier.

we had no far deferred considering in detail the recent Italian proposal for the Tangier harbour concession because we were disposed to think that the Italian Government were connected and had better be treated *pari passu*.

Count Saint-Aulaire said that he had received no intimation that the question of the internationalisation of Tangier was to be taken up at once. He said that the question was receiving consideration at the Quai d'Orsay, and perhaps the matter would be brought forward shortly, he himself however, was under the impression that owing to the recent Spanish reverses in Morocco the Spanish Government was no longer so eager to attack the Tangier problem, and that therefore there seemed to be no reason for the French Government to do so.

I said I doubted the accuracy of his impression. The information which we received from Madrid showed unmistakably that the Spanish Government's attitude about the future of Tangier remained unabated, and that they were getting very nervous about the prolonged inaction of the French Government. I therefore regretted that the French Government apparently intended to put off the matter again.

Count Saint-Aulaire went once more over the ground of the French objections to discussing the question with Spain before they had come to an understanding with Great Britain. I begged his Excellency not to reopen this chapter, and I observed that supposing the French Government had any reason to believe that Spain was less anxious than formerly about the settlement of the Tangier question, this should be put to the French Government to put forward their proposals at the appropriate moment. I said that if the prognostications, Spain might be less unwilling to be accommodating.

I said I gathered from the French note about the harbour works that the French Government above all feared the erosion of the Sultan's authority from Tangier.

This, I thought, was a complete misapprehension of the point of view urged either by Great Britain or by Spain. So far as I knew, no one had ever proposed to undermine the Sultan's authority. On the contrary, the draft tripartite agreement negotiated in 1913 definitely provided for the appointment of a Kalipha, who was to wield the Sultan's authority in the administration of Tangier. I could quite easily see that the Sultan's authority might be dependent on the conditions to be prescribed for the appointment of this Kalipha, but the draft treaty had made no provision for it, and therefore the matter seemed to me to be a matter of respect to the Sultan's authority. I said I did not take this view. We had been ready to pledge ourselves under the "formula" to take a certain view of Italy's interests in Albania but that view was clearly conditioned on an Albania without

Count Saint-Aulaire said that he had received no intimation that the question of the internationalisation of Tangier was to be taken up at once.

Foreign Office, September 20, 1921

E 10707 1/44

No. 50

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 2567. Urgent.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1921

My Lord,  
WITH reference to Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 2047 of the 16th July and my despatch No. 1987 of the 20th July, I transmit to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople regarding M. Franklin-Bouillon's present visit to Angora.

2. I should be glad if you would take an early opportunity of obtaining from M. Briand some information regarding the purpose of M. Franklin-Bouillon's visit. You might remind him that at my meeting with him and the Italian Ambassador at Paris on the 19th June last M. Briand stated, in reply to an enquiry of mine, that M. Bouillon had no mission from the French Government, but had gone as a French journalist to report upon the situation. In view of information which has appeared in the press and has reached His Majesty's Government from other sources, I should be glad to know whether M. Bouillon is still without any mandate from the French Government, and, if not, to learn generally the nature of his mission and the scope of the negotiations, if any, which he is conducting. You should remind M. Briand at the same time of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on the 10th August (see your telegram No. 587 of that date) "to use such informal means as may be available to them to ascertain the real intention of the belligerents and to interchange information on the subject."

3. In so speaking to M. Briand you should bear in mind the assurance given to me in the last paragraph of M. Briand's note of the 14th July (see Sir M. Cheetham's above-mentioned despatch) in connection with Bekir Sami's negotiations in Paris, that no general engagement would be entered into by the French Government with the Kemalists without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

\* See No. 46.

## CHAPTER II.—SYRIA AND ARABIA.

E 7776 104 93]

No. 51

Sir M. Curzon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 461)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Paris, July 1

YOUR telegram No. 371 of 5th July: Syrian amnesty.

I find an enquiry at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that arrangements referred to in enclosure to Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 1658 were in fact never carried out. No proclamation has been issued and no amnesty can be announced before submission to Parliament.

E 7635 4 91]

No. 52

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

Sir,

1. I transmit to you with special reference to the fact that the High Commissioner for the Levant is now in the hands of the High Commissioner for the Levant, the draft of a treaty which it is desired to conclude with King Hussein. The draft of the treaty which it is desired to conclude with King Hussein is enclosed herein, and I have to request you to use your best endeavours to induce His Majesty to agree to it. You should refer to me for instructions, should King Hussein insist, in the course of negotiations, upon introducing in this draft any modifications of substance. You should also report from time to time the state of your negotiations.

2. A draft of the treaty which it is desired to conclude with King Hussein is enclosed herein, and I have to request you to use your best endeavours to induce His Majesty to agree to it. You should refer to me for instructions, should King Hussein insist, in the course of negotiations, upon introducing in this draft any modifications of substance. You should also report from time to time the state of your negotiations.

3. The wording of articles 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 of the enclosed draft differs somewhat from the wording of these articles in the draft of the treaty as despatched to His Majesty King Hussein. The draft of the treaty as despatched to His Majesty King Hussein is enclosed herein, and I have to request you to use your best endeavours to induce His Majesty to agree to it. You should refer to me for instructions, should King Hussein insist, in the course of negotiations, upon introducing in this draft any modifications of substance. You should also report from time to time the state of your negotiations.

4. I also transmit to you, for your information, copies of the English versions of the treaties with Idris Seyyid and Ibn Saud.\* The Government of India have been asked by telegraph to send to you direct, c/o High Commission, Cairo, copies of the Arabic version.

5. Copies of this letter and of the draft treaty in its present form are being sent to the High Commissioner for the Levant, and to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Constantinople and Jeddah.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure in No. 52

Draft of a Declaration to be signed by His Majesty King Hussein simultaneously with the Conclusion of a Treaty between him and His Majesty's Government.

HIS Majesty King Hussein of the Hejaz, recognising that the progress and prosperity of the Arab countries of the Middle East is secured with the support and assistance of Great Britain and France, through whose help in the late war the Arabs were enabled to shake off the Turkish yoke, and mindful of the

\* Not printed.

sacrifices made by those Powers in the cause of Arab freedom, hereby declares that he will at no time take any action calculated to embarrass Great Britain or France in the task entrusted to them under the Covenant of the League of Nations of advising and assisting the populations of Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria until such time as they are able to stand alone.

### Draft of Proposed Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Hejaz.

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Most Gracious.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty King Hussein of the Hejaz on behalf of Themselves, Their heirs and successors, inspired with the sincere desire of confirming and strengthening the good faith and friendly relations established between their respective countries during the war together waged against the Germanic Powers and Turkey, and with the further desire of consolidating their mutual interests and ensuring permanent peace and harmony among the Arab peoples.

And His Britannic Majesty having named and appointed as His Plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for those purposes with His Majesty King Hussein,

The said and His Majesty King Hussein have agreed upon and concluded the articles following:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

The High British Government hereby confirm their recognition of the sovereignty of His Majesty King Hussein, His heirs and successors, over the territories of the Hejaz, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 3 following.

#### ARTICLE 2.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees and promises to use all the means which His laws provide to prevent His territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The frontiers and boundaries of the Hejaz being at present indeterminate, and the High Contracting Parties agreeing that they will use their good offices in order to settle the same as soon as possible, the High Contracting Parties agree that they will use their good offices in order to settle the same as soon as possible.

#### ARTICLE 4.

The High British Government undertake that they will use their good offices in order to settle the same as soon as possible, the High Contracting Parties agreeing that they will use their good offices in order to settle the same as soon as possible.

His Majesty King Hussein and his heirs and successors agree to be bound by the terms of this Treaty.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The High British Government undertake to restrain by all peaceful means in their power any aggression upon the Hejaz by neighbouring States who now are or who in the future may be in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

#### ARTICLE 6.

The treaties now in force between the High British Government and Seyyid Muhammad bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Feisal as-Saud are herewith communicated to His Majesty King Hussein. The High British Government likewise undertake to communicate in due course any other treaties that they may conclude with neighbours of His Majesty King Hussein.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the aforesaid treaties now exist between the High British Government and Seyyid Mohammed Ibn Ali El-Idrisi and between the High British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-Faisal-as-Saud, and undertakes to refrain from any act that would or might impede the due execution of those treaties by the High Contracting Parties.

## ARTICLE 7.

His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to cultivate, to the best of His opportunity and power, the maintenance of peace and friendly relations with those of His neighbours who have executed treaties with the High British Government and with those who may in the future do so; to refrain from unprovoked aggression in act or form, against such friendly States; and to discountenance, and as far as possible prevent, within the territories of the Hejaz, any conspiracy or intrigue directed against these States or the interests of their Rulers.

In issues of importance between the Hejaz and neighbouring States His Majesty King Hussein may invoke the arbitration of His Britannic Majesty as provided in Article 4.

## ARTICLE 8.

Each High Contracting Party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the Agent of the other. His Majesty King Hussein may appoint a Hishante Agent in London, and His Britannic Majesty may appoint a British Agent to reside at Jedidah or other seaport town of the Hejaz.

His Majesty King Hussein shall also be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint a Consular Agent in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to appoint a Consular Agent in the same countries, and the reports of the Hujaz as the High British Government may from time to time deem expedient.

These Agents and Consular Agents shall enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

## Appendix

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by the High British Government in Kurdistan to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912 or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon the said Government.

On their part the High British Government agree to recognize such compulsory measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the Hijaz in accordance with regulations to be published by His Majesty King Hussein.

## ARTICLE 10.

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the High British Government undertake not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Majesty King Hussein in the territories of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

On His part His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to place no obstacle in the way of any efforts made by Moslem British subjects or persons or institutions enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty to contribute towards the welfare, health and food-supply of pilgrims in the Hejaz.

## ARTICLE II.

The High Contracting Parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of year for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims, and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

## ARTICLE 12.

The High British Government agree to recognize the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Majesty King Hussein who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British protected territory or territory under a British mandate, and to issue such passports as may be required to persons so recognized by His Majesty King Hussein showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On His part His Majesty King Hussein agrees to recognise the British status of  
of His Britannic Majesty who may at any time be within the territory of the Hejaz,  
provided such British subjects or British protected persons are registered at a British  
Consulate in the Hejaz. The provisions of this Article are not, however, to apply to  
British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty's  
Government who are habitually resident outside Jeddah and other seaports at which  
His Britannic Majesty may appoint Consular Agents.

## ARTICLE 13.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that the property of British subjects or  
 persons—whether Moslem or otherwise—enjoying the protection of His Britannic  
 Majesty, who may die in the Hejaz shall be handed over to the British representative  
 in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British Representative in the  
 Hejaz will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under the  
 laws of the Hejaz are duly paid.

#### ARTICLE 14.

As a mark of confidence in the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and in order to relieve the Hashimite Courts of unnecessary and inconvenient labour, His Majesty King Hussein hereby agrees that all cases arising in the Hejaz in which a British subject or person—whether Moslem or otherwise—enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, is accused of a crime or offence, or is the defendant in a civil matter, and all cases involving the personal status of such persons who are not Moslems, shall be tried by the British Representative in the Hejaz or by such authority as may be nominated by him for the purpose. The provisions of this Article are not, however, to

Majesty's Government who are habitually resident outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint Consular Agents.

### Activity 15

At the desire and friendly request of His Britannic Majesty, and in the belief that action will be for the good of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Palestine and also for the general advantage of his own kingdom, His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the Mandate over Mesopotamia and the Mandate over Palestine conferred on Great Britain as Mandatory Power in execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. His Majesty King Hussein undertakes further that in such matters as come within his influence he will use his good offices and facilitate as much as possible the execution of the terms of both Mandates by His Britannic Majesty.

His Britannic Majesty for his part undertakes that nothing shall be done in these countries which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of their populations. His Britannic Majesty further undertakes that he will use his good offices towards the maintenance of good relations between Mesopotamia and Palestine and the territories of His Majesty King Hussein.

## ARTICLE 16

The High Powers have agreed to modify in the following manner the limits of the Hejaz, the limits which were fixed by the Convention of 1908, and to stipulate that the High Powers, assembled in the present Convention, will not permit any of their subjects to establish a colony or any other place of settlement lying within the boundaries of the Hejaz as determined by the present treaty, and shall be possessed of papers, issued by the Majesty King Hussein, in conformity with the certificates and documents issued by the High Powers to the equal independent States.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein hereby confirms His recognition of the flag as flown by merchant ships belonging to any parts of His Britannic Majesty's dominions, or to British-protected territory or to territories under a British mandate, provided that vessels flying such flag shall be possessed of the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

## ARTICLE 15

No customs duties shall be levied at seaports in Palestine on goods imported on behalf of the Hashimite Government for immediate transport to the Hejaz by the

However, provided that a certificate, signed by such Hashemite authority or representative as may from time to time be determined by the two Governments, shall be presented at the time of importation to the chief customs officer at the port of importation, the goods being sent under its orders to the Hejaz, and showing the use of the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed. The goods shall be exempted from all duties and taxes on importation and on exportation.

#### ARTICLE 18.

Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby declares that it will not, during the term of this treaty, enter into any treaty or understanding with a third party directed against the interests of the other High Contracting Party.

#### ARTICLE 19.

No clause contained in this treaty shall overrule any clause which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by any High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two Parties.

[E 7925 455 91]

No 53

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon. (Received July 11.)

(No 57. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, June 20, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah Report for the period the 11th-20th June, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Aden, Jerusalem and Simla.

I have &

W F MARSHALL Major R F W C  
British Agent Jeddah

Enclosure 1 in No. 53

Jeddah Report, June 11-20, 1921.

#### Departure of Emir Feisal

EMIR FEISAL arrived in Jeddah from Mecca on the evening of the 10th June, accompanied by King Hussein and Emir Zeid.

R I M S "Northbrook" arrived at Jeddah on the afternoon of the 11th, and at 4 o'clock the Royal party embarked. King Hussein was received by the captain of the ship, and the Emir made a speech to the captain emphasising his friendship for Great Britain. Thereafter he talked with the Mesopotamian notables on board, and left the boat at sunset with a salute of twenty-one guns. The "Northbrook" sailed on the morning of the 12th.

Emir Feisal was accompanied by the following:

#### Personal Staff —

Mohammed Rustom Haidar (private secretary)  
Fahseen Kadri (A D C.),  
Subeih el Ezzi (A D C.),  
Abdullah el Khammas (A D C.)

#### Mesopotamian Notables: —

Sayed Nur el Yaser  
Sayed Elwan Yaser  
Sayed Hadi-ibn-Sayed Hassan Makotor,  
Sayed Mahdi-ibn-Sayed Hadi Makotor  
Shakh Shaalan el-Jabr  
Sayed Mirza el Yaser  
Haji Mahdi-ibn-Haji Fadel  
Haji Sallal-ibn-Haji Fadel

There were in addition 16 servants, 7 with the Emir and his staff and 9 with the Mesopotamian notables.

I had a long interview with the Emir Feisal on the evening of his arrival at Jeddah, and he handed me a report which I am forwarding under cover of a separate despatch. The points emphasized in this report are —

1. The complete lack of public security and the consequent danger of a Wahhabi invasion.
2. The absence of any organised public health system and the lack of hospital accommodation.
3. The great need for money to put 1 and 2 on a proper basis.

He emphasised these points in his conversation, said he was very much afraid of a Wahhabi invasion of the Holy Places and that financial assistance was a dire necessity.

Just before Feisal's departure, King Hussein sent a telegram to Emir Abdullah saying that he considered Feisal as himself without distinction, and that he was in complete accord with him (Feisal) in all that had come to pass.

The King remained in Jeddah after the Emir Feisal's departure and left for Cairo on the afternoon of the 14th.

On the 11th, the Emir Feisal sent a telegram to the King, who sent him a reply on the 12th, in which he said:

"I am, Illustrious Sayed Naqib,

"Of course you have been informed of my son Feisal's departure to you in accordance with the various requests of the inhabitants. Owing to the connections of our families, I need not point out how necessary it is for all of you to work for the prosperity of the country and its welfare and good future. I earnestly hope this from your nobility and feelings, religious and national. May God grant us all success — Hussein."

The King was delighted with his visit to the "Northbrook," and with the arrangements made for Emir Feisal's departure. He repeatedly asserted his friendship for, and loyalty to, Great Britain, and said that our interests were the same. In local matters, however, he remains both obstinate and unreasonable.

#### Indian Pilgrimage Hospital

I called on the King on the morning of the 14th and, in the course of conversation, he said he had just heard that a patient had arrived by car from Mecca and had been admitted to the Indian hospital, which was contrary to his wishes. I replied that I knew nothing of the matter, that I would make enquiries, and that the only case that I had personally sent to the hospital was the case of enteric fever referred to in my previous report. The King then said he did not wish the hospital to work at all unless it was found necessary that they should assist the Arab hospital. I pointed out that it was illogical for His Majesty to allow the hospital to land and then to keep it idle for three months, and that I could not agree to this. His Majesty said that he would not leave Jeddah until the matter was arranged, but I refused to agree and took my departure. Thereafter numerous letters were exchanged between us. I agreed to limit the number of beds, so long as there was no epidemic disease, and to confine it entirely to British and British protected subjects, but would make no further concessions, other than sending it back to India, which I would do on receipt of a written order from His Majesty to that effect. In the meantime, I found out that the case referred to was an Indian pilgrim who was seriously ill and had come to Jeddah to see a British medical officer. He had not gone to the hospital, but to the house of a friend.

I again called on the King on the 17th and 18th, but no further reference was made to the subject. The hospital is an excellent one, splendidly run by Captain Samatullah, M.C., I.M.S., and many patients are clamouring for admission. In the meantime, I have instructed the officer commanding to accept British pilgrims, and I hope to make some arrangement with the local authorities as to the admission of Arab patients and patients of other nationalities.

Just after midday on the 18th, M. Émile Hanna, the local manager of the Ottoman Bank, came to see me in a great state of excitement, and said he had received orders from the Kaimakam of Jeddah that he must leave Jeddah by the first available boat, i.e., on the 22nd and that if he did not comply he would be removed by force. M. Hanna asked for my protection. I wrote a strong letter to the kaimakam warning him of the illegality of his action and asking the reasons, which, if personal, should have been submitted to me, and, if connected with the bank, to both the British and French consulates. I also sent a long telegram to the King to the same effect. At the same time I called upon the French consul general and explained the position to him, and received assurances of his cordial support.

### General

(b.) Emir Ali has telegraphed from Medina to his father that Ibn Saud, who is now in Boreiduh, the capital of Kasim, has begun to send his troops to attack the outskirts of Medina. They had attacked several Arabs near Ghoraba and El Khanak. He (Ibn Saud) further sent threatening notices to the villages of Khubar and El Havat and to the Huteim tribe, with the object of stopping all communications between Medina and Hail.

per mission, established a hospital for outdoor patients, and an appeal for donations is being made to Indian pilgrims. This hakim is not a qualified doctor, but is a druggist.

### Current Humours

2 That the Wahhabies have again appeared near Taif, and that the Hashimite Government has forbidden people to travel on the Mecca-Taif road because it is not considered safe.

W E MARSHALL, Major, R A M C.  
British Agent and Consul

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Passengers (When Departed.)	Cargoes (When Departed.)
Hwah Jah	Chinese						Tea &c.
Porto Maurizio	Italian	Marseilles		1			
Tantab	British				6		1000
Patrolus	Dutch						1000
Mansourah	British			1			1000
Nurea				1			1000

E 7948/117, 89]

No. 54.

*Consul-General Satow to Earl Curzon. (Received July 11.)*

(No. 81.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, June 27, 1921*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a speech\* recently made at Damascus by General Gouraud, as reported in one of the local papers, regarding the future development of the autonomous States of Syria.

After referring to the creation last year of these States, the general declared that the problem now was to complete and render more liberal the organisation of the different States, an organisation which, while it need not be exactly similar, must in every case comprise a representative institution, a council.

As regards the State of Damascus, this council is to be the old general council of the vilayet, which will be called the Government Council, and the members of which are to be elected on a wider suffrage than the old council. Until the census has been taken and elections can be held, a nominated council is to be formed. It is to have the same powers as the council which will eventually be elected, and from the outset it is in a consultative capacity to deal with such questions as the State budget and the laws and regulations proposed by the Government. Sanjak and Kaza Councils are also to be formed.

As regards the federation of the different States, the first step in this direction is to be the creation of a federal council, composed of five delegates each from Aleppo and Damascus, and sitting alternately at these places. The president will be chosen for one year, alternately from the Damascus and Aleppo delegates. This council will designate the persons from among whom the directors-general of the common services are to be chosen. Of these common services the following are those most needed now: (1) For the common budget; (2) for public works; (3) for the general control of the revenues of the federal budget will be provided from customs dues and certain other indirect taxes. The actual number of the directors-general is to be fixed when the federal council consists of elected members.

In his speech General Gouraud expressly excluded from the federal States of Syria the Lebanon, declaring that it must develop on separate lines until such time as it desired to enter the federation. Until then it would only have an economic connection with the federation. This clear statement will doubtless give much satisfaction to the Lebanese.

The rest of the general's speech contained some remarks as to the objects of French policy in Syria in the past, and as to the desire of France to resume good relations with the Turks. He also announced an amnesty to the twenty-one persons condemned by court-martial in August 1920, and that the unpaid balance of the war indemnity would be left at the disposal of the State of Damascus.

(Copies to Cairo, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)

I have, &amp;c

H. E. SATOW

E 8048 4/91]

No. 55.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office. (Received July 13.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, July 13, 1921.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to your letter of the 4th June, on the subject of an alleged interview between Mr M. T. Kaderboy and the Emir Feisal on the 11th April, and to India Office letter of the 17th June, on the same subject, of which a copy has been received in this Department; also to India Office letter of the 17th June, addressed to this Department, on the subject of the future of the Holy Places. A copy of the reply sent by this Department to the last mentioned letter is enclosed herewith.

\* Not printed.

As regards the question of the Khalifate, Mr. Churchill wishes to make his own view quite clear. He understands that the temporal character of this institution, however strongly it may be supported by Moslems in India or elsewhere, has no foundation in international jurisprudence. He is informed that Moslems all over the world differ widely on the question of who is the real Khalifa, and he is himself in a position to state that a considerable proportion of the British Moslem subjects (many millions in number) with whom he has to deal in his capacity of Secretary of State for the Colonies attach no importance whatever to the Khalifate of the Sultan of Turkey. He is very strongly opposed to any departure from the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government of non-interference in religious matters. He regards the Khalifate as a purely religious office, any reference to which would be quite out of place in a treaty between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein of the Hedjaz.

I am, &amp;c

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure in No. 54.

*Colonial Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Downing Street, July 13, 1921*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 17th June, regarding the future relations between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Hedjaz, and to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Montagu, that as the proposed negotiations are being conducted by the Foreign Office, to whom a copy of your letter was transmitted, he presumes that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will reply direct to you on the various points raised.

Mr. Churchill's own view with regard to the Khalifate is expressed in this Department's letter of to-day's date, addressed to the Foreign Office, of which a copy is enclosed for Mr. Montagu's information.

I am also to transmit herewith copy of this Department's letter of the 30th June (Addressed to the Foreign Office).

I am, &amp;c

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

E 8339 1977 91]

No. 56

*Major Marshall to Earl Curzon. (Received July 20.)*

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, June 24, 1921*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 43 of the 26th April last relative to the capitulatory rights of British subjects in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to transmit herewith a note on the subject by Mr. Vice Consul Griffith Smith.

I have, &amp;c

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.F. & A.  
British Agent at Jeddah

Enclosure in No. 56.

*India Office to Foreign Office. No. 43 of April 26, 1921.*

EVEN if, after pressure, King Hussein should agree to recognise as British subjects persons whose claims he has hitherto refused to accept, there remains the fact that His Majesty's Government have no representative at Mecca or Medina, and that practical consular intervention in these places is at present impossible.

No undertaking affecting British subjects in the Hedjaz will be of value unless King Hussein thereby undertakes to appoint British representatives at Jeddah, in default of special appointments at Mecca and Medina, to visit the Holy Places in an

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official capacity and to act, if necessary, on behalf of our nationals there. At present the consular district of Jeddah is described as "the eastern coast of the Red Sea"; this, in His Majesty's opinion, runs no further eastward than the Mecca Gate of Jeddah town.

2. The words "British subject" will require precise definition if future difficulties are to be avoided. Strict insistence upon an interpretation analogous to that with which Greek and Italian consular authorities in Egypt have made us familiar would entail responsibilities, more particularly in Mecca, of the greatest embarrassment; the King would, in his own phrase, be left with no other subjects than "Qorish Bedouin and the pariah dogs of the streets." One-third of Mecca is Indian, by any comprehensive definition.

We are not well championed against the local authorities all the Indians, Somalis, Adenese, Afghans, Hadhranis, Sudanese and Egyptians in the Hedjaz. Yet these are entitled to the good offices of His Majesty's consuls abroad.

And if, on the one hand, His Majesty's Government, by its recognition of the Hedjaz, assert capitulatory rights over all such persons, it appears equally impossible to disclaim them all; the one course is as unfair to the individuals as is the other to the Government concerned.

The ideal solution would be that the Hedjaz should be considered not as a national entity, but simply as the "Belad ul-Muslamin," and, as such, administered as an essentially neutral State under international Moslem control, vested in Arab, Indian, Egyptian, Moroccan and other representatives. We could then accept King Hussein's often implied contention that community of religion should transcend differences of nationality, and the international status of the Hedjaz, which in fact exists only by virtue of the attraction it exercises over the Moslem world, would be logically established.

But in this ideal republic there would be no exclusively Arab monopolies of trade, no discrimination against non-Arabs in the administration and in the Courts, and no general fear of a despotic ruler. All these things are found in the Hedjaz of King Hussein.

We cannot, in justice, abandon all the British subjects and British protected persons resident in the Hedjaz to the Hashimite Government. We cannot, on the other hand, without great embarrassment to King Hussein, spread the Union Jack over all residents in the Hedjaz who have any colour of British nationality or protection. Some formula must be found, binding us to accept as Hashimite subjects persons who might, by a more comprehensive definition, be considered as entitled to British protection, and leading the Hedjaz Government, for their part, to accept as British subjects, or as British protected persons, some whose claims they have hitherto vigorously contested.

The persons affected—the case of residents only being for the moment considered—fall into four categories:—

- (a) Persons born in the United Kingdom, the British colonies, India or the Protectorates, or who are or were or will be wives or widows of such persons.
- (b) Persons born in the Hedjaz, or who are or were or will be wives or widows of persons born in the Hedjaz.
- (c) Persons born in the Hedjaz, or who are or were or will be wives or widows of persons born in the Hedjaz, who are or were or will be British subjects or British protected persons.
- (d) Persons born in the Hedjaz, or who are or were or will be wives or widows of persons born in the Hedjaz, who are or were or will be British subjects or British protected persons, and who are or were or will be British subjects or British protected persons.

I would suggest that classes (a) and (b) should, without exception, in default of a declaration of allegiance, be recognised as British subjects in the Hedjaz, provided always that they can establish their claims by production of a British passport, a British certificate of registration or a birth certificate.

Further, that persons of class (c) should be accorded British protection if they have already been issued with British certificates of registration, if they hold British passports or if their names are endorsed upon their father's certificate of registration or passport. Adoption of a Hashimite or other nationality by a father should not make a man, if of age and duly registered at the British consulate, a Hashimite subject (cf. the Qabuli case).

Finally, that no measure of British protection in the Hedjaz should be extended to the persons mentioned in category (d), unless they hold personal papers issued under British authority.

The following considerations are cogent.

As explained in our despatch No. 1000, Office of the 29th January, there are very large numbers of British subjects in the Hedjaz who consider themselves as British subjects but who are not recognised as such by the local authorities. They are, by considerations of self-interest, parading this conviction. I am, of course, dissembling hitherto, but they have had considerable excuse for so doing. The majority, presumably, have no British papers immediately available, and it would be a somewhat drastic penalty for the Government to require them to produce them in an undertaking by which His Majesty's Government would be bound to protect them. These persons, mostly of categories (a) and (b), will be moved, in a degree proportionate to the attraction of declared British protection, to present their claims. Some fixed period of time, not less than six months, should I think, be allowed for this, and provision should be made against persons who, after the expiration of this period, have not presented their claims, to proceed to India to obtain British Indian papers must, in leaving the country, presumably sever their connection with the Hedjaz.

It will have to be a matter for discussion which of the papers of Egyptians and other British protected persons are considered as issued under direct British authority, and there will doubtless be some outcry against this and other aspects of the undertaking. But it seems better to make as clean a cut as possible, rather than to leave the matter for endless future disputes. Afghans, Hadhranis and the nationals of such mandated territories as Palestine and Mesopotamia appear to me to fall on one side; Adenese, Nigerians, Somalis and, at present, Egyptians and Sudanese on the other. I would recommend that a regular fetish be made of personal papers in all these cases; otherwise we must remain responsible for a host of nondescript Moslems, the local extension of preferential treatment to whom has something of artificiality and much embarrassment.

Outside the Hedjaz these people of this class not admitted to British protection might or might not travel as Arab subjects, but they would be local Hashimite subjects in the Hedjaz. If any question of their repatriation from the Hedjaz were raised, the good offices of the British consulate might be invoked at the discretion of the consul for the purpose of communicating with the competent authorities abroad.

It should, perhaps, be laid down that any resident of the Hedjaz is a Hashimite subject, unless and until he can show proof to the contrary. For many years an attempt has been made to establish a principle that persons who are not British subjects, but who are or were or will be British subjects, should be required to prove that they have not, in fact, definitely identified themselves with the Hedjaz, and that the burden of proof should be thrown upon the Government to which they have hitherto given practical allegiance.

Pilgrims are in a class by themselves. As a rule they have passports, return tickets or other documentary evidence that their connection with the Hedjaz is temporary only, and the King appears ready to admit that they are, indeed, foreigners. For this reason, however, they are not to be treated as such. By His Majesty's conception of his kingly rôle, he is not only the absolute and personal monarch of all who are born in or who reside in the Hedjaz; he is also the benevolent despot of all who come to the Hedjaz to do pilgrimage to his country, a host very much master in his own house. Pilgrim treatment is irrespective of nationality. Pilgrims are condemned to the discomforts of unnecessary quarantine indiscriminately, whether they are Turks or Tibetans. They are subject to the same bullying, robbery and exploitation whether they are Indians, Egyptians or Congolese. Consular representations on behalf of victims are taken by King Hussein as an affront, both to himself, as the most responsible for his guests' discomfort and, in some degree, to the democratic religion which brought them to the Hedjaz.

He appears, indeed, to be of opinion that pilgrimage is made more meritorious by hardships, he certainly resents intervention by the consulates in details of such exclusively Moslem interest as pilgrimage quarantine and pilgrims' hospitals.

In the circumstances it seems best to avoid any semblance of interference in the routine of a Mahomedan religious duty. The amelioration of pilgrimage conditions

should be brought about by pressure from representative Moslem associations rather than from diplomatic agencies and consulates; these latter cannot well undertake to guarantee to their nationals a pilgrimage as secure and effortless as a Cook's tour. To protest every time a British pilgrim suffered discomfort on the Haj would be ineffectual as well as invidious, and I think that we should confine our protection of British subjects in the Hedjaz to the submission and support of their claims in respect of the freedom of passages and to the disposal of the estates of those who die in this country.

There are many directions in which the King might be asked to adopt more business-like methods or to introduce practical reforms, but their examination hardly falls within the scope of this minute.

4. It is difficult to make recommendations as to the measure of active support which should be imparted in British protection in the Hedjaz.

5. We are often with protests and thunder whenever a British subject suffers from a lack of public security on the main caravan routes or from the inefficiency of the Hedjaz Customs administration. Are we to fight the battles of every individual who is himself aggrieved by hostile discrimination in, for instance, the right to transport goods to Mecca? At present Indians and Arabs alike suffer more or less in silence, but under the regime of the Capitulations the former will not be slow to make their sufferings vocal and to appeal for official support in their various enterprises. The position in the Hedjaz is, it is to be hoped, exceptional, in that such British claims would be almost invariably against the Government, not against individuals.

Nothing will induce the King to exempt British subjects from the normal work of his administration. If a too exacting "sovereign rights" to brook such treatment, or one law for the Arabs and another for his Indian subjects.

But if we press for no more than equality of treatment, we expose our nationals to sudden imprisonments, and general insecurity of life and property which characterize local government.

It should, I think, be very clearly understood that the Government of India is not prepared to undertake the responsibility of making any declaration of recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz. The Government of India is not prepared to undertake the responsibility of making any declaration of recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz.

6. The Government of India is not prepared to undertake the responsibility of making any declaration of recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz. The Government of India is not prepared to undertake the responsibility of making any declaration of recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz.

There are in the Hedjaz no Mixed Tribunals. Justice is administered by the courts in Jeddah, by a "Commercial Court," to which merchants have recourse of referring disputes about business matters. Cases between British and other foreigners are referred to the Consular Court, which is presided over by the British Consul, by the Consular Court on the defendant's application, and, in default of special objections, by the local authorities.

Criminal cases in which the accused is British should, I think, be tried by the consul. The reference of cases in which British subjects are interested to the local courts should always be reported by the local authorities to the consulate.

6. At present non Hashimite nationality is a disqualification for the acquisition of immovable property. Only an Arab subject can own such property, and many British subjects before the war adopted Turkish nationality to attain this object. It may be desired to request King Hussein to remove this disability.

7. The obligation to register themselves annually should be binding upon all British subjects in the Hedjaz. Failure to do so for a fixed period of years should entail loss of capitulatory rights.

8. I would again emphasize the necessity of an extension to Mecca and Medina of consular competence. Without it, any undertaking is worthless.

9. In closing, it may well, without duplicity, be said that the most important consideration in connection with the recognition of British subjects in the Hedjaz is the character of King Hussein's government.

L. B. GRAFFLEY SMITH, Vice Consul

E 8432 4 91

N 37

Indian Office to Foreign Office. Received July 22.

Sir,

India Office, July 22 1921

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 14th and 20th July and to express his great disappointment that the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston has not seen his way to co-operate in checking the alienation of Indian Moslem sentiment, even to the extent of supporting the suggestion that, in connection with the negotiations for a treaty with the Hedjaz Government, King Hussein might take the opportunity to make a public and formal indication of his recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz.

Mr. Montagu, I am to point out, has not suggested that any pressure should be brought to bear on King Hussein in this connection, nor did my letter of the 4th instant do more than suggest that King Hussein should publicly indicate his recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz.

Mr. Montagu recognises the objection to the insertion of a clause having this intention in the treaty itself, and he also recognises that there may be similar objections though they seem to him much less cogent even to the insertion of a clause to the effect that, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, King Hussein is entirely free to proclaim his recognition of the Caliph to the extent indicated, but he finds it difficult to believe that Colonel Lawrence, if he were so instructed, would not be able to afford King Hussein an opportunity, in the course of the negotiations, of formulating an expression of his recognition of the Caliph as religious suzerain of the Holy Places.

Of the effect of such a declaration (made, as it would obviously be, under the auspices of His Majesty's Government) upon Moslem opinion in India Mr. Secretary Montagu has no doubt whatever. It would, he believes, be widely regarded, not only as satisfactory in itself, but also, and by persons who at present impugn the motives of His Majesty's Government in these matters, as evidence of the sincerity of His Majesty's Government in conveying to the representatives of Moslem opinion in India, in connection with a possible revision of the Treaty of Sevres, the assurance that "it is not the intention of the Allies to interfere in the slightest degree with the spiritual relations between the Moslems and the Holy Places which are no longer to be Turkish" (Mr. Montagu's letter to the Indian Moslem delegation dated the 29th April, 1921).

Mr. Secretary Montagu therefore trusts that Lord Curzon will see his way, even at so late a stage to instruct Colonel Lawrence to endeavour to find an opportunity of indicating to King Hussein that a pronouncement in the sense indicated above would, in so far as it would give satisfaction to Indian Moslem sentiment, be equally a matter of satisfaction to His Majesty's Government.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Colonial Office with reference to that Department's letter of the 13th July to your address.

I am, &c.

L. D. WAKELY

*Sir M. Cheetham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (Received July 25.)*

(No. 211)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 22nd July, 1921, explaining the announcement made by General Gouraud of the

Paris, July 23, 1921

Inclosure in No. 58

*Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

PAR une note du 10 de ce mois, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté a bien voulu rappeler les communications échangées les 17 et 26 mai et le 3 juin dernier avec le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, en vue d'établir autant que possible la simultanéité des mesures générales de clémence qui seraient prises en Mésopotamie et en Syrie.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères fait savoir que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté à Paris a bien voulu prendre connaissance des paroles prononcées à Damas le 22 juillet par le Général Gouraud annonçant qu'une mesure de clémence serait prise en faveur des prisonniers de guerre et des civils. Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères conclut qu'une amnistie est en fait prononcée et que les renseignements recueillis par l'Ambassade britannique, une mesure d'amnistie ne peut résulter que d'une décision du Parlement français.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur de faire savoir à Sir Milne Cheetham que, d'après la législation française, deux espèces différentes de mesures de clémence peuvent être prises en faveur des condamnés : d'une part, l'amnistie résultant d'une loi et qui efface entièrement la condamnation avec toutes ses conséquences ; d'autre part, la grâce, prononcée par le Président de la République, qui ne concerne que les condamnés de tout ou partie de leur peine.

Les renseignements recueillis par l'Ambassade britannique au sujet de l'amnistie sont donc exacts.

La mesure de clémence envisagée par le Général Gouraud à l'égard des condamnés de Damas est une mesure de grâce qu'il a prié le Gouvernement français de proposer au Président de la République.

Il y a tout lieu de penser que cette procédure de grâce suivie par le Ministère de la Guerre aboutira à très bref délai.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
Paris, le 22 juillet 1921

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Milne Cheetham (Paris).*

(No. 2032.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 25, 1921.

I TRANSMIT to you the accompanying copy of a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Lawrence,\* instructing him as to the lines on which he should endeavour to negotiate a treaty between the King of Hedjaz and His Majesty's Government.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence left England for Cairo en route for Jeddah on the 8th July, and I have to request that you will make a communication to the French Government on the following lines in explanation of Colonel Lawrence's mission.

3. His Majesty's Government, as they have publicly stated in Parliament, contemplate the grant of subsidies to certain Arab rulers in the Arabian peninsula in

\* See No. 52

E 8557 5148 89

No. 60

*Comte de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 26.)*

L'E. consul general d'Angleterre a Bernouth a demandé au Haut-Commissaire du Gouvernement français en Syrie de reconnaître les Egyptiens comme protégés britanniques dans les conditions de l'article 107 du Traité de Sévres et d'admettre l'assistance du drogman anglais aux procès intéressant les Egyptiens.

Le Gouvernement français se propose d'inviter le General Gouraud à accéder à cette demande, à condition que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté accorde une promesse de réciprocité pour le traitement des Syriens établis en Egypte. Il va sans dire, toutefois, que cette situation cesserait le jour où, par suite de l'attribution des mandats, les Capitulations pourraient être suspendues.

L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de demander à son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est disposé à donner son assentiment à cette proposition.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 25 juillet 1921*

an endeavour to check inter-tribal warfare and to prevent aggression among neighbouring Arab territories for the administration of which they are responsible. In

but before actually granting him a subsidy His Majesty's Government desire to secure King Hussein's assent to the issue of some form of public declaration whereby he would recognise the mandatory principle and, in particular, the mandatory status of Great Britain in Palestine and Mesopotamia and of France in Syria, and his signature to an agreement with His Majesty's Government. This agreement is primarily designed to facilitate a peaceful settlement of frontier and other disputes affecting the Hedjaz and to safeguard so far as possible the interests of British subjects and, in particular, Indian Moslems resident in the Hedjaz, and to obtain some improvement in the King's

independent status of the Kingdom of the Hedjaz and its provisions will not give His Majesty's Government any privileged political or economic position.

4. In making a communication in the above sense to the French Government, you should add that His Majesty's Government feel sure that the French Government will welcome the successful conclusion of such negotiations, the main effect of which will be to facilitate their common task in these Arab areas.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 8432 4 91

No. 60

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

1 AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the letter of the 22nd July regarding the proposal to obtain King Hussein's recognition of the suzerainty of the Khair over the Holy Places.

an assurance from the Allies of non-interference in Khalifate matters which is required to check the alienation of Indian Moslem sentiment, but an actual interference, however veiled and indirect, in such matters, taking the form of instructions to His Majesty's officials to prompt King Hussein publicly to declare his recognition of the Khair's suzerainty. The Government of India, Moslem opinion, and the

Government's sincerity. The Government of India, Moslem opinion, and the assurance regarding the Khair's suzerainty. The Government of India, Moslem opinion, and the

that the Indian Moslems who are prepared to welcome both the declaration and the assurance, in spite of their inconsistency, are moved primarily not by religious but by political motives.

3. With the policy underlying the Allied assurance, Lord Curzon is in entire accord, it would appear to be the only possible policy for a Government to which rules—and in world wide relations with other Governments who rule—

Moslems of different race, holding differing views as to the Khalifate, but united in resenting to a hypersensitive degree any appearance of interference by a Christian Government in their spiritual affairs.

4. After a careful consideration of the arguments advanced in your letter, Lord Curzon does not, therefore, feel justified in sanctioning a departure from this well-established policy in an endeavour to placate the political grievances which, it is admitted, arise mainly from quite other sources, of one section, however important, of British Moslem opinion, and he regrets that he is not prepared to send the desired instructions to Colonel Lawrence.

5. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 60. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, July 10, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 21st June to the 10th July, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Suda.

I have &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Jeddah Report, June 21–July 7, 1921

SECRET

Ottoman Bank.

I OUTLINED in my report of the 20th June the King's order for the deportation of M. Emile Hanna, the manager of the local branch of the Ottoman Bank. In spite of all my protests, by telegram and by letter, and demand for delay, the only concession the King would make was to postpone the departure of M. Hanna until the 2nd July. As the King would not allow time for another visit to Jeddah to take over from M. Hanna and avowed, in his correspondence, all reference to a new manager—except that he did not recognise an Ottoman bank—I instructed M. Hanna to leave here on the 2nd July. He locked up the important documents in the bank safes and handed over to me the keys along with some money and other valuables. The bank is left in charge of three native caretakers.

I have not been able to find out the reason for the King's action. During his visit here he gave orders that Ahmed Mullah Nyas, the landlord of the Ottoman Bank, should, along with his son Aziz, be deported, and they left for Massawa by the first available boat. The reason given, as in M. Hanna's case, was for talking politically against the King, but again I can find no proof that this is so. The man's reputation is good, and he is said to have lived quietly, attended to his business, and taken no interest in politics. In his position as landlord, he occasionally visited the Ottoman Bank and took coffee with M. Hanna.

The French consulate joined me in an official protest to the King on the closing of the Ottoman Bank, but the King replied that, according to international rights, the Hashimite Government had a right to close the bank, as they had never consented to its being opened.

As I explained in my telegram No. 172 of the 26th June, the King's action in deporting M. Hanna has had a bad effect on foreign subjects in Jeddah, who realise that they have no security and no protection under the autocratic rule of King Hussein.

Gold Smuggling out of the Hedjaz.

On the 26th June the King gave orders that all the Salama family, well known pilots in Jeddah and pilots for the Blue Funnel and other shipping companies, should be deported. I was told that the King was angry with the Blue Funnel boat "Tydeus" was expected on the 27th June, the agent of that line asked me if I could arrange for one of the brothers to remain until the "Tydeus" had gone. I accordingly asked the King to allow the brother to remain until the "Tydeus" had gone. The King replied that he was very much grieved that the British agent should take care of people who were working against the Government and its interests. I replied that I had no wish to interfere when a Hashimite subject broke the laws of the country, but that all I asked was that, in the interests of British shipping, the trial of one member of the family might be delayed until the "Tydeus" had come to Jeddah. The King left two of the brothers in Jeddah, but found the family guilty and is said to have imposed a fine of 10,000l. As many notables in Jeddah are involved in this gold smuggling, it is

expected that eventually the King will pardon the Salama family, and I understand that a petition from the Jeddah merchants will be submitted to the King.

The Salama family are excellent pilots, much superior to the average Jeddah inhabitant, and very pro-British in their sympathies.

Political.

On the 26th June the King sent me the following telegram: "As four months have expired since you have been informed of the substance of Mr. Lloyd George's wire, and two months have expired since my letter of the 24th Shaban, 1339, and so far without result, it is to be expected that a man may be personally vexed, especially when he is without personal ambition. Therefore, as I did not ask for anything that is beyond the power of Great Britain, or even cause her trouble, will you please inform me of your opinion?" The letter referred to was given in full in my report of the 10th May, but I am not clear whether the King wishes a reply about Syria, or about the Sudan and the Idriani, but he probably refers to both.

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mecca is constantly referring, in his correspondence, to the Hashimite Government. In one letter he refers to the occupation of "Shallalat" (Waterfalls)—by which I presume he means the Yarmuk valley—which should be the property of this Government. In another he refers to the equipment, locomotives, etc., which are to be sent to the Hedjaz. These remarks are in letters in reply to correspondence on telegraph bills and other local business.

Pilgrimage.

There are now approximately 44,000 pilgrims in the Hedjaz. So far none have arrived from Egypt. We are expecting about 10,000 from Egypt and the M. J. and in due to arrive about the 2nd August. The hire for the camels for the Mahmal escort has been raised to 9l. gold per camel for the round trip. The rate in 1918 was 4l. per camel, in 1919 5l. per camel, and in 1920 7l. per camel. The reason given for the increase is the high price of forage—owing to the poor rains during the past four years—and the scarcity of camels.

The contractor appointed by the Government asked first for 12l., then reduced it to 10l., and finally to 9l., but refused to take less.

There was a great mortality among pilgrims in the big caravan which left Mecca for Medina on the 1st July. The pilgrims suffered from heat exhaustion during the first three days. Emir Zeid confirmed this news in our conversation yesterday.

General.

1. Emir Zeid, with the Queen of the Hedjaz, arrived in Jeddah in the morning of the 1st July for a change of air. I called on the Emir on the day of his arrival. King Hussein is expected to arrive in Jeddah about the 10th July.

2. Sheikh Mohamed-el-Sagoff, a Sheikh Qasbi of Mecca and brother of the King's private secretary, has left for Aden with Sheikh Ahmed Mukhtar and four servants. He said at first he was travelling on private business to Lahaj, but later said he was going on Government service. Our agents say he is on a visit to the Idriani.

3. On the 27th June King Hussein sent me a wire to say that Emir Ali had informed him that the Wahhabis attacked El Hankieh, 100 miles north-east of Medina, but that they had been repulsed by the garrison and had left forty-eight dead on the field of battle. This does not agree with our intelligence report, which said that Hankieh was in the hands of the Wahhabis.

4. All the foreign consulates in Jeddah have been informed that from the 1st Zu el-Qa'da (7th July) they will be charged for the telephone and for letters and telegrams to Mecca. Up to the present all telephones have been free and official telegrams and letters have been sent to Mecca free of charge.

5. It is said that King Hussein is trying to get the signature of many important Indian pilgrims to a declaration that the sanitary arrangements made by the Hashimite Government are adequate, that there are sufficient hospitals, and that no more hospitals for pilgrims are required. In the meantime the local dispensary at Jeddah is being improved. The King is also trying to get the signature of many important Indian pilgrims to a declaration that the sanitary arrangements made by the Hashimite Government are adequate, that there are sufficient hospitals, and that no more hospitals for pilgrims are required. In the meantime the local dispensary at Jeddah is being improved.

Press ("El Qibla").

No. 493 contains an account of Feisal's departure, and gives the text of a Royal Decree from King Hussein to the people of Mesopotamia.

No. 494 contains an article written in vituperative language, addressed to General Gouraud of the French Mandate in Mesopotamia, and Damascus.

There is also a telegram from Feisal announcing his arrival at Basra, and copies of letters received by King Hussein from the Naqib of Basra and from Emir Ali, head of the reception committee.

No. 496 contains a very long and vague leading article dealing with the Eastern question and criticising the policy of both Great Britain and of France.

It also contains a denial of a statement published in an Egyptian paper that the roads to Mecca and Medina are unsafe.

In No. 497 the leading article deals with the question of peace in the East, and advises the Allies to hasten a settlement, and to stop the at present quarrel between East and West.

It also contains the announcement of Feisal's arrival in Bagdad, Feisal having wired to King Hussein that he had been enthusiastically received.

No. 498 again refers to the attack on General Gouraud, and quotes a passage from "El Ahram," No. 13469. A passage is also published from a correspondent in Syria, saying that the people of Damascus were awaiting the return of Feisal, but disappointed have turned to his brother Abdullah.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

Shipping Intelligence to July 10, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st June and the 10th July 1921.

Ship	Company	From	To	Arrived	Departed
Al-Bahar	British India	Aden	Jeddah	21st June	22nd June
Al-Bahar	British India	Jeddah	Aden	23rd June	24th June
Al-Bahar	British India	Aden	Jeddah	25th June	26th June
Al-Bahar	British India	Jeddah	Aden	27th June	28th June
Al-Bahar	British India	Aden	Jeddah	29th June	30th June
Al-Bahar	British India	Jeddah	Aden	1st July	2nd July
Al-Bahar	British India	Aden	Jeddah	3rd July	4th July
Al-Bahar	British India	Jeddah	Aden	5th July	6th July
Al-Bahar	British India	Aden	Jeddah	7th July	8th July
Al-Bahar	British India	Jeddah	Aden	9th July	10th July

E 8868 4/91]

No. 62

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston—(Received August 3.)

(No. 11.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 2, 1921.

MILITARY position of King Hussein: Jeddah 40 men, Mecca 50 men, Taif 500 men, 30 automatics, some German Maxims, 60 mounted infantry. Troops are regularly paid and are well equipped. 3000 to 3500 men trained by Turks, remainder Meccans of little military value. They would fight Wahabins, since they would not anyhow receive quarter. Fort in Taif is strong, but only rationed for two days. There are no artillerymen. Civil and tribal population offer no resistance to the Wahabins and would not in any conditions, as they live in terror of them and dislike

King Hussein's methods and meanness. Hedjaz outpost lies 28 miles east-south-east of Taif, thence to Taraba, in Khalid's hands. Country a plain of hard gravel. It is certain that any expedition of 1,000 armed Wahabins could take Taif and Mecca, but Khalid does not dispose so many and distrusts Ibn Saud. He has no intention to suggest measure which would be violently refused.

I will report position in North Hedjaz later when I have discussed it with Ali.

E 8941 4/91]

No. 63

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 4.)

Sr.

India Office, August 4, 1921.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, regarding his suggestion that the King of the Hedjaz should be moved to recognise publicly the spiritual suzerainty of the caliph over the holy places in the Hedjaz.

Mr. Montagu greatly regrets that the Secretary of State fails to appreciate the

subjects which is demanded in India. Yet their attitude is very simple and consistent, and the defect in logic which the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston seeks to bring home to them does not exist. They maintain—whether correctly or not is beside the point—that the loss of the holy places in the Hedjaz to the Ottoman Empire is a interference with the caliphate, which they regard as vested in the Sultan of Turkey, and, inasmuch as they consider that Great Britain is largely responsible for this loss, they ask that His Majesty's Government will make it plain that so far as they are concerned it need not involve an interference with the spiritual attributes of the caliphate. The Prime Minister when he received the Indian deputation recognised the justice of this point of view, and undertook to endeavour to secure that the Treaty of Sevres should be amended so as to meet it. Meanwhile, the negotiations with the King of the Hedjaz afford a two-fold opportunity, which Mr. Montagu is most reluctant to lose, of demonstrating the desire of His Majesty's Government to disassociate themselves

interference with the caliphate, viz., either by the inclusion in the treaty of a clause to that effect, as was suggested in Mr. Wakely's letter of the 17th June to the Secretary of State, or by a declaration—manifestly obtained by His Majesty's Government—

Mr. Montagu still prefers the former as being at once more direct and more

Mr. Montagu trusts that he has made it clear that it is not necessary to attribute any political arrière-pensées to the Indian Moslems in order to explain their attitude. He is asking for no modification in the policy of His Majesty's Government, but he feels that he is entitled to expect that Lord Curzon will assist the Government of India in making that policy palatable to a community whose discontent may have consequences extending beyond India.

I have, &c.  
F. W. DUKK.

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No. 64

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston—(Received August 9.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 7, 1921.

FOLLOWING is broad outline of the present situation:

King accepts articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19 with unimportant modifications, which will be sent to you if you wish me to continue.

King asks for elimination of article 1 and article 3, since they offer benefits coveted by him.

King refuses article 11, and offers instead that consular officers should be permitted on the bench in Arab court when mixed cases are heard.

I gave him loan of 80,000 rupees in advance of subsidy at the end of to-day's interview on my own responsibility. He was in urgent need of it and proportionately grateful, and will be in as great need next time we meet and as ready to be grateful. Now he has gone to Mecca, leaving Zaid and Ali. "Clematis," probat a letter to me south, due here 12th August, so you should instruct me by then. I might get little more out of him, but I prefer to keep some dregs of influence for Versailles Treaty ratification. I regret premature payment, but I had no alternative, it has been a very bad week for both of us.

45

*Sedgely, August 10, 1921*

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

No. 65

*Sedgah, August 11, 1921*

owing to attitude towards herself of French Syrian press, which makes it neither tactful nor dignified of him to give them such a bouquet, but after the treaty signature . . . . . on with King Hussein will prod . . . . .

No. 67

(No. 721)

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1921.*

FOLLOWING for Colonel Lawrence

I am prepared to accept in principle King's proposal for article 14, but powers of consular officer require definition. Following wording would do :—

"In all cases where a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty is a party to a case before the Courts of His Majesty King Hussein, a British consular representative shall take part in the proceedings as one of the judges. In cases where the British subject is the defendant in a civil matter or accused in a criminal matter, the decision must be concurred in by the British consular representative in order to be effective.

"and the decision is not concerned in by the British consular representative the decision shall not be carried out pending discussion between His Majesty and the British representative in the Hedjaz."

I should like to keep the existing provision about cases involving personal status, but do not attach great importance to it. In any case I am prepared to keep last sentence of existing article 14 if King desires it.

If Hussein agrees to publish substance of declaration, I would agree to drop present article 15 and accept in substitution something like the following article:—

"His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the special position of His Britannic Majesty with regard to Mesopotamia and Palestine in accordance with the  
countries and come within his influence he will do all he can to assist His Britannic Majesty"

I would keep or drop second paragraph of existing article 15 as Hussein prefers. Following article should be added to treaty. —

This treaty shall come into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for seven years after such date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other, six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years, of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have given such notice."

In explaining your mission to the French we have told them officially that the treaty gives us no economic preference. You should therefore thank Hussein and say that we do not wish to ask for such special favours.

In practice, preference can doubtless be relied on.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 2313.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a communication received from M. Briand respecting Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence's visit to the King of the Hedjaz.

Paris, August 13, 1921

Enclosure in No. 68.

M. Briand to Lord Hardinge

Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Paris, le 13 août 1921.

M l'Ambassadeur,

VOUS avez bien voulu, d'ordre du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, me faire connaître le 4 août que le Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence s'est rendu au Hedjaz pour y négocier un traité avec le Roi du Hedjaz. Le Gouvernement britannique envisage l'attribution aux principaux chefs arabes de la presqu'île arabique de subside à mettre fin à la guerre entre les tribus et à rétablir la paix dans les territoires soumis à l'administration britannique.

Pour que le Roi Hussein, dont la collaboration à cette politique est indispensable, puisse y participer, le Gouvernement britannique estime nécessaire qu'il se lie par une déclaration publique reconnaissant le principe des mandats confiés à la Grande-Bretagne et à la France, en Mésopotamie, en Palestine et en Syrie. En même temps, le Gouvernement britannique devrait conclure un traité mettant fin aux disputes de frontières, sauvegardant les intérêts des sujets britanniques.

Je m'empresse de vous faire connaître que je prends volontiers acte de ces déclarations. Le Gouvernement français envisage en effet avec faveur l'idée que le Gouvernement britannique pourra conclure avec le Roi Hussein un tel accord qui, sans créer aucune situation privilégiée, serait de nature à diminuer les conflits des frontières et surtout à faire reconnaître par le Roi Hussein un régime plus régulier et moins contraire aux intérêts étrangers.

Le Gouvernement français attache une importance particulière à ce que le Roi Hussein renonce à sa théorie insoutenable d'après laquelle tout musulman débarquant au Hedjaz devient *ipso facto* son ressortissant. Il y aurait un très grand avantage à ce que le statut des étrangers fût celui du régime capitulaire. S'il est un pays qui n'est pas mûr pour l'abolition des Capitulations, c'est en effet avant tout le Hedjaz, qui, en tant que partie de la Turquie, y est soumis. On signale de nombreux cas de sujets étrangers molestés, même à Djeddah, contre tout droit. Le Roi devrait enfin, se lier par des règles fixes en matière douanière ou économique, régime d'arbitraire sans limite qui, d'après les informations du Gouvernement français, ne serait pas loin de le rendre odieux à son peuple.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. BRIAND

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No. 69

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)

(No. L. 14.)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, August 15, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 79 of 13th August: Hedjaz Treaty.

Alternative to article 15. I do not understand "special position in accordance with the provisions of the Capitulations."

We may interpret it agreed with covenant but cannot base [sic] it so. I suggest

either missing out reference to League or substitution of phrase "adviser and assistant" from covenant without mentioning source, or insertion after Palestine "which will be exercised."

Your telegram has crossed with one of mine about declaration which I do not think Hussein will accept in present conditions. French have made it very difficult for him to mention them publicly. I should prefer to get our own treaty signed safely by the Sultan.

Please inform Colonial Office I am due Aden 18th August

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No. 70

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17)

Sir,

Downing Street, August 17, 1921

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Churchill to transmit to you herewith for the consideration of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a despatch which has been received from the Resident, Aden, submitting the draft of an agreement with the Sultan of the Hedjaz.

Mr. Churchill proposes to approve the terms thereof.

2. Mr Churchill assumes that payment for the war materials referred to in the second paragraph of article 5 of the draft agreement will be made either by the Abdali Sultan himself or from the funds at the disposal of the India Office.

A similar letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

(For the Under-Secretary of State)

H. YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

Major-General Scott to Mr Churchill

Sir,

Aden Residency, July 18, 1921

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with the High Commissioner, Egypt's letter dated the 16th June, 1920 (copy attached), in which he asked me to arrange for the insertion of articles 2 and 3 of the agreement of 1881 in the new Subeiti Agreement with the Abdali Sultan of Lahj.

His Highness the Sultan was extremely averse from the insertion of the two articles as they stand, but, subject to the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the new agreement as a whole, he has accepted them in the modified form shown in the agreement which I have attached to this letter.

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the new agreement are identical with the corresponding articles of the draft agreement forwarded by the High Commissioner, Egypt, to the Foreign Office under his No. 128, dated the 26th March, 1919.

The first paragraph of article 4 of the new agreement is identical with article 2 of the agreement of 1881.

The second paragraph containing a protection clause has been added at the wish of His Highness the Sultan, who laid great stress on its insertion.

By the treaty of 1832, made between Commander Hamon and the Abdali, the British Government and the Abdali are bound to make a common cause in the event of an attack upon the territory of either, but no protection treaty has been made since that date, although an allusion to British protection has been made in section 7 of the agreement with the Abdali Sultan for the purchase of Sheikh Otman, printed on page 93 of Aitchison's Treaties, vol. xiii. The recent aggressive policy of the Imam has, however, made the Abdali, along with other sheikhs and Sultans in the Aden Protectorate, extremely nervous, and he desires this ratification of our old promise of protection.

Article 5 is the article 3 of the 1881 agreement modified to meet the wishes of the Sultan, who undertakes not to erect forts on the seashore without the permission of the Resident, but objects to the proposed right of veto in connection with other buildings, as the exercise of this right might, in his opinion, interfere with legitimate trade development in his territory.

The words "other than natural-born slaves of the Abdali and his subjects" have been added after "slaves" in order to permit the Abdalis to be accompanied by their

household slaves born in Adalali territory in the event of their leaving an Adalali port for trade or other purposes.

I consider these modifications to be reasonable, and recommend their acceptance.

The second paragraph of article 5 contains stipulations regarding the supply of arms and ammunition to the Adalali Sultan.

The British Government is interested in the complete suppression of the arms trade. It therefore throws certain responsible duties on the Sultan, so that it is reasonable that as a *quid pro quo* he should be supplied with arms and ammunition sufficient for the protection of his State and for the performance of the duties connected with the control of the marauding Subehis now allocated to him.

The Sultan considers that in the past his predecessors have suffered from delay in the delivery of arms and ammunition acknowledged to be necessary. In order to obviate such delay in the future, he desires the insertion of the final sentence of the article.

Under these terms it will be incumbent on His Majesty's Government to maintain a reserve of arms and ammunition in the Aden arsenal to meet any contingency that might occur. As this would not amount to anything excessive, I recommend its addition and acceptance of the whole article.

It should, I consider, be our policy to support, as far as we possibly can, the power of the Adalali Sultans of Lahej, who proved themselves during the war the only really loyal rulers in the Yemen. A strong loyal ruler in Lahej acts as a buffer for the British of Aden from land attack by possibly hostile Arab chieftains. I consider it therefore in the interests of the Adalali Sultan the backing he needs to consolidate his power. I therefore recommend it for acceptance.

I have, &c.  
A. L. E. SCOTT,  
Political Resident, Aden.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Major-General Scott (Aden).

Sir,  
WITH reference to your despatch of the 22nd April, I have the honour to inform you that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has decided that it is desirable to insert articles 2 and 3 of the 1881 agreement in the new Subehi treaty with the Sultan of Lahej.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the Secretary of State has approved the despatch of the 8th March, 1919, and should be glad if you will arrange for the insertion of the articles in question.

It has been decided to postpone the ratification of the treaty till the settlement of the future political status of Arabia.

I have, &c.  
ALLENBY, F. M.

Enclosure 3 in No. 70.

Subehi Agreement with the Sultan of Lahej.

BY virtue of the friendly relations existing between the British Government and the Sultans of Lahej, His Highness Sultan Sir Abdul Karim bin Fadi-ban Ali, K.C.I.E. hereby offers to maintain security on the trade route lying in the Subehi country, and to settle all transgressions perpetrated by the Subehis against merchants and others travelling on the trade route. So long as this offer remains operative, Major-General T. E. Scott, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., the Political Resident, engages on behalf of the British Government to accept the following proposals:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

All stipends granted by the Government to the Subehis shall be made over to the Sultan for disbursement. No Subehis will be admitted into Aden as guests except with the written recommendation of the Sultan, nor will they be given presents in Aden unless the Sultan so desires.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Should necessity arise for the dismissal of a Subehi sheikh and the appointment of another, the Sultan shall report the case to the Political Resident, and both the Political Resident and the Sultan shall, after consultation, act conjointly to deal effectively with the offenders.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Should any event of a serious nature take place on the coast of the Sultan's country, and on this account it be found necessary to punish any of the Subehis, the Sultan shall report the case to the Political Resident, and both the Political Resident and the Sultan shall, after consultation, act conjointly to deal effectively with the offenders.

#### ARTICLE 4.

No treaty or agreement of any kind is to be entered into with any other State for the sale, mortgage, lease or hire or gift of any portion of the territory now or hereafter subject to the authority of the Sultans of the Adalali without the consent of the British Government.

In return for the above, the Resident undertakes on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain to protect fully the territory now or hereafter subject to the authority of the Sultans of the Adalali.

#### ARTICLE 5.

No forts are to be erected by the Adalali Sultans on the sea coast without the permission of the Resident, Aden, but they can erect any other buildings they desire and open any part of their coast for commercial intercourse. No arms, ammunition, slaves other than natural-born slaves of the Adalali and his subjects, spirituous or other drugs are to be landed or embarked on any part of the coast now or hereafter subject to the Adalali jurisdiction without the sanction of the Resident previously obtained.

In return for the above, the Resident undertakes on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain to supply the Sultan of Lahej and his successors with reasonable quantities of war materials, ammunition, instruments and arms whenever he asks, for the purpose of instructing, training and arming his permanent army in connection with internal security. The Sultan will also be supplied with arms, ammunition and other war materials that may be required for defensive operations, also for offensive operations which are undertaken with the consent of the Resident for the safety of his or British interests or the maintenance of order on the routes. These supplies will be given by the Resident at Aden from the Aden arsenal without delay on a reference in such quantities as may be necessary and agreed upon by the Sultan and the Resident in consultation.

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No. 71

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,  
I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th August regarding the Khalifate and the holy places of the Hedjaz.

2. The letter from this Department of the 25th July dealt with the last suggestion made by your Department that Colonel Lawrence should be instructed to persuade the Sultan of the Hedjaz to accept the British proposal for the establishment of a British Protectorate over the Hedjaz and its holy cities from Turkey.

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that "so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, it (the loss of the holy places in the Hedjaz to the Ottoman Empire) need not involve our interference with the spiritual attributes of the Khalifa."

3. Lord Curzon does not wish to question Mr. Montagu's analysis of the Moslems' attitude. The analysis, however, surely amounts to this. A temporal development has, in their view, affected the spiritual position of the Khalifate. (Incidentally their suggestion of action by His Majesty's Government with regard to the spiritual aspect of this development seems meaningless if the Khalifate has no temporal power.) A statement of His Majesty's Government would be to say that the temporal development has not affected the spiritual position of the Khalifate. Lord Curzon is therefore surprised that the Indian Moslem attitude should be regarded by the India Office as "simple and consistent," that the question of its correctness should be discounted as "beside the point," and that the suggested explanation of some political *arrière-pensée* should be dismissed. He doubts, however, whether further dialectical discussion between Departments over the logic and accuracy of the Indian Moslem view or over the motives of the supporters of the Indian Khalifate agitation would be fruitful.

4. From your letter under reply the proposal to make, what must appear to all Moslems, a direct attack on the spiritual position of the Khalifate. Mr. Montagu's statement that "His Majesty's Government are not prepared to interfere with the Khalifate," but actually, according to your letter of the 17th June, to be worded as follows: "So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned there is nothing to prevent the religious suzerainty of the Khalif over the holy places in the Hedjaz."

5. Before dealing further with this suggestion, Lord Curzon would recall that he has already reluctantly consented to support the amendment of article 139 of the Turkish Treaty, in the sense desired by Mr. Montagu and accepted by the Prime Minister, in order to show that the treaty is not intended to interfere with the "spiritual" attributes of the Khalifate. Copies of extracts from the private letters exchanged between Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu on this point are enclosed for convenience of reference.\* Lord Curzon's reluctance to consent to this change was due not only to his firm belief that the attributes of the Khalifate cannot, like those of the Papacy, be divided into spiritual and temporal, but also to the fact that, holding this view, he was not prepared to accept the contention of the India Office that the correct course was to embody a wrong thesis in a treaty, provided only that their action planted the considerable body of opinion which persisted in maintaining and pursuing the thesis.

The proposed amendment of article 139, though based on a wrong view regarding the Khalifate, did not seem to Lord Curzon particularly harmful, because it was consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government not to interfere with the Khalifate and with the assurance to this effect given by Mr. Montagu to the Indian Moslem delegation in his letter of the 29th April last. As Mr. Montagu will also note from the enclosed extracts from private correspondence, Lord Curzon was even prepared to elaborate this assurance by adding that the spiritual relationship of King Hussein to the Khalif is a matter for them to settle between themselves. If the proposed amendment is to be put into a treaty provision, the treaty with the Khalif must be put in its appropriate place. Lord Curzon would, however, see no point in the insertion of such an assurance also in the treaty with King Hussein. He would consider that, even if it met the wishes of Indian Moslems, which seems doubtful, it would be regarded with such suspicion by King Hussein that it would probably wreck the chances of a successful issue of the negotiations as a whole. King Hussein would inevitably believe that such a clause, brought forward now by His Majesty's Government without his request, was designed to influence his relations with the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif.

7. The form of clause suggested in the India Office letter to the Colonial Office of the 17th June, and again in your letter under reply (see the end of paragraph 4 above) would be to the effect that "His Majesty's Government are not prepared to interfere with the Khalifate." The acceptance of this clause by King Hussein as part of a treaty could only imply

\* Not printed.

that, at His Majesty's Government's wish, he accepted the Khalif's religious suzerainty over the holy places. King Hussein could hardly accept a clause with this implication for the obvious reason that, in the absence (to say but the Indian Moslem mind) of any clear division between the religious and non-religious attributes of the Khalifate a recognition of the Sultan's religious suzerainty over Mecca and Medina could only open the path to a political interference by the Turks in the affairs of the Hedjaz to the prejudice of its independence.

8. For the rest, King Hussein is believed in some quarters himself to aspire to the Khalifate. It is not to be taken for granted that it is the policy of this Department, there would be much to be said for this step, if only because it would weaken the power of the Sultan of Turkey—or rather the Turkish Government—to misuse, as in the past, the prestige of the Khalifate in the Moslem world for political purposes. Lord Curzon is well aware, however, that the step would be disagreeable to Indian Moslems, who, for whatever motives, are anxious to maintain the power and prestige of the Sultan Khalif. In so delicate a situation the only policy for His Majesty's Government to pursue is clearly one of remaining scrupulously aloof, leaving it to the Moslems themselves, inside and outside India, to settle not only whom they will regard as Khalif, but whether the Khalifate carries with it any such particular powers as religious or spiritual suzerainty—and, if so, in what precise form—over the holy places of the Hedjaz.

9. In conclusion, and at the risk of repetition, Lord Curzon wishes to make it quite clear that while he is reluctantly prepared to meet the views of Indian Moslems to the extent of disclaiming any interference by His Majesty's Government in the so-called spiritual attributes of the Khalifate, he is not ready to go further in the direction of recognizing the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif, or to endow him with any special "spiritual" prerogatives in any part of the Moslem world.

10. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 9617,455 91]

No. 72

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 23.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, July 31, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th-31st July, 1921.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Sindh.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in N. 72

Jeddah Report, July 11-31, 1921.

(Secret.)

Pilgrimage.

THE number of pilgrims who have arrived by sea is 51,459. A considerable number are expected during the first week in August, and the total number will be approximately the same as last year.

So far the public security has been very good. The Jeddah-Mecca road is perfectly safe and the caravans from Medina have returned safely. There is no doubt King Hussein takes a great personal interest in the Medina caravans, and the steps taken to secure their safe passage. One of the first to be sent to Jeddah for the purpose of the Hajj the past season was a large group of pilgrims, and the King's envoy, failed to come to terms with the Hamada so the Medina caravans

have gone via Gir, where the "shukdufs" must be left behind, owing to the nature of the road, until the return journey.

No report has been received of any prevalent sickness among the pilgrims and the health conditions at present are satisfactory.

#### General

1. The Emir of Katana, accompanied by his suite and Mr. Webster, arrived at Jeddah on the Blue Funnel boat "Elpenor" on the morning of the 29th July. He was met on board by the Kaimakam of Jeddah, the commandant of the Sheressian forces in Jeddah and myself. On disembarkation at the quay he was met by the Emir Zeid, and a guard of honour was drawn up to receive him. A house in Jeddah was placed at his disposal, and the party left for Mecca in the afternoon.

Mr. Webster is remaining at the Emir's house. The Emir is to be a royal guest during his visit, and a house in Mecca has been prepared for him. The King will accompany him on his journey to Medina after he has seen Emir Ali.

Colonel T. E. Lawrence, H.M.S. "Albatross", accompanied by his son and an Arab (Abd al Malik Arab) and a British pilot (Brooke late Royal Air Force) arrived on the Italian boat "Massima" on the 29th July. They also were met on board by the kaimakam, the commandant of Jeddah and myself, and were received with a guard of honour on disembarkation.

3. King Hussein arrived from Mecca in the afternoon of the 2nd August. Accompanied by Colonel Lawrence and Mr. Webster I called on him in the evening.

4. Captain Brooke has come to Jeddah to see the King with regard to the formation of a Hedjaz flying unit. The idea is to have a contract with the King by which he will arrange all the personnel and running of aeroplanes at a fixed sum per annum. If the King accepts these conditions, he proposes to have an aerodrome at Jeddah and another at Taif. The cost is estimated at about 12,000l. yearly. The four aeroplanes ordered by the King and for which he paid 3,000l. each (there is an extra engine with each aeroplane) will arrive on the "Tantah" on the 6th August.

The Ottoman Bank in Alexandria have sent another manager in place of M. Emile Hanna. So far the Hashemite authorities have raised no objection.

6. Fuad el-Khatib, who held the position of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs during the war, has been appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I was very anxious for this appointment. Fuad el-Khatib was employed in the Intelligence Department of the Sudan Government, and King Hussein frequently wrote to him asking him to return to the Hedjaz. On my representation to the Sudan Government, Fuad was allowed to come to Mecca, nominally on two months' pilgrimage duty, to see the King. The King promptly accepted his appointment.

7. The only question is his future. He has had considerable service in the Sudan Government and has no security of tenure in his office here. He has offered to His Majesty to remain in the Hedjaz, but I prefer that he should return to the Sudan.

8. In the event of the King's favourable consideration of the question discussed with Colonel Lawrence, I shall probably telegraph to your Excellency hoping that you will endeavour to induce the Sudan Government to accept the seconding of Fuad el-Khatib.

9. Emir Ali left Medina on the 20th July and is travelling by the eastern route to Mecca. He has a considerable force with him, as 600 camels were sent for him from Mecca. He is expected in Mecca about the 3rd August and will proceed at once to Jeddah to join in the discussions between King Hussein and Colonel Lawrence.

#### Current Rumours

1. That Hail is surrounded by Ibn Saud's forces. That Ibn Rashid has asked for help from Nur Shaban and will give back Jof to him in return for his help. It is reported that one of Ibn Saud's sons has been killed in a battle.

2. King Hussein has asked Sherref Shaban of Medina to come on the pilgrimage as he wishes to see him. Sherref Shaban has refused to leave Medina.

3. The Medina military and civil expenses are estimated at 13,000l.

4. It is said that the French have been in communication with Ibn Rashid. Their chief agent is a man called Mohamed-el-Magrabi, son of Abdul Kadir Magrabi, a merchant of Medina. This man is also in touch with Ibn Sabah of Kuwait.

Mohamed-el-Magrabi has had an extraordinary career. He is quite young and was sent to Jerusalem at the beginning of the war, where he was studying at Saleh-ud-Din College. After the fall of Jerusalem he went to Damascus, and from Syrian merchants there he received 400l. worth of goods and went to Ibn Rashid, where he declared himself a friend of the Sherref of Mecca. After the fall of Mecca he was sent by Ibn Rashid to Emir Albulaba, who received him well and gave him money and presents for Ibn Rashid. He was also received by King Hussein in Mecca as an agent of Ibn Rashid, and it is said that King Hussein paid him 2,000l. He spent the money received from the King and Emir Abdulla, among the Arabs at Hail and then went to Damascus, where he met the French authorities and was well received by them. He then went to Ibn Sabah of Kuwait, where he was again well received and given 500 bags of coffee, 500 bags of rice and 500 bags of sugar. From Kuwait he went to Damascus via Bursa and Bagdad. He came to the Hedjaz about five months ago, but the King had heard that he was on a special mission on behalf of the French and he was coldly received both here and at Yenbo. After his arrival in Medina he again disappeared, and is now supposed to be with the French in Cairo or in Damascus.

#### "Al Qibla".

No. 499 contains, for the information of the pilgrims and to protect them against extortion, a revised list of charges for camel hire. These are as follows:—

For "shukduf" from Jeddah to Mecca	2
For "shukduf" from Mecca to Medina	15
For "shukduf" from Medina to Mecca	10
For "shukduf" from Mecca to Jeddah	10

These charges are calculated at the rate of 20 piastres to the mejdiah, 140 piastres to the rupia, and 10 piastres to the rupee.

For "shukduf" from Mecca to Medina and back is 25 mejdiahs: 10 mejdiahs to be paid before leaving Mecca, 10 mejdiahs on arrival at Medina and 5 mejdiahs on return to Mecca. "Shukduf" hire is to be charged for the whole journey and is to be assessed between the two cities.

No. 500 contains a list of the names of the pilgrims who have been interviewed with King Hussein at Medina. The list is as follows:—

No. 501 contains a list of the names of the pilgrims who have been interviewed with King Hussein at Medina. The list is as follows:—

No. 502 contains a list of the names of the pilgrims who have been interviewed with King Hussein at Medina. The list is as follows:—

An "official proclamation" denying the rumour that "Al Qibla" is the official mouthpiece of the Government.

An "official proclamation" warning pilgrims against proceeding to Taif on foot, unless they are accompanied by a guide and have made proper provision for water en route, owing to their ignorance of the road and the extreme heat. Any pilgrim failing to comply with this order will be turned back by the police.

No. 503 contains a notification of the award of the Third Class of the Order of El Nahda to Commander F. R. Campbell, R.L.M.S. "Northbrook".

No. 504 publishes the following telegram from Moussa Kazim, President of the Palestine Delegation to King Hussein, to which His Majesty replied, saying that it was the duty of every Arab to devote all his powers to the Arab cause:—

"The Palestine sub-delegate is sailing for London to discuss various questions relating to Palestine, to combat the idea of a national home for the Jews and to ask for constitutional Government.

"The delegation asks for your Majesty's help."

No. 505 notifies the departure for Jeddah of King Hussein in connection with important affairs.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and the 31st July, 1921

[illegible]

D.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 19th July and left on the 22nd July

| E 9396 9398 91 |

No. 73

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1921.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th August enclosing the draft of an agreement with the Sultan of Lahor.

2. Although Lahdj, being in the Arabian peninsula, is in one of the "prohibited" areas under article 6 of the Arms Traffic Convention, it is also within the Aden protectorate, and His Majesty's Government have held that it is within their right to ship arms for Government use to any part of the British Empire. The convention would not, therefore, appear to be infringed by the controlled supply of arms to the Abulali Sultan for the purpose of keeping order within his territ

3. The arrangements for such supply indicated in the final article of the draft agreement appear, moreover, to be in accordance with articles 7 and 9 of the Arms Traffic Convention. If, however, as Lord Curzon assumes, it is the intention to communicate the final agreement to the League of Nations and publish it, it might be advisable to insert a paragraph in the agreement to the effect that the Sultan will regard himself as bound by any general agreement with regard to the trade in, and possession of, arms to which His Majesty's Government may be or become a party.

1. Lord Curzon would venture to draw attention to the provision regarding domestic slaves in article 5 of the draft. This provision may be a perfectly proper one from the point of view of local practice, but it might be misinterpreted by the League and by some sections of public opinion in this country, if and when the agreement is communicated to the League and published. The point is not one, however, in which this Department is directly concerned and it has doubtless not escaped Mr. Churchill's

5. Subject to these observations Lord Curzon concurs in the draft agreement.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office

I have, &c

D. G. OSBORNE,

No. 74

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Cornwallis of Kedleston.*—(Received August 2.)

No. 23761

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 22nd August, respecting the attack on Djebel Druze by Assad-el-Attrache.

Paris, August 23, 1921

Enclosure in No. 74

*Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

1) Le seraf Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la République en Syrie, vient de faire connaître au Département des Affaires étrangères qu'un agent de l'émir Abdallah s'est rendu le 12 août accompagné de dix-sept cavaliers à l'Etat du Djebel Druse, sur la frontière de Transjordanie, et a traversé la ville avec un drapeau émirien, déclarant qu'il venait prendre possession du pays au nom du Chérif Abdallah et arborer son drapeau.

Assad-el-Attrache est d'ailleurs toujours au Dybhel Bruso, d'où le Gouvernement français va le faire expulser.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, prie l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique de bien vouloir appeler toute l'attention du Gouvernement anglais sur cette violation des droits du mandat français de Syrie de la part de l'Émir Abdallah, installé par l'autorité britannique elle-même en Transjordanie malgré les serres formels du Gouvernement français, lequel est parfaitement renseigné sur les intentions de ce protégé britannique et n'a cause de craindre des incidents de ce genre. L'Émir Abdallah est d'ailleurs compromis dans la tentative d'assassinat du Général Gouraud, perpétrée par des gens à son service ou de son entourage.

Le Gouvernement britannique ne saurait décliner une certaine responsabilité dans les actes de l'Emir Abdullah et le Gouvernement de la République compte qu'il trouvera les moyens d'y mettre fin.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,  
le 22 août 1921

E 9308 4 91]

No. 75.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

523

• plus, plus

Foreign Office, August 23, 1921

FOLLOWING for Colonel Lawrence on return from Aden:—

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. L. 14 of 15th August. Hedjaz Treaty.

You may omit reference in article 15 to 'Covenant of League of Nations.' If Hussein refuses to recognise French position in Syria by issue of declaration or substance of it, you should press, as you suggest in your telegram No. L. 12, for ratification of Treaty of Versailles, which can be put forward by us—at any rate to the French—as a recognition in principle of French mandatory position in Syria, even though Hussein may dispute contention. I agree that you should obtain signature of treaty, even if declaration and ratification prove impossible."



Emir Ali arrived from Mecca in the morning of the 9th, and Colonel Lawrence and I had two long conversations with him—in the morning at his house and in the evening at the agency. He gave us a full description of the conditions in the Hedjaz and of the progress of the war between Ibn Saud and Ibn al-Faisal. This was the first time that I had seen him since the 11th of the 10th August.

A direct route from Medina to Mecca. At Sefima he pursued and captured a party of Arabs, who were said to be carrying Wahabi banners, but whom he considered a simple raiding party. Emir Ali returned to Mecca on the 10th August. Emir Zaid, accompanied by Foad-el-Khatib, left in the morning of the 12th.

Her Majesty the Queen and her daughters remained in Jeddah during the pilgrimage.

Colonel Lawrence left on H.M.S. "Cleopatra" for Aden on the 15th. He sailed direct to Aden, but will call at Hodeida, Kamaran and Jazan on the return, and will arrive in Jeddah at the end of August. The King will then come with to Jeddah, and discussions will be resumed.

#### Local Affairs.

The General of Quarantine, who is also in charge of the condenser, has accepted delivery of best Natal coal from Gollatly, Hankey and Co. On its arrival, he reported that it was not up to standard, was full of dust, and that it was very small, but contained very little coal dust. I have written to the Director of Quarantine asking him if he will accept this survey or whether I shall report the matter to the agency. I asked two chief engineers from the pilgrim ships to survey the coal. They reported that it was up to the standard of best Natal coal, that it was very small, but contained very little coal dust. I have written to the Director of Quarantine asking him if he will accept this survey or whether I shall report the matter to the agency.

The quarantine authorities have decided to medically examine all pilgrims on embarkation, and to give them a certificate of health at 5 piastres per head. I have written to the shipping companies asking them not to issue any tickets to pilgrims unless they are in possession of these health certificates. I have protested this, and have been in telephonic communication with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject. I pointed out that there would be considerable delay in the pilgrim steamers, that, as the pilgrimage was clean, I could see no necessity for it, and that, according to the convention, medical examination of returning pilgrims was only carried out at the request of the consular authority concerned.

As I suspected, it is simply for the sake of revenue that this has been instituted, and I understand now that the mutawwifs will receive the health certificates and send the money to the quarantine authorities, and that only those pilgrims who have no mutawwif will be examined. I am still hopeful that my representations will have the desired effect.

#### Press ("Al Qibla")

There is nothing of importance in Nos. 506 and 507.

In No. 508 "one of the readers" replies to an article written by Sheikh Rashid Rida, editor of a review in Egypt, criticising the actions of King Hussein and his sons. It also announces the gift of 4,000 rupees by Saleh Bey Akhel Wahid of educational purposes.

A special proclamation informing pilgrims that claims in respect of some 940 packages at present lying at the customs will not be entertained after the pilgrimage.

There is also an article on the pilgrimage giving an account of the scenes at Mecca and Ararat, and another describing the arrival of the Mahmal.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul



Acceptance of Hussein's proposal regarding protection of Hasl not possible owing to inevitable difficulties, e.g., in Syria. In any to include such a provision in a treaty, and applications to protect Hashimite subjects in specific countries such as United States of America, where there might be no objection, can later perhaps be favourably considered. You can doubtless find formula for refusal in these lines which will not offend Hussein.

I do not think we can insert in treaty formal renunciation of capitulatory rights. As British consular agent cannot act as judge, it is very doubtful how proposed judicial system under treaty will work, and in any case knowledge of such renunciation must prejudice security of trade and prevent economic development of any part of Hedjaz by European capital and skill. It would not, therefore, be in true interests of Hedjaz. You should endeavour to dissuade Hussein on these lines.

It must also be borne in mind that French Government in any case are determined to insist on continuance of Capitulations, and we can hardly put our nationals in principle in a worse position than theirs.

Is draft of article 15 suggested in my telegram No. 79 of 13th August accepted? Presumably declaration in any form cannot be obtained.

E 10226 4 91

No. 82

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 11)*

(No. L 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 11, 1921.

YOL R telegram No. 1 of 9th September.

King has returned to Mecca for three days.

"Arab-Hashimite Government" was Hussein's suggestion; it seems to me a convenient style, since his present area is in places less, and in places more, than Turkish Hedjaz, and in view of fluid character of his State, a family, rather than a geographical, title may save us [group undecipherable]ment. It does not conflict with or deny, use of "Hedjaz" in Versailles Treaty, and cannot involve, assist or hinder any claim to be ruler of anything inside or outside Hedjaz limits. King's full title is "Hussein, Founder of Hashimite State and King Warden of Precincts of City of God and of his Forefathers' Arch-Messenger."

Possibilities you suggest by changes in article 7 are not immediate, since

King's unbounded greed prompts him to try to wrangle universal dominion, but Ali may be relied on to check him henceforward.

They expect us to refuse to protect Hashimites abroad.

New article 15, as it is modified in your telegram No. 80, accepted. Declaration refused, since King hopes to obtain French favours comparable with our own in exchange for complaisant attitude; and our credit here is not good enough to carry their account.

Unnumbered articles to-morrow.

E 10227 4 91

No. 83

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 78)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 11, 1921.

YOL R telegram No. 1 to Colonel Lawrence.

I agree with Lawrence that all necessary rights can be obtained in treaty without introducing Capitulations. I would suggest the following six points:

1. Consular agent may attend Jeddah Court when British subject is plaintiff or defendant.

2. That a sentence be not promulgated pending issue of negotiations between Hussein and British agent.

That consular bail be admitted.

1. That cases between British subjects be tried by Consular Court.

5. That no British subject be deported except through British agent.

That every British pilgrim be in possession of counterfoil passport of type now issued to Indian pilgrims.

These deposited here make them registered British subjects for the purpose of these privileges.

We have reason to believe that Hussein will accept these points under pressure.

E 10274 4 91

No. 84

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12)*

(No. L 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 11, 1921.

## CAPITULATIONS.

Present position is that since 1916 Great Britain has not pressed. King Hussein has not admitted any claim based on Capitulations. Other Powers are in same position, and Arabs do not intend to modify their attitude. Meanwhile, trial of foreign subjects proceeding in Hashimite court without any consular agent present, and if any changes of procedure are now made in our favour it will be by virtue of treaty. It would be refused on account of Capitulations.

Consequently I do not consider that "inferiority in principle" will be set up by our renunciation of Capitulations after embodiment in treaty of all privileges contained in them which appear to His Majesty's Government practicable and useful. Nor do I think that determination of French Government to maintain Capitulations will be efficacious; they will only attempt it for lack of a corresponding treaty, and if they insist too much King Hussein will ask them to leave the country. He feels immune in Mecca from reprisals and would like to be a martyr. We can only incline him to our point of view by exploitation of his remaining good nature, by stoppage of subsidies, by blockade of Jeddah, or by losing Ibn Saud on him.

I recommend that you should inform me what other points in Capitulations are worthy of insertion in treaty, and that we buy King Hussein's consent to treaty by renunciation of the rest to avoid future conflict in respect of authority of Capitulations Treaty.

Marshall telegraphing separately.

E 10358 4 91

No. 85

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 14)*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 13, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN paid, for his ten aeroplanes, cash from Hedjaz revenue, which we refused export licence for four British. One has been assembled and twice failed to reach Taif.

The pilot is leaving the country, and King Hussein is sick at having paid 2,500l. to operate our machines.

Landing ground prepared at Mecca and Taif, where I fear tribal conditions fully justify Ali's determination to show his aeroplanes. In accordance with your telegram I will ask him not to, but his refusal will be probably prudent; I think he can be persuaded not to allow flight beyond Taif. Ibn Saud might be informed that they have no machine guns or bombs. I am also getting Ali put off Khorma, since he has sent me documentary evidence that Tarahanyabisha belonged to Turkish Hedjaz, and he will wait for Ibn Saud's reply. Present situation is intolerable, and must be regulated somehow.

[E 10247 7250 99]

No. 86

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*

(No. 2448.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 15, 1921

WITH reference to your telegram No. 638 of the 23rd August and your despatch No. 1378 of the 23rd August, I have to request that your Excellency will reply to the note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the raid of Assad-el-Attrash on Zuweida on the following lines:—

2. His Majesty's Government at once called for a report from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine on the allegations contained in the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd August, as regards the complicity of the Emir Abdullah in the raid on Zuweida and in harbouring the persons responsible for the attack on General Gouraud. Sir H. Samuel has now telegraphed that the Emir Abdullah disclaims all responsibility for the attack on Zuweida which was effected by the surrender of Al Attrash to the French. He stated that any charge of direct complicity of the Emir in the attack on General Gouraud is unfounded, but the question of the whereabouts of those responsible and persons who may be seized in Transjordan is reported by Sir H. Samuel to be now under direct discussion between himself, the Emir Abdullah and certain French officers sent expressly for this purpose to Jerusalem by General Gouraud.

In their note under reply, the French Government assert that His Majesty's Government have a certain responsibility for Abdullah's activities. His Majesty's Government have no wish to disclaim such responsibility, but it is only fair to state in what manner His Majesty's Government interpret it should be understood. As the French Government are aware, His Majesty's Government have felt bound by the support of Arab Nationalist aspirations and by such declarations of policy as the proclamation issued by Lord Curzon in November, 1918, to do their utmost in Mesopotamia and in the north of the Jordan falling within their mandate zone to establish a form of administration acceptable to the people. Having deliberately fostered the growth of Nationalist sentiments through the Sherrefian channel as a weapon against the Turks, His Majesty's Government could not but have been disappointed when the war was over. In the matter of the encouragement thus given to the Sherrefian movement His Majesty's Government were not in exactly the same position as the French Government, since, with the concurrence of the French Government, it was His Majesty's officers who conducted the actual negotiations with King Hussein. His Majesty's Government do not wish to reopen a subject which has in the past caused considerable friction between the two Governments, but it must be frankly admitted that the French Government, on grounds the justice of which His Majesty's Government do not dispute, have regarded themselves, in their relations with the Arab Nationalists and Sherrefian leaders, as under no such obligations as His Majesty's Government. A divergence of view has been reflected in a divergence of policy, and this divergence of policy is directly or indirectly the reason why the zone of Transjordan, for which His Majesty's Government are responsible, has become the refuge of a large number of Arab Nationalist sentiment.

1. When the Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Palestine in March with a view to determine in consultation with the local British authorities the lines of future policy in Transjordan, the authority of the Emir Abdullah was already accepted over a large part of that area, and the nationalism of the inhabitants had been stimulated by the presence of the exiles from Syria. It would not have been possible for His Majesty's Government with the resources at their disposal to drive the Emir or these exiles from the country, and such action would in any case have been entirely at variance with His Majesty's Government's professed policy.

In the circumstances the temporary arrangement reached with the Emir by Mr. Churchill, one of the essential features of which was the Emir's promise to check French activities, presented the only policy which His Majesty's Government could adopt. The guiding lines of this policy as well as its risks were frankly pointed out by Mr. Churchill to M. de Caix personally at the time, and also in writing later to General Gouraud. A copy of Mr. Churchill's letter to the general is enclosed for the information of the French Government.

6. Mr. Churchill received neither a reply to nor an acknowledgment of this letter, but assuming that it had safely reached General Gouraud, he had hoped that a solution of the difficult problems caused by the presence of the Syrian exiles in Transjordan might be promoted from the French side by the amnesty discussed in the note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

yet been declared by the French Government.

7. While account must be taken of the natural sympathies of the Emir Abdullah and the limitations on his authority imposed by the scantiness of his resources, His Majesty's Government have hitherto received no concrete evidence that the Emir has not used his personal influence to prevent and discourage anti-French activities in accordance with the assurance given to Mr. Churchill. In itself the fact that the chief of an important Druze family should have raised the Sherrefian flag in his native town of Zuweida and asserted that he was about to seize Jebel Druze on behalf of the Emir does not necessarily constitute a breach of faith on behalf of the Emir. It is a further proof His Majesty's Government are unable to reject the Emir's assurance that he did not plan or encourage the raid. Further, it is clear that if instead of doing his utmost to restrain anti-French action the Emir had thrown in his lot with the wilder elements and the Syrian exiles, a situation far more unsatisfactory than the existing one would have arisen.

8. At the same time the French Government may rest assured that in spite of the difficulties which the divergent policies of the two Governments may create, His Majesty's Government are determined to do all that they can to give effect to the assurances already given by Mr. Churchill to M. de Caix and General Gouraud to prevent any form of anti-French activity being directed or encouraged from the zone of Transjordan.

as to the adoption of fresh measures with this purpose.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Mr. Churchill to General Gouraud

My dear General,

En route to Alexandria, March 31, 1921

I AM extremely disappointed not to have seen you during my visit to Palestine. Had it been possible for me to have postponed my departure for England I would gladly have done so, but the pressure of my work at home when Parliament is sitting is considerable, and I have already been away for nearly five weeks.

I had, however, a valuable and pleasant interview with M. de Caix, to whom, at the suggestion of the French Government, I had been sent to discuss the possibility of leading to a Sherrefian solution, but of course we shall be guided by the wishes of the people both in Iraq and elsewhere.

As regards Transjordan, I am most anxious to give you effective security from raids and annoyance of all kinds. I have made an arrangement with Abdullah of a

British amnesty it would have the advantage of appearing to be an act taken in common by our two nations, and would give the impression to the Arab world that we were working hand in hand. I cannot long delay the amnesty in Mesopotamia, but if

there was any chance of its synchronising with similar action upon your Excellency's part I would delay it until the eve of Ramadan. If you think this suggestion helpful perhaps you will communicate with Sir Herbert Samuel, who will at once inform me.

I have written with Abdallah that Ali Khouli, of whom you spoke to me, shall remain in his present position and sent to a district remote from the French zone; and I have given the strictest instruction to everyone serving under the Colonial Office to do everything in their power to further and facilitate French interests and the security of French territory. I am sure I can count upon similar aid from you. It is a great advantage that a French soldier, who is so greatly honoured throughout the British service, should at the present juncture be in charge of French interests in the Middle East.

With sincere regards, &c.  
WINSTON CHURCHILL

E 10400 4 91]

No. 57

India Office to Foreign Office. (Received September 16.)

Sir,

India Office, September 15, 1921.

IN reply to your letter dated the 14th September, relative to the Hedjaz negotiations, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that, subject to the one suggestion below, he concurs in the terms of the draft telegram to Colonel Lawrence enclosed therein.

Mr. Montagu has had his attention drawn to the limiting clause with which articles 12 and 14 conclude. It appears to him that, as it stands, this clause, strictly interpreted, would have the effect of debarring from the operation of the question all British subjects habitually resident in any part of the world outside the Hedjaz, &c., and that, to convey the meaning which he presumes to be intended, it would be necessary to insert between "habitually resident" and "outside Jeddah" the words "in the Hedjaz" or "in the territory of His Majesty King Hussein." He would be instructed to this effect, to avoid any possibility of dispute hereafter as to the meaning of this clause.

A copy of this letter has been communicated to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.  
L. D. WAKELY

E 10432 4 91]

No. 88

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 16.)

(No. L 21)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 16, 1921.

WHEN he ratified Treaty of Versailles King Hussein professed without our knowledge, phrase "provided that the independence [group undecipherable] Arabs is respected." Will this affect validity of the act?

I have not had reply to my telegrams Nos. 18 and 19.

E 10247/7255 89]

No. 89

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).

(No. 4)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1921.

COLONIAL Office ask us to inform you that Sir H. Samuel telegraphed on 2nd September that Abramson persuaded Abdullah, after long discussion, to try to arrest men who are wanted by French according to a list of those unculpated in murder of Gouraud handed to Sir H. Samuel on 25th September. Abdullah said that he was being asked to sacrifice everything, and was losing all chance of achieving his hope of retiring from Transjordan, personal connection with which he wishes to end. Sir H. Samuel pronounced that decision must await Young's and your arrival.

E 10247 7255 89]

No. 90

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 16, 1921.

MY telegram No. 4 of 16th September.

Colonial Office are therefore anxious that you should be free to visit Transjordan as soon as possible and consult with Sir H. Samuel as to future policy there.

My telegram No. 5 of 16th September, which was expedited, please inform Sir H. Samuel that it has been received. If possible, please inform Sir H. Samuel that it has been received. If possible, please inform Sir H. Samuel that it has been received.

E 10400 4 91]

No. 91

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 16, 1921.

My telegrams Nos. L 16, 18 and 19 of 10th and 11th September: Negotiations with King Hussein.

Proposed substitution of "His Hashimite Majesty" or "Arab-Hashimite Government" or "Hedjaz" is approved. I should prefer former. Words "in the territory of" will in consequence require to be inserted in several articles.

Proposed changes in articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 are accepted.

Insertion in article 8 is accepted, but I would prefer word "zeal" instead of "zeal," unless Hussein sets particular store on propaganda purposes.

Articles 12 to 14. If you can incorporate in treaty six safeguards specified in Jeddah telegram No. 78, I will accept a provision in treaty renouncing Capitulations otherwise than as provided for in treaty. In concluding clause of articles 12 and 14, words "in the territory of His Hashimite Majesty" should be inserted between "habitually resident" and "outside Jeddah."

E 10509 10509 91]

No. 92

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).

(No. 2.)

Foreign Office, September 17, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN has telegraphed to the King asking that Prince of Wales may visit Jeddah either privately or officially on his way to India. On the supposition that negotiations for treaty do not take turn for the worse, and that Prince's time-table permits, presumably the Prince would have to land, or could King Hussein visit him on board off Jeddah?

(Confidential)

Please telegraph your views.

E 10358 4 91]

No. 93

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 17, 1921.

Friendly representations have been made to Italian Government, in order that we may be consulted in future before armaments are licensed for export to the Hedjaz.

[7360]

R

I am also considering whether condition should not be attached to any future payment of King's subsidy, either that our subsidy is not spent on armaments without consulting us, or, since King's yearly revenue is so large, that King buys no armaments without prior consultation with us.

Is King's desire to have our subsidy and treaty such that he will conclude latter if either condition is attached to payment of subsidy?

Colonial Office are being asked to have Ibn Saud informed as suggested.

[E 10510/10509/91]

No. 94.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 18, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 17th September to Lawrence: Visit of Prince of Wales to Jedah.

Ali would meet the Prince on board and bring him ashore to visit King Hussein. King would return visit on board. Six day [group undecypherable] hours probably sufficient.

Treaty almost certain to be signed Tuesday morning.

Visit probably would have good effect.

Lawrence concurs.

[E 10432/4/91]

No. 95.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 19, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. L 21 of 16th September: Ratification of Treaty of Versailles.

Technically King Hussein's addition destroys validity of ratification, which is merely a formal endorsement of a signed treaty, and a signatory Power has no right whatever to introduce a condition into ratification which he did not indicate at the time of signature. While for political reasons and in view of King's ignorance of international law and formalities we might ignore his insertion, French Government, in whose interests we were largely anxious to obtain Hussein's ratification as recognising their position in Syria, will almost certainly reject its validity if modified by his reservation. If it is not too late you should do your best to make Hussein withdraw it.

[E 10524/4/91]

No. 96.

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 20.)

(No. L 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 19, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 17th September.

Perhaps it is not understood by you what rubbish Italian aeroplanes here are (warp control, low ceiling, short range) and how disgusted King Hussein will be with this very expensive purchase. Admirable lesson for him. If, however, we wish him to consult us before arming himself, we must in return promise and give him our best advice and help. He will then willingly accept conditions. What drove him to Italy was barren Foreign Office attitude towards his requests for aeroplanes and armoured cars. If you give him reasons he will rely on our advice not merely in buying, but in using, them later. In fact, Ali has approached me in this sense. Italian influence about King Hussein is active.

King Hussein's deficit this year, expenditure beyond income, is 70,000*l*. He is introducing new taxation to meet larger deficit expected next year.

[E 10556/10556/89]

No. 97.

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 20.)

(No. L 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 20, 1921.

FRENCH consul told Ali this afternoon French Government wish him to go incognito to Paris to discuss terms on which he would accept the Kingdom of Syria. Ali asked for details.

[E 10524/4/91]

No. 98.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1921.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the payment of a subsidy to King Hussein, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram from Colonel Lawrence regarding the proposal to attach a condition to the next payment of King Hussein's subsidy that the latter should consult His Majesty's Government before purchasing arms or ammunition.\*

2. Colonel Lawrence seems to be under some misapprehension regarding the alleged omission of the Foreign Office to inform King Hussein of their reasons for not facilitating the import of aeroplanes and armoured cars into the Hedjaz. As long ago as the 13th January last Lord Curzon, in a conversation with the then Emir Feisal, a copy of the report of which is enclosed herein,† explained fully the objections to the supply of these armaments. As Emir Feisal was then putting forward his request on behalf of King Hussein, it was presumed that he would report the result fully to his father.

3. It is not clear from the enclosed telegram whether or not Colonel Lawrence recommends attaching any condition to the next payment of the subsidy, but since, in Lord Curzon's view, it is probable that King Hussein will only be guided by His Majesty's Government's advice so long as this advice harmonises with his own opinion of his interests, and since it will always be open to His Majesty's Government to withhold altogether or postpone the payment of instalments of the subsidy, it is probably unwise, if not useless, to jeopardise the signature of the agreement by attaching formal conditions regarding armaments to the payment of the subsidy at this stage. Subject to Mr. Churchill's concurrence, Lord Curzon therefore proposes to instruct Colonel Lawrence that, if and when the next instalment of the subsidy is paid, he should make it quite clear to the King that His Majesty's Government expect to be consulted regarding the employment of this money for the purchase of arms and ammunition outside the Hedjaz.

I am, &amp;c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 10623/4/91]

No. 99.

Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 23.)

(No. L 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 22, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN had approved each clause in treaty and announced publicly his forthcoming signature of it. When Ali presented him with text for ratification [groups omitted] shouted and struck at him, and then sent us eight contradictory sets of prior conditions and stipulations, all unacceptable. Ali says that the old man is mad and is preparing with Zeid to obtain his formal abdication.

Ali and Zeid have behaved splendidly, and they may change things in the next week. I have left Marshall text of treaty, and if King Hussein climbs down he will receive signature; but meanwhile, or till I reach England and report, I suggest that no changes or new line of policy be taken by you.

I have asked King Hussein to return 80,000 rupees paid him in advance of subsidy on his promise to sign.

\* See No. 95.

† See Part VI, No. 154.

[E 10714/9382/89]

No. 100.

*Mr. Dormer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

*Rome, September 17, 1921.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 90 of the 27th August last respecting the audience which Mr. Ronald Storrs had had with the Pope, I have the honour to report that Mr. Storrs and I yesterday paid a visit to the Cardinal Secretary of State at his home at the small village of Ussita, in the Marche.

His Eminence was to have returned to Rome early this month, but owing to the recent death of his nephew his return was postponed continually, until finally I was informed that he would only be back in Rome to-night. As Mr. Storrs had to leave yesterday evening to catch his boat at Brindisi, we arranged at short notice to go up to Ussita. The cardinal received us at 8 A.M. yesterday morning, and expressed his regret that Mr. Storrs should have had to come so far in order to see him, and that our visit had to be so short. Turning to affairs in Palestine, his Eminence discussed the the French protectorate. He said that the line the French took was hard to understand. They had informed the Holy See in writing that they had renounced the protectorate, but not the liturgical honours which under the Capitulations had been rendered to the French consul. The honours were only an accessory of the protectorate, and had no meaning once the protectorate no longer existed. M. Doucet, the late French Chargé d'Affaires, had declared that the San Remo Agreement had no binding character, that the British text which his Eminence had shown him was incorrect and incomplete, and, in reply to the cardinal's request to be shown the correct one, he had merely repeated that the French Government still insisted on having the honours continued. In the circumstances the line the Vatican took was that the matter was one for settlement between the British and French Governments, and that their only proper course was to maintain the *status quo* so long as the Treaty of Peace was not ratified and the Capitulations remained in force.

His Eminence then discussed the Jewish question. He said that His Majesty's Government were fortunate in that the Jews in England were of a well-to-do and orderly class, and contrasted them with the bulk of the Jews in Roumania, Poland and Hungary. In Hungary he said they numbered 5 per cent. of the population and yet were in control. The allusion, of course, was clear, and his Eminence showed that it was not the immigration of Jews in considerable numbers into Palestine that caused misgivings so much as the possibility that they might one day control the administration. On questions of minor importance his Eminence did not touch, but he listened with interest to Mr. Storrs' explanation of various points which had been the subject of complaint either on the part of the Patriarch or in the press. He made no allusion to the Holy Places. Finally, his Eminence expressed himself as confident that Mr. Storrs would help to dissipate any causes of misunderstanding, and would show himself friendly to the interests of the Church.

Mr. Storrs also met, while here, Mgr. Biasiotti, who unofficially represents Mgr. Burlasina in Rome. It is evident that some of the difficulties caused by the Patriarch's personality are well realised, and I understand that he has been recommended to adopt a more friendly tone and attitude towards the British authorities. Mgr. Biasiotti also intimated that we might before long expect to see an English ecclesiastic attached to the Patriarchate as a liaison officer with members of the administration.

Mgr. Biasiotti was present at the station last night to bid farewell to Mr. Storrs, and informed him that the Pope had desired to be remembered to him on his departure.

Mr. Storrs' visit, I think, has been most useful, and he has done much to reassure the Holy See of the goodwill and intentions of His Majesty's Government and of the Palestine administration to ensure justice to all.

I have, &amp;c.

CECIL DORMER.

[E 10829/455/91]

No. 101.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 75. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, September 10, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah Report for the period 21st August to 10th September, 1921.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL,

*British Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

*Jeddah Report, August 21 to September 10, 1921.*

(Secret.)

*Pilgrimage.*

THE pilgrimage has been a most successful one, and the majority of the pilgrims reporting here on their return were highly delighted with the arrangements. They said that the public security was excellent, that there was very little sickness, and that all the ceremonials connected with the "Haj" were very impressive. The pilgrims began to arrive in Jeddah about the 20th August, and the first pilgrim boat left for south on the 24th August. Thereafter there was a steady departure of pilgrims, and already over 27,000 have left the country.

King Hussein took a great personal interest this year in the pilgrims, and as a result of his example they were everywhere respected. There is no example in the past history of the Hedjaz of such universal courtesy to pilgrims. The King daily received pilgrims of all classes, heard their complaints, talked to them politely, and in many cases aided with them against the mutarrifa and local people. The more important ones were invited to an interview and to take food at the King's table. He was frequently seen surrounded by crowds of pilgrims exhorting the camelmen to carry the guests of God comfortably and safely.

Unfortunately, this year the local authorities have made great difficulties about the embarkation of pilgrims, and in consequence the majority of steamers have been delayed. This has been particularly marked in the case of the Holt steamers. Last year the pilgrims were well on their way to the boat before she had anchored. This year the pilgrims are not allowed to leave their houses until the boat has anchored, and not allowed to leave the quay until the bill of health has been inspected. Further, the local quarantine authorities have refused to visit the Holt steamers, which have always remained in the outer harbour, and have insisted on the medical officer coming ashore with his papers. As a proof that this is mere officiousness on the part of Dr. Ihsabet, the local quarantine doctor, he has since visited an Italian steamer in the same anchorage. I have represented all these things to the Hashimite Government, but so far without any satisfaction.

The booking of Indian pilgrims for the Indian steamers has not been satisfactory, and I regret to say that there seems no doubt that Abdullah Zeinal Aly Reza, the kaimakam, has abused his official position for the sake of business. The Bombay-Persia Steam Navigation Company and the Arab Steamers (Turner, Morrison and Co.) have two agents—Haji Zeinal Aly Reza for the former and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. for the latter—while the opposition line of steamers, the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, have as agent Abdullah bin-Kassawani. In order to fight this company the Bombay-Persia Line gave a single-fare passage for 45 rupees, and they took 300 single-ticket holders on the "Akbar," 400 on the "Nairung," 700 on the "Shuja" and 200 on the "Nurani," for all of which boats Haji Zeinal Aly Reza is agent. The result is that some 235 return-ticket holders, who were here before the "Nurani" sailed, have been left behind, while the "Sultanah," of the Persian Gulf Line, left with about 500 pilgrims instead of 1,500.

The "Koweit," of which Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. are the agents, has been here since the 1st August, and the "Nurani" arrived here full of cargo on the 24th August. The latter was discharged with the greatest possible speed, and at once

booked up. I sent for the representative of Haji Zeinal Aly Reza and explained that the "Koweit," which carried 400 pilgrims more than the "Nurani," could take all the "Nurani" pilgrims plus the 300 booked for the "Koweit," and that, as both boats belonged to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., this should be done. I wired to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., but the "Nurani" left, and the 300 pilgrims for the "Koweit" had to remain in Jeddah. They have been appealing to me daily. I again wired to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., asking that the "Koweit" might sail, but they replied instructing Haji Zeinal Aly Reza, who is not agent for that boat, to feed the return-ticket holders, and that the boat should wait until the return of the Medina pilgrims. I have now wired to the Government of India, as the Medina pilgrims will probably not return until early in October, and many of the pilgrims now here are clamouring to return to India for business reasons.

Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. have given all possible assistance, and have frequently wired to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. explaining the situation.

The Kaimakam of Jeddah, Abdullah Aly Reza, is the head of the firm of Haji Zeinal Aly Reza. He, as kaimakam, controls the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah. When the Indian pilgrims arrive here, the vast majority are sent by the mutarrifs' brokers to his office to book passages. Many of the pilgrims can neither read nor write, and are given receipts for steamers other than they expected. I have definite evidence that more than 100 pilgrims who wanted tickets for the "Jeddah," for which boat Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. are the agents, were given tickets for a different boat. He was booking pilgrims for the "Nurani" before that boat had left Port Soudan, while I recall that last year, in his official capacity as kaimakam, he forbade Mr. Khaidwani to book pilgrims for the "Zayani" before that boat arrived in Jeddah harbour. His control over the lightermen is also considerable.

There is no doubt that the jealousy between shipping companies and between different agents of the same company is not in the interests of pilgrims, and, unless the companies concerned can come to some understanding, I would suggest some control from this office or a special official sent by the Government of India to control the embarkation of Indian pilgrims, as is done by the Egyptian Government.

I have received an interesting report on the medical arrangements at Mecca during the pilgrimage. The hospitals are very short of medicines—in one there is no sulphate of soda and no sulphate of magnesium—and the key for the medical store-room is in the charge of Dr. Thabit, the quarantine doctor at Jeddah. My informant reports that the sanitary service of Mecca is very bad, and is neglected to a degree difficult to believe.

On the 7th September I received a telegram from the Public Health Department, Cairo, that an Egyptian pilgrim on the steamship "Kench" had died from gastro-enteritis, and that, from cases of diarrhoea from the same boat, vibrios, giving high agglutination with cholera serum, had been isolated. Up to the present there has not been any suspicious case in either Mecca or Jeddah, and I have not received any report of any cases from boats proceeding to the East. Perhaps, as last year, they have found a certain number of cholera carriers.

#### Italian Steamers.

For some months three small Italian steamers of the trawler class, the "G. 38," "Serpentaria" and "Charpoli," have been trading in the Red Sea and calling frequently at Jeddah. These steamers belong to a man named Channele, of Massowa. Each boat carries 1,500-2,000 bags or 150-200 deck passengers. Except for a small number of pilgrims, no passengers travel by these boats. The freight charged is, from Massowa to Aden, 10 piastres a bag, and, from Jeddah to Yembo, Rabegh and other ports, 7½ piastres. The amount they can make is not sufficient for the heavy expenses that they have to bear, and they must have been running at a loss since the commencement of the venture. I can find no evidence that they are trading in forbidden materials. Their agent here is a local Hadramite merchant called Ali Umara. I have heard that the boats are going to be withdrawn.

The steamship "Nilo" is another Italian boat which trades in the Red Sea. She belongs to M. Uglo Rossi, an Italian, of Massowa. She takes 5,000 bags and 324 deck passengers. She has not called at Jeddah during the last six months.

Two new Italian steamers of a larger class recently arrived from Italy. These are the "Vincenzo" and the "Paulo." The former takes 250 deck passengers and 2,000 bags, and the latter 450 deck passengers and 4,500 bags. These were formerly coastguard steamers of the Italian Government, and were sold to an Italian Company, Amedeo, Garibaldi and Co. There are said to be two or three steamers of the same

class on the way. The local agent is Haji Zeinal Aly Reza. These boats brought no cargo from Italy, but six aeroplanes (*vide infra*). I have reported all particulars about these steamers to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea.

#### Italian Aeroplanes.

As I reported in my telegram No. 76 of the 6th September, four Coudron biplanes and two Maurice Farman aeroplanes have arrived from Italy. They were consigned to Massowa, but were landed here, and one Coudron biplane has flown three times since its arrival, but only over and around Jeddah. One Italian pilot and one Italian mechanic pilot are in charge of these machines. I do not know if the King has bought any of these aeroplanes, but it is reported that one is going to Taif, and this is in keeping with what I reported in my telegram—that King Hussein is going to reoccupy Khurma after his return to Mecca, using the troops brought by Emir Ali from Medina. The tribes round Khurma are now in the King's favour, and he should have no difficulty in occupying Khurma, but whether he will be able to remain there is doubtful.

Colonel Lawrence has been advising Emir Ali against this expedition until after the signing of our treaty and the question of Hedjaz boundaries has been raised between us and Ibn Saud. I do not think, however, that his advice will be taken.

Eight other aeroplanes—Spads—are on their way. They also are consigned to Massowa.

I have since heard that King Hussein has bought the six aeroplanes at the price of 450l. per aeroplane. One of the Coudron's started for Taif, but had to return. The reason given was that they lost their way—an Arab officer was acting as guide—but I understand the engine was not running properly, and that this was the true reason of the return. The King is said to be very angry.

#### Political and General.

1. Under cover of my despatch No. 73 of the 31st August I transmitted to your Lordship two letters received by King Hussein from Mohammed-bin-Rashid and Ibrahim-el-Salin-al-Subhan, his Prime Minister. They give interesting news of the present position in Hail. Mohammed-bin-Tellal is now ruler there, but whether as Regent for Mishal or not it is difficult to say. He mentions Mishal in his letter to the King. Abdullah-el-Netaab, a cousin of Mishal, has taken refuge with Ibn Saud.

2. The Hashimite Government report that Sheikh Nasir, of the Auzal tribe, and three other men sent by Ibn Saud have arrived at Khairbar for the purpose of intriguing against the Hashimite Government.

3. There was a good deal of anti-British talk during this year's pilgrimage. Some Egyptians were talking of raising a jihad in Egypt and driving the British into the sea. Mohammed the Bunu, a West African from the Soudan, is also talking in the same strain with regard to a jihad in Nigeria.

4. On the occasion of Emir Feisal's accession 101 guns were fired at Jeddah and a series of speeches were delivered at the Government buildings. These speeches were all in the same strain—independence of the Arabs and realisation of their aspirations. In the evening Emir Zeid held a reception at the barracks. Haddad Pasha delivered the only speech. He pointed out the part Great Britain had played, and told the Arabs frankly that they had much to learn, and that they could only do this by association with European Powers. This speech, somewhat to his surprise, has been published in full in "Al Qibla" (No. 512).

5. Colonel Lawrence returned on H.M.S. "Clematis" on the 29th August. King Hussein and Emir Ali arrived on the 2nd September, and negotiations were resumed on the 3rd September. These are still going on, but are proceeding satisfactorily, and the King has signified his intention to go to Mecca on the 10th and to return to Jeddah after three or four days.

#### Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 510 contains an article on the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah. It praises the arrangements made by the Hashimite Government, but says they were spoilt by the fact that the shipping agents had failed to supply the necessary steamers in time. "Al Qibla" expresses sympathy with the poor pilgrims.

This, of course, is not true. The steamers have been considerably delayed owing to the lack of pilgrims and through difficulties created by the local Government. Last year the majority of the Holt steamers arrived in the morning and left the same

afternoon. This year they are sometimes here for two or three days, and always for twenty-four hours.

No. 511 contains an account of the ceremonies at Mecca in honour of the Emir Feisal's accession. King Hussein's speech is given in full.

An Egyptian named Abdul Rahim Tarah, a teacher in a secondary school in Egypt, who has been appointed Egyptian correspondent to "Al Qibla," recited poems on this occasion. These poems were in praise of the King and his family, and expressed the hope that the aspirations of the Arabs in Palestine and Syria might be realised.

No. 512 contains Haddad Pasha's speech in full.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

#### Shipping Intelligence.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th August and the 10th September, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims embarked.	Cargo discharged.
Tantah	British	Port Sudan	Suez	Aug. 11	Aug. 13	..	Packages. 530
Asmara	Italian	Massawa	"	" 13	" 13	..	260
Vorgemere	British	Port Sudan	"	" 14	" 14	..	846
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 15	" 16	..	926
Sultana	"	Bombay	Bombay	" 16	" 31	492	7,927
Mansourah	"	Port Sudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	..	709
Toukai	"	Liverpool	Batavia	" 22	" 26	836	..
Konsum	"	"	Singapore	" 23	" 25	998	..
Vincenzo	Italian	"	Yambo	" 23	" 23	96	..
Nirani	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 24	" 31	751	16,321
Akbar	"	"	"	" 24	" 24	1,368	..
Zayami	"	"	"	" 24	" 24	322	..
Jeddah	"	"	"	" 25	" 25	1,183	..
Keneh	"	"	Tor	" 25	" 25	750	..
Dakalish	"	"	"	" 25	" 25	840	..
Nairung	"	"	Bombay	" 25	" 25	765	..
Tantah	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 25	" 26	699	1,354
Pasho	Italian	"	Hodeidah	" 27	" 27	448	..
Titan	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 25	" 27	1,220	..
Djember	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 26	" 29	1,335	..
Shoja	British	"	Bombay	" 27	" 27	1,415	..
Massawa	Italian	Massawa	Suez	" 27	" 27	..	331
Asmara	"	Suez	Massawa	" 27	" 27	..	204
Demodocus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 27	" 30	1,196	..
Homsyeh	"	"	Batavia	" 28	" 28	894	..
Hwah Jah	Chinese	"	Batavia	" 28	" 28	1,402	..
Warina	British	Rangoon	Aden	" 28	Sept. 6	..	54,262
Notley Abbey	"	Amsterdam	Zanzibar	" 29	Aug. 29	12	..
Agapond	"	Liverpool	Singapore	" 29	Sept. 3	1,360	..
Tantah	"	Port Sudan	Suez	" 31	" 1	79	1,294
Tantah	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 31	" 1	606	..
Vincenzo	Italian	Yambo	Sunkie and Hodeidah	" 1	" 1	267	..
Dakalish	British	Tor	Tor	Sept. 1	" 3	780	..
Keneh	"	"	"	" 1	" 3	514	..
Antenor	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 1	" 4	283	..
Antiochus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 4	" 5	999	..
Haitemorg	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 5	" 7	1,350	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Sudan	" 5	" 5	466	398
Massawa	"	"	Massawa	" 5	" 5	..	44
Celebes	Dutch	America	Batavia	" 6	" 8	1,438	..
Massawa	Italian	Massawa	Suez	" 10	" 10	..	155
Botti	Dutch	"	"	" 10	" 10	..	..

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 29th August and left on the 31st August, 1921.